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40th Anniversary of the Tet Offensive
Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit
sent by Steven Robinson - activ-l
International Viewpoint #396 - January, 2008
http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1401
40 years ago this month...
The Tet Offensive: decisive battle of the Vietnam war
by Phil Hearse
The January-February 1968 Tet offensive sealed American defeat in the
Vietnam War. Paradoxically the insurgent armies - the Peoples Army of
Vietnam (PAVN) and the National Liberation Front (NLF) - achieved few of
their main military or political objectives and suffered heavy
casualties. But the dramatic scale of the offensive and the images of
urban battles seen on TV screens around the world convinced world and
American public opinion that the war could not be won by the US. It
shattered the bravado and public optimism of the American government
and their military commanders in the field. Within five months of the
offensive American commander General William C. Westmorland had been
sacked, the bombing of North Vietnam had been suspended and US
president Lyndon Johnson had announced he would not stand again for a
second term of office.
NLF guerrilla fighters Build-up to the offensive: 1965-8
The decision that the US would make a stand in Vietnam and not permit a
Communist victory was taken not by Johnson, but as early as 1962 by
John F Kennedy. Shocked by events like the evolution of the Cuban
revolution, the development of of leftist nationalism in the Congo and
elsewhere and a series of guerrilla struggles in the ****tuguese
colonies [1], the American political and intelligence elites began to
worry that 'Moscow', 'Beijing' or 'the Communists' more generally were
evolving a strategy of armed national liberation struggles in the third
world.
The main danger of 'Communist aggression' ****fted from an entirely
mythical prospect of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe to the very
real danger of guerrilla uprisings in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
In his inaurgural address Kennedy said the US would "pay any price,
bear any burden, meet any hard****p, sup****t any friend, oppose any foe,
in order to assure the survival and success of liberty". What this
meant, and who exactly would be required to "pay any price" became very
clear in Vietnam.
By 1965 there were half a million American soldiers in Vietnam. It was
not until US forces had reached this figure that PAVN units were
detected in South Vietnam; before that the fighting was done mainly by
the part-time guerrillas of the NLF. American strategy revolved around
two tactics:
1) An attempt to punish North Vietnamese sup****t for the NLF by
destroying the infrastructure of North Vietnam in aerial bombing
(Operation 'Rolling Thunder').
2) 'Search and destroy' missions in the Vietnamese countryside,
puni****ng the Vietnamese peasants for their sup****t of the NLF by
destroying hundreds of villages, and trying to force the NLF and PAVN
into open battle. The key objective was to inflict maximum casualties
in a war of attrition.
Rolling Thunder in its three years of permanent bombing achieved its
objective of destroying most of North Vietnam's infrastructure. By the
time Johnson suspended the bombing of the North, US air planners were
having difficulties finding targets still standing to bomb.
Paradoxically, Rolling Thunder saw one of the most effective
anti-aircraft efforts in history. More than 1200 American planes were
shot down, including dozens of giant B52 bombers and hundreds of
fighter-bombers. Around one thousand US air crew were killed and
hundreds taken prisoner. It seems likely that China supplied some
anti-aircraft units in the early phase of the campaign, but the
decisive surface-to-air missiles were supplied by the Soviet Union.
Some US planes were shot down in dogfights with Vietnamese airforce
MiGs, but the accusation that some of these planes were flown by
Russian pilots is unproven.
Despite the success of the anti-aircraft effort - extraordinary by the
standards of the two anti-Iraq wars [2]- the scale of the bombing
campaign made it unstoppable. Tens of thousands of North Vietnamese
civilians died. Michael Maclear, a Canadian journalist who visited
North Vietnam during Rolling Thunder, estimates the number of civilian
dead at 180,000 [3]. He says, "The journey showed that five cities had
been levelled. These, traveling south, were the cities of Phu Ly, Ninh
Binh, Thanh Hoa, Vinh and Ha Tinh, each formerly with populations
between 10,000 and 30,000. The North's third largest city, Nam Dinh -
population 90,000 -was largely destroyed but at least recognizable.
Another 18 destroyed centers were classified as towns" [4]. But it did
not prevent or even seriously interrupt the supply of soldiers and
materials southwards via the Ho Chi Minh trail through Cambodia.
America's attrition strategy in the South smashed the social structure
of the Vietnamese countryside and killed up to a million people in the
countryside [5] - most of them civilians While not cru****ng the
insurgency, the war on the peasantry made it much more difficult. The
US outdid the colonial savagery exhibited by the British in Malaya and
the French in Algeria in its ruthless and systematic massacre of
peasant villagers. Many were herded into 'strategic hamlets' on the
Malayan model; but after this strategy failed, hundreds of thousands
fled the bombing and streamed into the relative safety of the major
cities which became bloated with refugees [6].
Supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail Between 1965 and 1967 dozens
of battles were fought by US soldiers and marines against the NLF and
PAVN. Despite escalating claims of military success in the daily 'body
count', the US commanders were unable to inflict any cru****ng defeats
on the Vietnamese. In this period the anti-war movement grew worldwide
- - and decisively in the United States - as news of the savagery of the
war filtered through and the toll of US dead grew.
Response of the Vietnamese Communist leader****p
It's now clear that a debate broke out inside the Communist Party (VCP)
in 1967 about how to confront this situation of stalemate, where the
prodigious use of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, together with
highly mobile helicopter trans****ted troops, was both depopulating the
countryside and making insurgent victories difficult.
Some writers have attempted to assign different hard-and-fast positions
to particular VCP leaders, claiming that Le Duan led the 'militants' who
eventually won a struggle in favour of a general uprising against those
who wanted a 'protracted peoples war' (drawn out guerrilla struggle)
plus negotiations, or alternatively conventional warfare plus
negotiations. Whatever the truth of the precise positions adopted by
different VCP leaders, such a debate is entirely normal and indeed
closely parallels debates in the Sandinista leader****p before 1979 and
the FMLN leader****p during the Salvadorean insurgency.
US military police battle to re-take the US embassy. By mid-1967 the
party leader****p had embarked on a line of "General Offensive, General
Uprising". This would involve countrywide attacks on the US military,
but also an invasion of the cities on a perspective of provoking an
urban uprising against the Americans and their South Vietnamese Allies.
Gabriel Kolko in his book Vietnam - Anatomy of War says that feelers
were put out to non-Communist Vietnamese exiles about the possibility
of forming a Provisional Government with the NLF in the event that the
offensive scored a major success (which presumably would involve the
capture of at least one provincial capital).
Gabriel Kolko argues that the Tet offensive was not launched on the
perspective that a general uprising was certain, but only that it was
possible. Rather, he argues, the VCP leader****p hoped for an uprising
but in any event felt the offensive would strike a decisive military
blow to the Americans and South Vietnamese army from which they would
never fully recover [7].
There's a Storm Coming
From September 1967 NLF and PAVN commanders began to be briefed on the
coming offensive. Articles in the Vietnamese press analysed the state
of the war and military perspectives; according to observers these
articles, read carefully, revealed the possibility of a general
offensive. Vast amounts of matiriel began to be moved southward and new
PAVN units set off down the Ho Chi Minh trail. American intelligence,
including do***ents captured in battle, revealed that a major offensive
was planned, but the US military was confused about the scope and the
timing. Nobody believed that the offensive, if there was one, would be
on the scale that eventually happened.
PAVN commander Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor of Dien Bien Phu [8], planned
a series of attacks in the border areas in October and November 1967 to
draw the US and South Vietnamese troops away from the cities. At the
same time the US base at Khe Sanh was besieged by the PAVN, and
remained invested until April 1968, resulting in hundreds of US dead.
American planners wondered whether these battles were the offensive;
they weren't, and when the real offensive came it was a complete shock.
The attack unrolled on January 30 as six provincial capitals and many US
bases came under attack. This first wave seems to have been an
extraordinary mistake because of the use of different calendars by
different PAVN and NLF battalions. Next night, 31 January, the real
blow was dealt as hundreds of targets were attacked through South
Vietnam. NLF fighters attacked key point in Saigon and invaded the US
embassy. US military police had to fight a six-hour battle to regain
control of the symbol of US power in the country. This caused a news
sensation worldwide.
Puni****ng the peasantry for sup****ting NLF Most of the attacks however
were thrown back, sometimes with heavy NLF and PAVN losses. However in
the Saigon Chinese suburb Cholon the NLF fighters could not be ****fted.
This battle was televised and reverberated worldwide. The NLF were
driven out only after a massive aerial bombardment which killed
hundreds of civilians.
PAVN troops held the northern provincial capital Hue for 26 days, a
battle that provoked the spectacularly inept comment b y a US commander
that "we had to destroy the city to save it". Indeed, with a huge toll
in civilian lives. After the city was retaken by US troops, the
Americans claimed that mass graves had been found in which the bodies
of hundreds of civilians executed by the PAVN were deposited.
Subsequent research has shown that after the city was retaken South
Vietnamese 'revenge squads' executed anyone suspected of collaborating
with the PAVN.
The attacks during Tet had been spectacular, but they had not given
rise to a popular uprising. Why not? The civilians who flooded into the
cities because of US bombing were in general outside the reach of NLF
propaganda and agitation. In any case, it is incredibly hard for an
urban population to 'rise up' against a well-armed and brutal enemy if
it has no prior form of organisation, has no weapons and no way of
physically defending itself, particularly if there is no sign of the
insurgents scoring a decisive victory. That it also the lesson the
attempted general uprising by the FMLN [9] in El Salvador in 1979; the
insurgents lacked the means to defend the civilian population that they
were asking to rise up.
More generally the offensive showed the difficulty of defeating huge
armies that are very mobile [10] and have superior weaponry in head-on
pitched battle. Knocking out the US and South Vietnamese armies was too
big a target for a single blow. In any case, the whole history of
national liberation guerrilla warfare from Algeria to Mozambique shows
the colonial powers were driven out by a long and difficult guerrilla
struggle (including a vital urban element in Algeria); they were worn
down, demoralised, politically defeated in the long run.
Political axes of the insurgency
The political objectives of the insurgency were set out clearly in
broadcasts by Hanoi Radio, Dai Giai Phong (Liberation Radio) and by
numerous proclamations handed out in leaflets to the population. These
announced the formation of a National, Democratic and Peace Alliance
Front, putting the emphasis on the national and democratic tasks of the
revolution. They also announced the formation of numerous united front
committees, appealing particularly to professional people, religious
groups, young people and others to join the uprising. Particular
emphasis was put on calls to rank and file South Vietnam Army troops to
desert. Also crucial were the announcement of Uprising Committees,
effectively the NLF, to direct the military struggle.
On 31 January Hanoi radio's domestic service quoted the Saigon Uprising
Committee thus: "The Uprising Committee calls on all the people and the
revolutionary forces in Saigon to resolutely stand up to and constantly
attack the enemy and win complete victory. The Uprising Committee calls
on the compatriots in the areas still under control of the Thieu-Ky-Loan
clique's tem****ary control to firmly and vigorously oppose terrorism, to
help the revolutionary forces track down the dishonest and cruel
lackeys, to form patriotic forces and patriotic neutralist forces, and
to contribute to liberating our beloved city. The Uprising Committee
also calls on the puppet troops of the general reserve forces and
ranger and police forces and the armoured and artillery forces not to
die uselessly for the country-selling and bloodthirsty Thieu-Ky-Loan
clique, to fire on it, and to swiftly join the revolutionary ranks in
scoring achievements for the fatherland." [11]
In Hue, as in many other places, the National, Democratic and Peace
Alliance Front made a specific appeal for the people to rise up: "The
National, Democratic and Peace Alliance Front urgently calls on all
groups and all forces of patriotic people, youths, women, college
students, and high school students in Hue city, to rise up to conduct
an armed uprising, to overthrow the traitorous Thieu-Ky clique, to
force the Americans to withdraw from the South, to wrest back the
administration to the people, and to achieve peace and independence for
the country. The fatherland and nation call on all people in Hue city
to rise up as one man".
Numerous similar broadcasts and leaflets were monitored by US
intelligence. They revealed at least the public objectives of the
offensive - to create a broad front of all forces opposed the South
Vietnamese regime and hostile to the American occupation, to overthrow
the Thieu-Ky South Vietnamese government, to win over substantial
sections of South Vietnamese troops, to form popular organisations for
every major social sector and to unite these into a provisional
government that would negotiate with the NLF about peace and national
reunification. The violence of the US response, and its willingness to
inflict huge civilian casualties to drive the NLF-PAVN out of towns and
cities made these objectives unobtainable.
To the 'losers' the spoils
Anti-Communist commentators were not slow in proclaiming Tet to be an
enormous defeat for the Communists. Walter Schwartz was given two pages
in the London Guardian to prove that the military losses incurred by the
insurgents were so huge that they had lost the war. But after Tet
proclamations by American commanders suffered from what became known at
the time as the 'credibility gap'. General Westmorland had regularly
briefed the world's press on the major defeats suffered by the NLF and
PAVN; such optimistic accounts excluded the possibility of such
nationwide attacks. In particular US public opinion was utterly
shocked, not only by the scale of the offensive but by the brutal
scenes in Saigon shown on their television screens. The eventual
withdrawal of US troops was made certain by this event.
For the Vietnamese Communists the outcome was both much more and much
less than they expected. Military it was less successful than expected;
one result seems to have been a dispro****tionate rate of casualties
among the units of the NLF who, as the people with local knowledge,
were the first to enter the cities. After Tet the NLF was never again
so prominent in the fighting, which became increasingly a conventional
war in which many North Vietnamese units used heavy artillery and tanks
- - not the weapons of guerrilla war.
This picture of the execution of an NLF fighter shocked world opinion
Politically the offensive was successful beyond the wildest dreams of
the VCP leader****p. Not only was the Wa****ngton government confused and
humiliated, a big boost was given to anti-war opinion worldwide.
More than that, the Tet offensive outcome was politically appropriated
by the Left internationally, and formed an essential part of the
backdrop, the political spirit of the times, which suffused the events
in other countries later that year. The February 1968 Berlin
international Vietnam conference and demonstration was held in the
immediate wake of the offensive beneath a banner proclaiming "The duty
of the revolutionary is to make the revolution". Politically Tet showed
the imperialists were not invincible; moreover those fighting them in
Vietnam, unlike Iraq, were politically of the Left. Socialists of many
types could sympathise with these fighters, even if they had criticisms
of the VCP. Vietnam was also widely seen as a social revolution, not
just a national liberation struggle. Tet was a further boost to the
Left's interpretation of the world and helped generate an atmosphere
favourable to discussion to anti-imperialist and revolutionary
socialist themes, especially amongst young people.
Richard Nixon took office in January 1969 and began negotiations in
earnest, leading to the withdrawal of most American troops by 1973.
>From then on it was just a matter of time before the South Vietnamese
government collapsed and the country was reunified, finally
accomplished in May 1975.
British social commentator Will Hutton [12] claims that the real result
of the Vietnam war was that the ability of the Americans to hold off
the VCP until 1975 prevented a swathe of South East Asian states from
suc***bing to Communism. Like most counterfactual history, there is no
way of proving that one way or another. Even it that were true, it was
achieved at an enormous price. The United States' ability to intervene
elsewhere was stymied for a generation. Military deficit spending
caused huge inflation in the world economy and the decline of the
dollar, which in turn were major contributors to the 1975-5 world
slump. The US was forced into a shockingly brutal imperialist war that
transformed the words "US imperialism" from a leftist clichi into a
vivid reality for hundreds of thousands. The war brought forth a mass
anti-war movement within which the traditions of international
solidarity were rebuilt after being largely absent since the Spanish
civil war. And by no means least, it put the forces of revolutionary
socialism in the imperialist countries to the fore in a mass movement
for the first time since the 1930s.
NOTES
[1] Especially that led by radical nationalist Amilcar Cabral in the
Cape Verde islands
[2] Something like 150 allied planes were shot down by the Iraqis in the
1991 war; in the 2003 war only a handful were downed.
[3] Michael Maclear, Vietnam - the Ten Thousand Day War, Thames Methuen,
London 1981
[4] Ibid p.334
[5] See Gabrield Kolko, Vietnam, Anatomy of War, p.200
[6] The urban population grew from 21% in 1960 to 43% by 1972
[7] Kolko's sources for this claim are writings by VCP leaders after the
event - which could involve could involved some post hoc rationalisation
[8] The decisive 1954 battle that finally drove the French from Vietnam.
[9] Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, the Salvadorean
revolutionary co-ordination.
[10] Vietnam was the first 'helicopter war'
[11] Viet-Nam do***ents and research notes, Saigon, March 1968.
[12] In his book "The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the
21st Century"
[Phil Hearse writes for Socialist Resistance in Britain. He is the
editor of Marxsite at http://www.marxsite.com
.]
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