Is the United States Killing 10,000 people Every Month? Or Is It More?
by Michael Schwartz
http://www.voltairenet.org/article149840.html
While the atlantist media is re****ting more than 3 000 GI's
killed in Iraq and many civilian victims of inter-confessional
violences, it looks away from the daily slaughter of civilians
by patrols conducting their search operations for suspects.
Professor Michael Schwartz estimates that their number
reached 10 000 a month in the first 3 years of occupation.
And much more since Bush ordered his surge of operations.
A state-of-the-art research study of The Lancet (the most
prestigious British medical journal) concluded that - as of
a year ago - 600,000 Iraqis had died violently due to the
war in Iraq. That is, the Iraqi death rate for the first 39 months
of the war was just about 15,000 per month.
That wasn't the worst of it, because the death rate was
increasing precipitously, and during the first half of 2006
the monthly rate was approximately 30,000 per month, a
rate that no doubt has increased further during the ferocious
fighting associated with the current American surge. The
U.S. and British governments quickly dismissed these
results as "methodologically flawed," even though the
researchers used standard procedures for measuring
mortality in war and disaster zones. (They visited a random
set of homes and asked the residents if anyone in their
household had died in the last few years, recording the
details, and inspecting death certificates in the vast majority
of cases.) The two belligerent governments offered no
concrete reasons for rejecting the study's findings, and
they ignored the fact that they had sponsored identical
studies (conducted by some of the same researchers)
in other disaster areas, including Darfur and Kosovo. The
reasons for this rejection were, however, clear enough:
the results were simply too devastating for the culpable
governments to acknowledge. (Secretly the British
government later admitted that it was "a tried and tested
way to measuring mortality in conflict zones"; but it has
never publicly admitted its validity).
Reputable researchers have accepted the Lancet study's results as valid
with
virtually no dissent. Juan Cole, the most visible American Middle East
scholar,
summarized it in a particularly vivid comment: "the US misadventure in
Iraq is
responsible [in a little over three years] for setting off the killing of
twice as
many civilians as Saddam managed to polish off in 25 years."
Despite the scholarly consensus, the governments' denials have been quite
effective
from a public education point of view, and the few news items that mention
the Lancet
study bracket it with official rebuttals. One BBC re****t, for example,
mentioned the
figure in an article headlined "Huge Rise in Iraqi Death Tolls," and
quoted at length
from President Bush's public rebuttal, in which he said that the
methodology was
"pretty well discredited," adding that "six-hundred thousand or whatever
they guessed
at is just ... it's not credible." As a consequence of this sort of
coverage, most
Americans probably believe that Bush's December 2005 figure of 30,000
Iraqi civilian
deaths (less than 10% of the actual total) is the best estimate of Iraqi
deaths up to
that time.
Counting how many Iraqis the occupation has killed
These shocking statistics are made all the more horrific when we realize
that among
the 600,000 or so victims of Iraqi war violence, the largest ****tion have
been killed
by the American military, not by carbombings or death squads, or violent
criminals -
or even all these groups combined.
The Lancet interviewers asked their Iraqi respondents how their loved ones
died and
who was responsible. The families were very good at the cause of death,
telling the
re****ters that over half (56%) were due to gunshots, with an eighth due
each to car
bombs (13%), air strikes (13%) and other ordinance (14%). Only 4% were due
to unknown
causes.
The families were not as good at identifying who was responsible. Although
they knew,
for example, that air strike victims were killed by the occupation, and
that carbomb
victims were killed by insurgents, the gunshot and ordinance fatalities
often
occurred in firefights or in cir***stances with no witnesses. Many times,
therefore,
they could not tell for sure who was responsible. Only were certain, and
the
interviewers did not record the responsible party if "households had any
uncertainly"
as to who fired the death shot.
The results are nevertheless staggering for those of us who read the
American press:
for the deaths that the victims families knew for sure who the perpetrator
was, U.S.
forces (or their "Coalition of the Willing" allies) were responsible for
56%. That
is, we can be very confident that the Coalition had killed at least
180,000 Iraqis by
the middle of 2006. Moreover, we have every reason to believe that the
U.S. is
responsible for its pro rata share (or more) of the unattributed deaths.
That means
that the U.S. and its allies may well have killed upwards of 330,000
Iraqis by the
middle of 2006.
The remainder can be attributed to the insurgents, criminals, and to Iraqi
forces.
And let's be very clear here: car bombs, the one source that was most easy
for
victims' families to identify, was responsible for 13% of the deaths,
about 80,000
people, or about 2,000 per month. This is horrendous, but it is far less
than half of
the confirmed American total, and less than a quarter of the probable
American total.
Even if we work with the lower, confirmed, figured of 180,000 Iraqi deaths
caused by
the occupation firepower, which yields an average of just over 5,000
Iraqis killed
every month by U.S. forces and our allies since the beginning of the war.
And we have
to remember that the rate of fatalities was twice as high in 2006 as the
overall
average, meaning that the American average in 2006 was well over 10,000
per month, or
something over 300 Iraqis every day, including Sundays. With the surge
that began in
2007, the current figure is likely even higher.
Why don't we know about this?
These figures sound impossible to most Americans. Certainly 300 Iraqis
killed by
Americans each day would be headline news, over and over again. And yet,
the
electronic and print media simply do not tell us that the U.S. is killing
all these
people. We hear plenty about car bombers and death squads, but little
about Americans
killing Iraqis, except the occasional terrorist, and the even more
occasional
atrocity story.
How, then, is the US accompli****ng this carnage, and why is it not
newsworthy? The
answer lies in another amazing statistic: this one released by the U.S.
military and
re****ted by the highly respectable Brookings Institution: for the past
four years,
the American military sends out something over 1,000 patrols each day into
hostile
neighborhoods, looking to capture or kill insurgents and terrorists.
(Since February,
the number has increased to nearly 5,000 patrols a day, if we include the
Iraqi
troops participating in the American surge.)
These thousands of patrols regularly turn into thousands of Iraqi deaths
because
these patrols are not the "walk in the sun" that they appear to be in our
mind's eye.
Actually, as independent journalist Nir Rosen described vividly and
agonizingly in
his indispensable book, In the Belly of the Green Bird , they involve a
kind of
energetic brutality that is only occasionally re****ted by an embedded
American
mainstream journalist.
This brutality is all very logical, once we understand the purpose and
process of
these patrols. American soldiers and marines are sent into hostile
communities where
virtually the entire population is sup****ts the insurgency. They often
have a list of
suspects' addresses; and their job is to interrorgate or arrest or kill
the suspect;
and search the house for incriminating evidence, particularly arms and
ammunition,
but also literature, video equipment, and other items that the insurgency
depends
upon for its political and military activities. When they don't have lists
of
suspects, they conduct "house-to-house" searches, looking for suspicious
behavior,
individuals or evidence.
In this context, any fighting age man is not just a suspect, but a
potentially lethal
adversary. Our soldiers are told not to take any chances: in many
instances, for
example, knocking on doors could invite gunshots through the doors. Their
instructions are therefore to use the element of surprise whenever the
situation
appears to be dangerous - to break down doors, shoot at anything
suspicious, and
throw grenades into rooms or homes where there is any chance of
resistance. If they
encounter tangible resistance, they can call in artillery and/or air power
rather
than try to invade a building.
Here is how two Iraqi civilians described these patrols to Asia Times
re****ter Pepe
Escobar:
"Hussein and Hasan confirm that the Americans usually 'come at night,
sometimes by
day, always protected by helicopters.' They "sometimes bomb houses,
sometimes arrest
people, sometimes throw missiles'"
If they encounter no resistance, these patrols can track down 30 or so
suspects, or
inspect several dozen homes, in a days work. That is, our 1,000 or so
patrols can
invade 30,000 homes in a single day. But if an IED explodes under their
Humvee or a
sniper shoots at them from nearby, then their job is transformed into
finding,
capturing, or killing the perpetrator of the attack. Iraqi insurgents
often set off
IEDs and invite these firefights, in order to stall the patrols prevent
the soldiers
from forcibly entering 30 or so homes, violently accosting their
residents, and
perhaps beating, arresting, or simply humiliating the residents.
The battles triggered by IEDs and sniper attacks almost always involve the
buildings
surrounding the incident, since that is where the insurgents take cover to
avoid the
American counter-attack. Americans, therefore, regular shoot into these
buildings
where the perpetrators are suspected of hiding, with all the attendant
dangers of
killing other people. The rules of engagement for American soldiers
include efforts
to avoid killing civilians, and there are many accounts of restraint
because
civilians are visibly in the line of fire. But if they are in hot pursuit
of a
perpetrator, their rules of engagement make it clear that capturing or
killing the
insurgent takes precedent over civilian safety.
This sounds pretty tame, and not capable of generating the statistics that
the Lancet
study do***ented. But the sheer quantity of American patrols - 1,000 each
day - and
the sheer quantity of the confrontations inside people's homes, the
responses to
sniper and IED attacks, and the ensuring firefights add up to mass
slaughter.
The ***ulative brutality of these thousands of patrols can be culled from
the recent
inquest into the suspected war crimes committed in the city of Haditha
back in
November 19, 2005. The investigation seeks to ascertain whether American
marines
deliberately murdered 24 civilians including executing with point blank
head shots
nineteen unarmed women, children and older men in a single room,
apparently in
retribution for the death of one of their comrades earlier in the day.
These horrific
charges have made the incident newsworthy and propelled the investigation.
But it is the defense's version of the story that makes the Haditha useful
in
understanding the translation of American patrols into hundreds of
thousands of Iraqi
deaths. First Lt. William T. Kallop, the highest ranking officer in
Haditha that day,
told the military hearing that he had ordered a patrol "to 'clear' an
Iraqi home in
Haditha after a roadside bomb had killed a Marine" earlier in the day.
Later, after
the firefight that this action generated, he went to inspect the home and
was shocked
to discover that only civilians had been killed:
"He inspected one of the homes with a Marine cor****al, Hector Salinas, and
found
women, children and older men who had been killed when marines threw a
grenade into
the room. "'What the hell happened, why aren't there any insurgents here?'
Lieutenant
Kallop testified that he asked aloud. 'I looked at Cor****al Salinas, and
he looked
just as shocked as I did.'
It is im****tant to keep in mind that Lt. Kallop would not have been
shocked if there
had been one or more insurgents among the dead. What made the situation
problematic
was that all the fatalities were clearly civilians, and it led to the
possibility
that they had not been in hot pursuit of an enemy combatant.
Later, however, Lt. Kallop decided that even this situation involved no
misbehavior
on the part of his troops, after questioning Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich,
who had
led the patrol and commanded the military action:
"Sergeant Wuterich had told him that they had killed people [in that
house] after
approaching a door to it and hearing the distinct metallic sound of an
AK-47 being
prepared to fire. "'I thought that was within the rules of engagement
because the
squad leader thought that he was about to kick in the door and walk into a
machine
gun,' Lieutenant Kallop said." According to Kallop, the soldiers were thus
following
the rules of engagement because if the squad leader "thought" that he was
going to be
attacked (based on recognizing a noise through a closed door), he was
authorized and
justified to use the full lethal force of the patrol (in this case a hand
grenade),
enough to kill all the people huddled within the apartment.
The critical distinction has to do with intentionality. First Lieutenant
Max D.
Frank, sent to investigate the incident somewhat later, explained this
logic: "It was
unfortunate what happened, sir," Lieutenant Frank told the Marine
prosecutor, Lt.
Col. Sean Sullivan, "but I didn't have any reason to believe that what
they had done
was on purpose."
Translated, this means that as long as the soldiers sincerely believed
that their
attack might capture or kill an armed insurgent who could attack them, the
rules of
engagement justified their action and they were therefore not culpable of
any crime.
Note here that other alternatives were not considered. The soldiers could
have
decided that there was a good chance of hurting civilians in this
situation, and
therefore retreated without pursuing the suspected insurgent. This would
have allowed
him to get away, but it would have protected the residents of the house.
This option
was not considered, even though many of us might feel that letting one or
two or
three insurgents escape (in a town filled with insurgents) might be
acceptable
instead of risking (and ultimately ending) the lives of 19 civilians.
Later in the hearing, Major General Richard Huck, the commanding officer
in charge of
the Marines in Haditha, underscored these rules of engagement in more
general
terms, - and also ignored the unthinkable option of letting the insurgents
get away -
when he explained why he had not ordered an investigation of the deaths:
"They had occurred during a combat operation and it was not uncommon for
civilians to
die in such cir***stances. 'In my mind's eye, I saw insurgent fire, I saw
Kilo
Company fire,' Huck testified, via video link from the Pentagon, where he
is
assistant deputy commandant for plans, policies and operations. 'I could
see how 15
neutrals in those cir***stances could be killed.'"
For General Huck, and for other commanders in Iraq, once "insurgent fire"
- or even
the threat of insurgent fire - entered the picture (and it certainly had
earlier,
when the American soldier was killed), then the actions re****ted by the
Marines in
that Haditha home were not just legitimate(if they re****ted them
honestly), but
exemplary. They were responding appropriately in a battlefield situation,
and the
death of "15 neutrals" is "not uncommon" in those cir***stances.
Let's keep in mind, then, that the United States undertakes something over
1,000
patrols each day, and lately this number has surged to over 5,000 (if we
also count
patrols by the Iraqi military). According to U.S. military statistics,
again re****ted
by the Brookings Institute, these patrols patrols currently result in just
under
3,000 firefights every month, or just under an average of 100 per day (not
counting
the additional 25 or so involving our Iraqi allies). Most of them do not
produce 24
Iraqi deaths, but the rules of engagement our soldiers are given -
throwing hand
grenades into buildings holding suspected insurgents, using maximum
firepower against
snipers, and calling in artillery and air power against stubborn
resistance -
guarantee a regular drumbeat of mortality.
It is worth recording how these events are re****ted in the American press,
when they
are noted at all. Here, for example, is an Associated Press account of
American/British patrols in Meyssan province, a stronghold of the Mahdi
army:
Well to the south, Iraqi officials re****ted as many as 36 people were
killed in
fierce overnight fighting that began as British and Iraqi forces conducted
house-to-house searches in Amarah, a stronghold of the ****ite Mahdi Army
militia.
This brief description was part of a five paragraph account of fighting
all over
Iraq, part of a review under the headline "U.S. and Iraqi forces Move on
Insurgents."
It contained brief accounts of several different operations, none of them
presented
as major events. There were 100 or so engagements that day, and many of
them produced
deaths. How many? Based on the Lancet article, we could guess that on that
day - and
most days - the incident in Amarah represented perhaps one-tenth of all
the Iraqis
killed by Americans that day. Over the course of June, the ac***ulated
total probably
came to something over 10,000.
During the hearing about Haditha one of the investigators addressed the
larger
question that emerges from the sacrifice of so many civilians to the cause
of chasing
and catching insurgents in Iraq. Lieutenant Max D. Frank, the first
officer to
investigate the deaths, characterized is an "unfortunate and unintended
result of
local residents' allowing insurgent fighters to use family homes to shoot
at passing
American patrols." Using a similar logic, First Lt. Adam P. Mathes, the
executive
office of the company involved, argued against issuing an apology to local
residents
for the incident. Mathes advocated that instead they should issue a
warning to
Haditha residents, that the incident was "an unfortunate thing that
happens when you
let terrorists use your house to attack our troops."
The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines terror as "violent or destructive
acts (as
bombing) committed by groups in order to intimidate a population. ..." The
incident
at Haditha was just such a violent act, and was one of about 100 that day
that Lt.
Mathes hoped would intimidate the population of Haditha and other towns in
Iraq from
continuing to sup****t insurgents.
Michael Schwartz
--
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I intend to last long enough to put out of business all COck-suckers
and other beneficiaries of the institutionalized slavery and genocide.
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"The army that will defeat terrorism doesn't wear uniforms, or drive
Humvees, or calls in air-strikes. It doesn't have a high command, or
high security, or a high budget. The army that can defeat terrorism
does battle quietly, clearing minefields and vaccinating children. It
undermines military dictator****ps and military lobbyists. It subverts
sweatshops and special interests.Where people feel powerless, it
helps them organize for change, and where people are powerful, it
reminds them of their responsibility." ~~~~ Author Unknown ~~~~
___________________________________________________
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