In article <pZqdnYU28fXInLbVnZ2dnUVZ_tPinZ2d@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
VTR <vexjorge@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> No yuks as Stewart presses Iraq War architect on honesty
> 05/13/2008 @[EMAIL PROTECTED]
9:45 am
> Filed by David Edwards and Muriel Kane
>
> Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, who was at
the
> heart of the Bush
> administration's selective cherry-picking of intelligence to make its
case
> for the invasion of
> Iraq, appeared on The Daily Show on Monday to promote his new book about
the
> run-up to the war.
> Advertisement
>
> The central premise of Feith's book, which he repeated over and over to
Jon
> Stewart, is that
> although there were errors in some of the administration's claims about
the
> dangers posed by
> Saddam Hussein, the people making those statements were not being
> intentionally dishonest and
> did not set out to mislead the American public.
>
> "The administration had an honest belief in the things that it said,"
Feith
> insisted. "Some of
> the things that it said about the war that were part of the rationale
for the
> war were wrong.
> But errors are not lies and I think much of what the administration said
was
> correct and
> provided an im****tant argument that leaving Saddam Hussein in power
would
> have been extremely
> risky -- even though the president's decision to remove him was
extremely
> risky."
>
> Stewart pointed out in response that painting a rosy picture of how
quick and
> easy the war
> would be while downplaying the risks was itself a form of dishonesty.
"You
> said something that
> I thought was interesting," he noted to Feith. "'The common refrain that
the
> postwar has been a
> disaster is only true if you had completely unrealistic expectations.'
Where
> would we have
> gotten those expectations?"
>
> "If you knew the perils but the conversation that you had with the
public
> painted a rosier
> picture, how is that not deception?" Stewart asked.
>
> Feith attempted to counter this by suggesting that because "the recent
> history has been very
> unhappy in a lot of ways ... people look back and I think they
misremember a
> lot," but he
> finally resorted to claiming once more that "there were statements ...
that
> in looking back you
> wish you would have made differently ... I don't think any of them were
> deception. I think they
> were errors."
>
> "You don't think it was a purposeful strategy?" Stewart asked. "This is
an
> administration very
> sophisticated in the arts of propaganda and public relations."
>
> Feith insisted that far from being sophisticated, the administration was
> actually very bad at
> propaganda. He then went on to summarize his version of what led up to
the
> war:
>
> "What the president decided after 9/11 was we should not focus only on
the
> group that hit us,
> we should be trying to prevent the next attack. ... The administration
...
> became persuaded by
> the facts that Saddam Hussein was an extremely serious danger. ... There
was
> a moment when the
> president wanted to focus on diplomacy. ... Ultimately the diplomacy
failed.
> ... The
> administration grossly mishandled the public explanation."
>
> "You removed the ability for the American public to make an informed
> decision," responded
> Stewart. "Once you have removed that, then you no longer have, I think,
the
> authority."
>
> This video is from Comedy Central's The Daily Show, broadcast May 12,
2008.
>
>
> Download video
>
http://www.rawprint.com/media/2008/0805/com_tds_douglas_feith_080512a.flv
>
> Transcript via closed captions
>
> :: jon: welcome back to the show, everybody. my guest tonight was the
> :: undersecretary of defense
> for policy from 2001-2005. his new book is called "war and decision:
inside
> the pentagon at the
> dawn of the war on terrorism." please welcome to the show doug feith.
sir.
> welcome. i
> appreciate you being here. i know you and i disagree somewhat on the
war, but
> we may agree.
> what's your favorite baseball team.
>
> :: the philadelphia phillies.
>
> :: jon: oh, man. we really disagree. mets. "war: indecision." what if it
> :: boils down to that, i
> like the mets, you like the phillies. the whole thing falls apart. it
seem
> like in reading it
> sort of the basic idea of the book-- and tell me if i'm wrong-- that a
lot of
> what we know
> about the run-up to the iraq war, a low of the conventional wisdom is
wrong.
> this idea that, i
> think it's something that you might take offense to that we were misled
into
> war somehow. (one
> person applauding).
>
> :: jon: settle down. it will be a long ten minutes, lady. the idea we're
> :: misled in a war is
> wrong. now, from this side of it, i always felt like we were misled. so,
> let's bridge that gap
> in ten minutes. what makes you say we were not misled? what was so
honest
> about....
>
> :: i think the administration had an honest belief in the things that it
> :: said. some of the
> things that it said about the war that were part of the rationale for
the war
> were wrong.
> errors are not lies. i think much of what the administration said was
correct
> and provided an
> im****tant argument that leaving saddam hussein in power would have been
> extremely risky even
> though the president's decision to remove him was extremely risky.
>
> :: jon: let me stop you there because the president's decision to remove
him
> :: was extremely
> risky. that's not the sense, i think, that the american people got in
the
> run-up. ( applause )
> the sense that you got from people was not... the sense was, we'll be
greeted
> as liberators. it
> will last maybe six weeks, maybe six months. it will pay for itself. all
> these scenarios that
> were publicly proffered never happened. you said something that i
thought was
> interesting. the
> common refrain that the post war has been a disaster is only true if you
had
> completely
> unrealistic expectations. where would we have gotten those expectations?
> (laughing)
>
> :: well, there were a lot of things that did not go according to
> :: expectations. we know that the
> war has been bloodier and costlyier and lengthyier than anybody hoped.
but
> the president had an
> extremely difficult task. after 9/11, there was a great sensitivity to
our
> vulnerability. and
> the president had to weigh-- and what i do in the book is i look at the
> actual documents where
> secretary rumsfeld was writing to the president and powell and rice and
the
> vice president and
> general myers and others. i talk about what they said to each other and
what
> they were saying
> back to secretary rumsfeld. what you see is there was a serious
consideration
> of the very great
> risks of war. i think that many of them were actually discussed with the
> public. but to tell
> you the truth, looking back one thing is absolutely clear. this
> administration made grocerors
> in the way it talked about the war. some of them are very obvious like
> the....
>
> :: jon: that was all we had to go on. you know, that was... i guess the
> :: difference in my mind
> is if you knew the perils but the conversation that you had with the
public
> painted a rosier
> picture, how is that not deception? that sounds like... when you're sell
ago
> product.... (
> applause ) what it sounds like for me. sorry. the fact that you seem to
know
> all the risks
> takes this from manslaughter to homicide. it almost takes it from like
with
> the cigarette
> companies. if they come out and say, no, our products i think are going
to be
> delicious. you go
> back and you look and they go, well, they actually did talk about
> addictiveness and cancer.
> isn't that deception?
>
> :: i do not think-- and i think when people read this book, i think
people
> :: will be surprised,
> to be reminded of what was actually said. i think a lot of people's
> perceptions of what were
> said are filtered through, you know, the recent history. and the recent
> history has been very
> unhappy in a lot of ways. we've had a very serious losses in iraq, more
than
> anybody
> anticipated. people look back and i think they misremember aate lot. one
of
> the reasons i wrote
> this book is that almost all the other books that are out there on iraq
are
> based on anonymous
> sources or they're based on interviews with people who are pretending
that
> they remember what
> happened years before. and what i wanted to do was bring forward the
written
> record so that
> people can actually be reminded of what was said within the government
and
> what was said publicly.
>
> :: jon: maybe the disconnect is the written record within the government
> :: differs so greatly.
> all respect, i think i remember pretty clearly the general tenor of what
the
> government was
> saying to the people in the run-up to the war. it was, the president
> specifically, the risk of
> going in, we have two choices: to do nothing. the risk of doing nothing
is
> far greater than the
> risk of going in. but the risks of going in were never quantifyd
publicly the
> way they were
> privately. in fact, the opposite. they undersold them. donald rumsfeld,
your
> boss, consistently
> went out there and said, looting? it's one guy with a vase. i watch
these
> re****ts. violence?
> henny-penny, the sky is falling. these are what we were getting over and
over
> again. dick
> cheney saying the insurgency is in its last throes. a consistent drum
beat, a
> willful, i
> think-- and you can tell me if i'm wrong-- selling of the positive and
> pu****ng back of the
> negative.
>
> :: some of the criticisms you've made are valid. i criticized some of
the...
> :: there were
> statements that everybody in the administration-- myself included-- made
that
> in looking back
> you wish you would have made differently, you would have call fied
> differently. i don't think
> any of them were deception. i think they were errors.
>
> :: jon: you don't think it was a purposeful strategy, andrew card said
you
> :: don't want your new
> product in august. they had the white house iraq group that went through
this
> is an
> administration very sophisticated in the art of propaganda and public
> relations.
>
> :: i disagree with that.
>
> :: jon: really?
>
> :: i think this is an administration... i strongly disagree. i think
that....
>
> :: jon: being bad at it doesn't mean you're sophisticated. you know what
i
> :: mean. ( applause )
>
> :: i think that the administration thought through a lot of these
problems
> :: reasonably well
> although there were errors in the thinking- through also. but they
talked
> about them not at all
> well. i think the administration's strategy was in many ways better than
it
> sounded. part of
> what....
>
> :: jon: that's a good point. when we come back we'll talk about the
reasoning
> :: behind that
> because that's actually a very interesting point. we'll be right back
with
> doug feith. (
> applause ) ,, .. ,, .. captioning sponsored by comedy central captioned
by
> media access group
> at wgbh access.wgbh.org welcome back. we're talking to douglas feith
> undersecretary of defense
> to president bush. it's very difficult to get into sort of an argument
of
> whether or not iraq
> was the right next move in the war on terror. that's another whole issue
that
> i'll still come
> down on the bad news i think you guys decided it was a good move. the
one
> thing i think we can
> look at is there was no momentum for a war in iraq. the momentum had to
be
> generated somewhere.
> afghanistan had its own momentum. we were attacked from there. bin laden
was
> taking refuge
> there with the taliban. to get the country to mobilize to war in iraq
took
> effort.
>
> :: i think you're looking at it differently from the way we looked at
it.
>
> :: jon: i believe that is correct.
>
> :: i think that is correct.
>
> :: you're looking at it from the point of view that the administration
came
> :: in hell bept on
> going to war.
>
> :: jon: no, no, no. i'm looking at it as iraq and a war didn't have its
own
> :: momentum. it had to
> draft behind another... did you ever watch auto racing? you know when a
guy
> sneaks in there and
> he starts to draft behind a lead car. afghanistan had its own momentum.
the
> administration had
> to work very hard to create the case. it was a prosecution, if you will.
>
> :: i really don't think you're talking about it the way any of us in the
> :: government thought
> about it.
>
> :: jon: no?
>
> :: the way we approached this was the main thought that the president
had
> :: after 9/11 was that
> the standard approach that we had taken for years, the law enforcement
> approach-- find out who
> did it and go and arrest them and prosecute them-- was not adequate to
the
> challenge after
> 9/11. what the president decided after 9/11 was we didn't have... we
should
> not focus only on
> the group that hit us. we should be trying to prevent the next attack.
it
> wasn't that the
> administration built the case. it's that the administration seriously
> considering what needed
> to be done to prevent the next attack became persuaded by the facts that
> saddam hussein was an
> extremely serious danger and that removing him was im****tant to
america's
> national security.
>
> :: jon: i'm saying that the facts were not presented to the american
people
> :: because in making
> the prosecution they seemed to downplay the negative side. anything that
went
> towards not
> making the case was brushed aside. anything that would take away the
> momentum. why didn't you
> call your group... you called it the office of special plans. why didn't
you
> call it what you
> had originally thought to call it, which was....
>
> :: the office of northern gulf affairs.
>
> :: jon: why didn't you call it that?
>
> :: there was a moment when the president wanted to focus on diplomacy
and he
> :: didn't... (laughing).
>
> :: jon: i remember that moment.
>
> :: it was more than a moment. it was a period of months.
>
> :: jon: there was a reason you said why you didn't call it that.
>
> :: the president didn't want to put out a signal that he had decided to
go to
> :: war when he in
> fact had not decided to go to war. so he wanted to emphasize that he was
> trying to find a
> diplomatic resolution of the problem. now the diplomacy was backed up by
a
> threat of force.
> then ultimately the dip diplomacy failed when hussein didn't make an
honest
> declaration on his
> chemical and biological.
>
> :: jon: the decisions made were based on the sales aspect of this war in
the
> :: administration.
>
> :: to tell you the truth, what i would say is the administration should
> :: really be criticized
> for the opposite which is that the administration grossly mishandled the
> public explanation.
>
> :: jon: that's what i'm saying.
>
> :: then we agree on that. it grossly mishandled it. i don't think it was
> :: dishonesty. i think it
> was... it was.
>
> :: jon: just because your intentions are good and noble and you believe
it to
> :: be the right move
> for the country doesn't make dishonesty. you remove the ability for the
> american public to make
> an informed decision. ( applause ) once you have removed that, then you
no
> longer have, i
> think, the authority because what you've done is you've told us what
part of
> the argument you
> think is appropriate for us to know about. but i do appreciate it. the
book
> is very footnoted.
> it makes for slow reading. but it's interesting. thank you. ( cheers and
> applause ) douglas feith.
and;
In article <gra2u3pbfpprfrptsoh8gpm23q2kpitlfv@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
Roedy Green <see_website@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> Have you noticed how often Bush claims that it is desperately
> im****tant for America to vanquish Iraq but he never says why.
>
> Why is it so all fired im****tant to him?
>
> 1. Exxon wants control of Iraq's oil.
>
> 2. Halliburton needs the war to continue to let it rake up record
> profits without delivering anything of value.
>
> 3. his pride. He does not want to be to the Iraq war what Nixon was to
> Viet Nam. It is all a big game, a sort of ***ualised football game
> where he gets kiddie rape **** as a bonus. (google Judge Hellerstein
> if you don't know what I am referring to).
not to mention;
OF COURSE THERE IS "NO END IN SIGHT".
THE "WAR" IS AN END IN ITSELF.
The object of the war was, has been, and IS -- to transfer the
contents of the U.S. Treasury to Bush's sup****ters, the war
profiteers; to enhance his "Unitary" powers,
and to dominate the oil resources of the middle east.
Continuation of the war continues the looting of the treasury and
confirms his "war presidency".
THE OBJECT OF THE "WAR" WAS NEVER TO
"WIN" BUT TO JUSTIFY THEIR OBSCENE PROFITS AND POWER GRAB.
Bush and his sup****ters have already "won" the war--- and they
continue winning every day the war continues.
WHAT REALLY TERRIFIES THEM IS THE PROSPECT OF ALL THAT UNITARY
PRESIDENTIAL POWER BEING TRANSFERRED TO THE DEMOCRATS IN THE 2008
ELECTIONS. THEY WILL GOTO ANY LENGTH TO AVOID THAT.
----------------------------------------------------
--
when you believe the only tool you have is a hammer.
problems tend to look like nails.
--
If Evolution is out-lawed. Only the Out-laws will evolve.
|
