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THE NEWIN DOCTRINE: A Systematic Campaign of Hatred
Date: Fri, 04 May 2001 15:32:44
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From: "Rhododendron News" <chinhro@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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The Newin Doctrine:
A Systematic Campaign of Hatred
By Vum Son
(Chin National Day Golden Jubilee Journal, Publicity & Information
Department, Chin National Front, February 1998, Pp. 191 - 200)
The Union of Burma is the amalgamation of formerly independent kingdoms of
Arakan, Burma, and Mon; princely states of the Shan and Karennis;
chiefdoms
of the Chin and Kachin; and independent communities of the Karen. The
Union
of Burma was formed by the Panglong agreement of the Chin, Kachin, Shan,
and
the Burman. However, the agreement encompasses the Arakanese, Mon, Karenni
and Karen, who were proud nations and communities and who had distinct and
unique identities different from the Burman, Chin, Kachin, or Shan.
In the constitution drafted in 1947, Bogyoke Aung San promised the
non-Burman equality and autonomy. After the Death of Aung San, however, U
Nu
and the AFPFL amended the draft constitution, betraying both the letter
and
spirit of the Panglong agreement. The amendments invalidated the
recognition
of the formerly proud nations of Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon
and the Shan. Therefore, serious trouble was looming for Burma at
independence.
Shortly after Burma's independence in 1948, the Karen, followed by several
other non-Burman nationalities, rose up in arms to fight for independence.
At the height of the Karen rebellion and underground movement of the
communists, soldiers defected en masse from the Burma Rifles and other
army
units (e.g., the Karen Rifles). Out of the five battalions of Burma
Rifles,
only about two thousand soldiers were loyal to the union government.
Because
of the Karen rebellion, the government forced numerous non-Burman holding
key positions in the army to retire. Among those forced to retire were
General Smith Dun, the commanding officer of the Burma Army, Saw Shi Sho,
the chief of the air force, Brigadier Saw Kya Doe, chief of operation, and
all Karen nationals, to name a few. These positions were then assigned
only
ethnic Burman. General Ne Win, a Sino-Burman, and a member of the " Thirty
Comrades" became the Commanding Officer of the Burma Army. He was also
made
the Defence Minister of the Union government.
General Ne Win became ambitious and requested to be made the Prime
Minister.
The civilian government dismissed him back to the barracks. Ne Win
realized
that to become the Prime Minister of Burma or to be able to run the
country,
he needed to be the commanding officer of a large army, and from that day
on
he worked on a scheme that eventually made him the oppressor of the
peoples
of Burma for forty years. That scheme might be called the "Ne Win
Doctrine".
Premise of the Ne Win Doctrine:
To become the ruler of the country as the commanding officer of the Burma
Army, the army must be large and strong. The requisite for having a strong
army is that the army must have a strong and sizeable enemy.
How could the Burma Army have a strong enemy? The answer lies in the
history
of Burma and the history of the members of the Union of Burma.
History of Ethnic Conflict
There are no known facts about the ethnic conflicts prior to the Burmese
King Anawrahta, who became king in the eleventh century. Long before the
Burman descended from the high regions of Tibet and northwestern China to
the present Burma in the seventh or eight century AD the Mon had
established
their kingdom in lower Burma, and the Arakanese in Arakan. Our knowledge
of
Burman history started with the king Anawrahta because of the
aggressiveness
of the Burman, who in the course of time attacked and were attacked by
Arakan, Mon and Shan. The history of the Thai, Assamese, and Meitei
(Manipuris) describes the immense cruelty of the Burman forces. Because of
their notoriety, historians concentrated on the Burman history and
unjustly
gave little attention to the history of the other groups in the region.
This
one-sided view of history has had a catastrophic effect on the modern
relationships between the ethnic groups because the Burmese military can
convince outsider that there is only the history of the Burman and the
other
people are anonymous.
In fact, there were many ethnic conflicts among the peoples that
constitute
Burma today. Most notably, the Burman and the Mon engaged in a great
contest
of power against each other. To a lesser extent, extended wars we fought
between Arakan, Burma, and Shan against the Burman. The Karen apparently
did
not establish a powerful enough system to challenge the Burmese
leadership,
but they were subjected to high taxation and forced to work for the
Burman.
The Burman had no interest, authority, or influence on the outlying areas,
such as the Chin, Naga and Kachin. In all their wars, the opponents of the
Burman know them as most brutal, and most cruel. The brutality and cruelty
of the Burmese Army in post-colonial Burma has only carried on the
tradition
of Burman behavior.
Development of the Doctrine
With the mistrust and turbulent history between the Burman and the
non-Burman, Ne Win had the means by which to create a powerful enemy that
would justify a large army for him to command. Thus, he created the Ne Win
doctrine.
Ne Win Doctrine
Create an enemy of the non-Burman by driving them to military resistance.
Drive them to military resistance by exploiting the political unrest in
Burma.
The political situation facilitated Ne Win's plan to exacerbate the
non-Burman and Burman mistrust. As soon as the Union of Burma was formed,
the AFPFL, who dominated the politics of Burma, initiated ethnic conflict.
The AFPFL betrayed the Panglong agreement by adopting a quasi-federal
constitution. Although the constitution allowed some non-Burman
nationalities the status of national states, the constitution gave the
power
of the state to the central government, which was the government of proper
Burma or the government of the Burman. The states were governed by the
central government, with no possible self-determination. They were
practically the colonies of the Burman. The constitution refused to
recognize the Mon and the Arakanese statehood, denying them recognitions
as
a distinct ethnic group. The constitution also declared the Burman
language
as the common language, marginalizing the non-Burman nationalities.
Furthermore, when Ne Win assumed the post of Commanding officer, U Nu, the
prime minister of Burma, proclaimed martial law in some regions of the
Shan
state in response to the formidable Karen forces scattered in many parts
of
Burma including the Shan State. However, the Karen were severely beaten at
Insein and were no longer a threat to the government of Burma by the
mid-fifties. General Ne Win needed the continuation of the Karen rebellion
and other existing civil wars to maintain the strength of the Burma Army.
Therefore, the Burma Army units created renewed hatred for the Burman by
roaming Karen villages to create victims. Thus began the implementation of
the Ne Win Doctrine, making the Non-Burman fear and hate the Burman and
leading them to armed resistance.
Implementation of the Doctrine
The main feature of the doctrine was to make the Burma Army above the law
wherever there was insurgency or rebellion. The army could do whatever
they
wanted in the countryside where there were disturbances. But its purpose
was
never to quell rebellion. The people had no right whatsoever. As soon as
the
Burma Army came to an area, the people lost their rights to their land,
property, and even their own children. Worst of all, they lost the right
to
their own lives. On the other hand, the officers and men of the army could
do whatever they wanted. From stealing the property of the people, beating
the people, raping the women, and killing people singularly or en masse,
they do not have to report to any other authority. They were not
accountable
to any law and there was no authority the people to complain to. The Burma
Army was an independent entity. The people, if they dared, could complain
to
the army authorities who had laid out the policies and had drawn up the
guidelines for these atrocities. Their policies were to make the people
hate
them. If there were complaints by the people that meant the people had not
learned their lesson. It meant more brutality towards the community.
The army came mainly to dehumanize the people regardless whether they
belong
to the rebels or not. They were treated as if they were animals. The army
was the law. These brutalities produced endless atrocities. And these
brutalities and atrocities brought incalculable damage to the army's
credibility and to national unity. The soldiers were seduced by the power
of
their guns and the tacit encouragement from their superiors. They adhered
to
the philosophy of being invincible and they created wars where there were
none before. The result was racial hatred.
The army usually came to villages fully informed about the people. The
Burma
Army units usually came after a battle was fought between the rebel group
and the Burma Army. They had knowledge about the men from the village who
were in the rebellion. Usually the army called all the villagers to a
meeting ground usually a football field and executed a popular leader of
the
community. The person was executed not because he was an enemy of the
Burma
Army but because the Burma Army had learned that by doing so, they forced
the recruitment of youngsters to the rebel army, thereby creating a large
enemy for the Burma Army. If Burma Army soldiers had died in the battle
with
the rebel group, the army unit came to the villages to punish the people
of
the villages. The army than killed civilians from these villages at least
double in number of the soldiers killed at the battle.
The doctrine was to deepen the suspicion and hatred that existed between
the
non-Burman and the Burman in pre-colonial and British Burma. It was to
create hatred among the non-Burman against the Burman because the Burma
Army
was run by the Burman. Officers and men of the Burma Army treated the
population with cruel, humiliating, and degrading inhuman practices. When
the army units come to villages they went from house to house and took
anything they wanted. They killed domestic animals to substantiate their
eager rations. The army encouraged Burman soldiers to marry the non-Burman
women. The soldiers were made to understand that to molest and rape women
in
the "disturbed" areas was no crime. There was no punishment for such
misdeeds. The army burned villages and were instructed to destroy and burn
Christian Churches and Muslim mosques. During the communist rebellion
non-Burman class battalions were sent to areas controlled by the
communist.
These class battalions destroyed Buddhist temples and killed the people
including women and children. The point was to make the Burman hate the
non-Burman. The army employed forced labor in disturbed areas, which were
created by the Army itself. The army demanded porters from the villages
who
were not paid. It was forced porter conscription. One of the main reasons
for all of this cruel treatment was the forever prolongation of the civil
war. Without the civil war a strong Burma army was not necessary. Only
cruel
treatment of the people guaranteed the continuation of armed rebellion.
Results of the Doctrine on the non-Burman
In all of the civil conflicts in Burma, even during parliamentary
democracy,
the Burma Army sought military solutions to their problems. Putting an end
to the rebellion would have been easy if a political solution had been
sought. Instead, the Burma Army was systematically campaigning for hate.
The
hatred of the military by the people guaranteed the increase of volunteers
for the non-Burman ethnic rebellion. After the campaign of hate for 10
years, there was a strong rebellion in Burman that a strong enough army
was
created to contain the rebellion. Ne Win fostered this strong rebellion by
applying the doctrine to each of the ethic groups in Burma.
Karen
The Karen lived side-by-side with the Burman in the delta region and had
suffered atrocities under Burman kings. During the rule of Burmese kings,
the relationship between Karen and Burman was not friendly. Karens
suffered
under high taxation and racial discrimination. There was always animosity
between the two communities. Although living side-by-side, the Karen and
Burman seldom intermarried because of the hate existing between them.
There
had always been a racially motivated segregation between the Burman and
the
Karen. They stood on opposite sides of the firing line when the Japanese
invaded Burma during WW II. They committed atrocities against each other
and
the animosity between them further deepened. The Karen did not want to be
a
part of independent Burma. However, they lived intermingled with the
Burman
and a solution to their problems was difficult to sole. Britain refused to
listen to the Karen's demand for separation from the Burman.
Because the Karen wee honest and trustworthy, the British hired them into
their armed forces and civil administration. At the end of WW II, the
Karen
dominated both of these parts of government. When independence was eminent
for Burma after the end of the war, the Karen sought all avenues available
to them to separate themselves from the Burman, but they failed. In 1949,
the Karen formed the Karen National Defence Organization to protect Karen
villages from the Burman. The formation of this organization started the
Karen rebellion in 1949.
The Karen and communist defections in the army left only a small army
contingent loyal to the government. In other words, the Karen at one time
were close to taking the capital Rangoon. The few remaining Chin and
Kachin
rifles battalions stood their ground and saved the Rangoon government from
falling. The Karen were driven out of Insein, a satellite Karen town of
Rangoon.
Thus, the Karen situation could explode any time unless they could agree
with the Burman terms to build a state together.
General Ne Win and his officers never wanted peace. The Karens could have
easily been beaten if a political solution had been sought. The Burmese
government refused to discuss the Karen problems with Karen leaders. It
was
left to the military to solve the Karen problem. The Burma Army could have
beaten the Karen rebellion if they had fought with good intentions. Often
times Chin or Kachin, forces of the Burman Army had beaten Karen units.
When
the Chin units thought that they could eliminate the Karen unit, the Chin
Rifles were ordered to withdraw and the Karen units were allowed to
regroup.
The Karen survived with mounting losses in life and material, and Ne Win
continued to build his army with the excuse of the Karen threat.
The last stronghold of the Karen at Manaplaw was not attacked for over
twenty years because the Burma Army wanted to show that they had a strong
enemy. Only when Manaplaw became the second capital of Burma, where all
democracy-loving people assembled, and the international media was
informed
of the brutality of the Burma did the Burma Army feel the need to attack.
Manaplaw was not easily taken, but for a two-hundred-thousand strong army
to
beat a fifteen thousand men army should not be that difficult a task.
Arakan and Mon
Arakan and Mon were independent nations before they were overrun by Burman
kings. Because these people were colonies of the Burman for a long period
of
time, and because they were Buddhists and Intermarried with the Burman.
The
Burman leadership believed that they were already absorbed into Burman
society. The Burman leadership therefore found no reason to negotiate with
the people of Arakan and Mon. On the other side, the Arakanese and Mon
felt
that they had been freed from Burman colonialization when the British gave
independence to the Union of Burma. In independent Burma, they wanted the
recognition of their unique ethnic national identity and their rights as a
nation. But the Burman leadership completely miscalculated the nationality
feelings and endeavor of the Arakan and Mon.
Like the Karen, the Mon and the Arakanese had been at war with the Burman
before the British came. During those wars, the Burman treated both the
Mon
and Arakanese brutally. The people of Mon and Arakan regarded the British
occupation of their land as the end of Burman colonialization. Ironically,
the British introduction of schools and the teaching of Burmese in the
schools was instrumental in transforming of the Arakan and Mon society
into
one much closer to the Burmese society. Although animosity and hatred
existed between the Burman and Arakanese, and Mon, they share the same
religion and intermarry. The Arakanese and the Mon could have easily been
content if the Burman leadership had given them their rightful position in
the society of the independent Union of Burman. Luckily for Ne Win, the
Burman leadership, beginning with General Aung San, completely
miscalculated
the nationality feelings of the Arakanese and the Mon. They believed that
the Arakan and Mon had fully and completely integrated into Burman
society.
The Burman leadership did not recognize their unique national identity.
Therefore, an insurgency started at the end of 1946, even before
independence was attained.
General Ne Win only needed a little push for the Arakanese and Mon to rise
up in arms and mobilize their national feelings. Cases of atrocities
committed against them as punishment for disturbances quickly intensified
the hate of the Burman that already existed from the past. The Burma Army
used small uprisings as an excuse to send a large contingent to terrorize
villages that were situated in the nearby areas. The Burma Army simply
applied the Ne Win doctrine. In response, the Arakan and Mon created an
independence movement. General San Yu was the commander of the Burma Army
contingent in Arakan for fifteen years before he became the president of
Burma under Ne Win's Burma Socialist Program Party.
Karenni
The Karenni were independent when Burma was under colonialism, but when
Burma became independent, the Karenni became a part of Burma (viz. A
colony
of Burma). Thus, without proper agreement for equality in the new
independent state of Burma, the Karenni would always demand their rights
and
independence.
Like the Arakanese and Mon, the Karennis fought to regain their
independence
just after Burma's independence. Instead of realizing their goal of
independence, they were drawn into the Ne Win doctrine. As the Karenni
rebellion grew, so did the army stationed in the Karenni State. The AFPFL
authorities in Rangoon resorted to a military solution to the Karenni
conflict, putting the fate of the people of the Karenni in the hands of
the
brutal Burma Army under Ne Win. He, of course, immediately applied his
doctrine of making the people hate the Burman. Where the Burma Army set
foot
into any territory was to terrorize the inhabitants. The Karenni were no
exception. The government of the AFPFL had created a new front for the
Burma
Army.
Shan
Unlike the Arakan, Mon, and Karen, the Shan had never been completely
subjugated by the Burman in historic times. On the contrary, the Shan had
at
one time ruled to Burman. Historically, Burman and the Shan dealt with
each
other as equals and there was mutual respect for each other. The ruling
Saophas were mostly well-educated and versed in politics and world
affairs.
General Ne Win was able to extend his doctrine to the Federated Shan
States
when the Karen rebellion spilled over to Taungyi, the Shan capital, in
1950.
Then the remnants of the Chinese Koumintang (KMT) forces infiltrated the
Shan State from China and gave the government even more reason to send
troops there. The placing of most of the regions of the Shan State under
martial law by the U Nu government delivered the Shans into the evil claws
of Ne Win and his Burma Army, the Tatmadaw. The Burma Army saw the martial
law as their god-sent opportunity to terrorize the Shan population. Among
the Burma men, the fair-skinned Shan women were a prized commodity to
exploit. When the General encouraged his soldiers to marry Shan women, it
was like a dream-come-true to the soldiers. The Burma Army gave promotions
to those who married ordinary Shan women. Those who married Shan princess
were made officers (if the soldier was an NCO). If the soldier was an
officer, the officer received a double promotion. The purpose of the
marriage policy was not purely the Burmanization of the Shan, but it was
rather to reap hatred. The soldier thus hunted Shan women for marriage or
for other purposes. They ambushed Shan women on their way to their fields,
and if the women tied to run, the soldiers would shoot at them. They
killed
some women and raped many. Shan women were so afraid of the Burma Army
that
they hid on seeing army vehicles. A Shan elderly said, "I could bear it
when
they took away my chicken, pigs, and property. I could bear it when they
burned down my house. But I cannot bear it when they abuse my wife and
daughter in front of me." The soldiers commonly looted Shan property and
hunted their domestic animals to supplement their meager rations.
Prominent
and well-loved Shans disappeared without a trace. After ten years of the
army presence, the Shan youth could not bear the oppression and
degradation.
The Shan youth, led by university students, rose up in arms in the late
fifties. By then, many non-Burman ethnic groups had stood in arms against
the Burma Army. Ne Win had once again driven the Shan to rebel against his
army. The Ne Win doctrine was successfully inplemented and was working in
the Shan State.
The destruction of Shan society through opium was also mainly the work of
Ne
Win and the military. The growing of opium and the opium trade may have
been
started by the KMT and international drug smugglers, but the Burma Army
was
the authority in the Shan state. Without the tacit approval of the
military,
the opium production could not have continued. The Burma Army used the
excuse that the military could not control opium production in the Shan
State because of the Shan rebellion. This excuse was extremely misleading
because, as explained above, the military was the cause of the rebellion.
The military and Ne Win benefited by the drug trade because they were the
main transports of the drug inside Burma. A major aim of the Ne Win
Doctrine
was to destroy the Shan social establishment. The production of opium and
heroin enhanced the implementation of the Doctrine, and Ne Win would apply
that part of the doctrine elsewhere.
Kachin
The Kachin State is rich in natural resources. Many Kachin profited from
the
large jade deposits, which are found in Kachin land. The Kachin served
loyally in the British Burma Army and in post-independence Burma. There
had
never been problems with the Kachin until 1960. But soon U Nu came to the
aid of Ne Win. During the election campaign in 1960, U Nu made an election
promise to make Buddhism the state religion if he was given the mandate to
govern Burma. He won the election and Buddhism did become the state
religion. Because of these events, the Kachin formed the Kachin
Independence
Organization, initiating a rebellion against the ruling government of
Burma.
The Burma Army immediately applied the Ne Win doctrine in the Kachin
State.
By the time the Kachin Independent Army signed a cease-fire agreement
after
thirty years of civil war, Kachin villages had lost much of their previous
relative wealth. Total destruction of the Kachin society and Kachin
properties resulted and the Burma Army is in every corner of the Kachin
land. The Kachin have traded their rights as human beings and their right
to
be treated as an equal by the Burman for a cease fire.
Communists and Wa
The Burman communists met the same fate as the non-Burma ethnic
insurgency.
Chin, Karen, Burman, and Kachin battalions were deployed to fight the
communists. As with the Karen, the communists were attacked, allowed to
regroup, and attacked again. Within a few years after independence, the
communists were no longer a formidable force because, unlike the non-Burma
ethnic groups, the Ne Win doctrine could not make the Burman hate the
Burmam, perhaps because they understood what the Burma Army was doing.
Whenever the communists had a stronghold, the Burma Army terrorized the
local people. When the villagers were tired of the harassment from the
Burma
Army and the taxation of the communists, they simply moved away. Unlike
the
non-Burman, they did not have elaborate housing and they could easily farm
somewhere else. The communist regained their momentum only when they moved
to the Chinese border and persuaded the Wa to fight for them. When the Ne
Win doctrine was applied to the Wa, the Wa started to hate the Burman of
the
Burma Army. The racial hatred transferred to hatred of their Burmese
communists' masters. They eventually overthrew the Burman communists and
started an ethnic war against the Burman. Because of the huge assistance
given by China to the Burma communist party, there were incentives for the
Wa young men to join the communists. The price tag was high for the Wa.
Almost every Wa household lost a son or a family member in the conflict.
After the Wa signed the cease-fire agreement with the Burma Army, the Wa
ran
drug production and trade under more peaceful circumstances. Due to the Wa
rebellion, a powerful contingent of the Burma Army was needed and the
Burma
Army fulfilled its purpose controlling the drug trade.
Chin
Historically, the Chin and the Burman did not have much contact. Their
interaction was mostly limited to mutual raiding, including taking war
prisoners as slaves. Being in the remote areas of the hills, the Chins
were
isolated from the valley-dwelling Burman. Consequently, they never
dominated
one another, or had any other diplomatic relations.
For forty years since joining the Burman, the Chin Hills continued on
relatively quietly because there was no reason for the Ne Win army to go
there. General Ne Win and most Burman had never been to the chin Hills
themselves, and perceived it to be a very primitive areas whose simple
inhabitants had neither the ability nor the will to develop their country.
However, when Ne Win visited the Chin Hills in 1955 as the commanding
officer of the Burma Army, he saw that the Chins were not as primitive as
he
had thought. Moreover, he realized that the Chins lived in bigger houses
than the general Burman. Whereas most Burman lived in bamboo thatch
houses,
the Chin used wooden planks as walls with wooden floors and corrugated
iron
or slate as their roofs. Ne Win would wait and find a way to apply his
doctrine.
In the late 1970s, the BSPP under Ne Win began to grow opium in the Chin
Hills. They had found this strategy successful in the Shan State, where
the
army had been stationed since 1950. Army officers profited by transporting
the drug and were able to addict many of the people by making the drug
easily accessible. The Burman then could easily acquire their property.
The growing of opium in the Chin Hills in 1997(???) means nothing less
than
the ruin of the future of the Chin people. It was reported that heroin is
being refined in Tahan, Tedim, and Tamu under the military supervision.
This
is clearly an attempt to destroy the Chin people in order to be able to
control them. Until now, Ne Win was incapable of making the Chin hate the
Burman. Soon he will destroy the Chin people as more and more people
become
addicted to heroin.
The Chins were drawn to the same fate as other ethnic groups in only after
the 1988 general uprising against the practice of the Ne Win doctrine in
the
whole of Burma. Three Chin men formed the Chin National Front (CNF) in
1988
in India. The CNF was formed as an armed independence movement and grew to
about fifty members, mostly Chin students who fled to Mizoram in India.
The
CNF had no money, arms, or supporters in 1988, but its existence was
enough
to serve as an excuse for the Burma army to destroy the Chin social
establishment. In 1980, there was only a Burma Army company in the Chin
Hills. By 1995 ten thousand Burma Army soldiers were stationed in the Chin
Hills not necessarily to fight the CNF but to instill hatred and fear for
the Burman consistent with applying the doctrine.
Results of the Doctrine on the Union
In 1958, after leading the Burma army for almost ten years, General Ne Win
felt that his army was strong enough to overthrow the government of the
Union of Burma under U Nu. Ne Win's subordinates gave U Nu the ultimatum
that the Burma Army was going to take over power either peacefully or by
force. U Nu cleverly announced on the Burma Radio that he had requested
General Ne Win to take over the administration of the country until the
general election, which was to be held soon. Because such a transfer was
legal under the 1947 constitution, the general attained what he wanted but
was still bound by the constitution. However, at that time several high
ranking army officers opposed a military dictatorships. Once again General
Ne Win had to go back to the barracks. Within a few months of his return,
he
forced out all the officers that might oppose his next attempt to take
over.
Ne Win remained the prime minister as well as the commanding general of
the
Burma Army from 1958 to 1960. In that time, he steadily raised the
strength
of the army. At a conference in Taungyi in 1961, non-Burman
parliamentarians
and politicians, led by Shan leaders, requested the amendment of the
constitution, which would have given the non-Burman more autonomy in their
affairs, equality among ethnic groups, less interference by the central
government authorities in the non-Burman ethnic regions, and a fair
distribution of the nation's money. Ne Win understood what they wanted. If
there was equality and peace in Burma, he had no chance to ever rule the
country.
By 1962, almost all the non-Burman ethnic groups were up in arms against
the
government of the union. All non-Burman ethnic people had only hatred and
distrust for the Burman and the Burman-led government. By that time,
General
Ne Win had built a strong enough army to control the whole country at
gunpoint. In March 1962, Ne Win staged a coup d'etat and seized power. The
future held more rebellion and more oppression to instill hatred. From a
two
thousand, man Burma Rifles, plus two battalions each for the Chin and
kachin
in 1950, the Burma Army rose to number 180,000 in 1988.
Ne Win's Miscalculation: The Doctrine Worked too well
The application of the Ne Win doctrine raised the non-Burman ethnic
rebellion to approximately 60,000 soldiers in 1988. The end of the Burma
Socialist Program Party and a mass pro-democracy uprising in 1988
paralyzed
the government in Rangoon and the Burma Army was in a very weak position.
They were short of arms and ammunition because they concentrated their
fighting forces in the non-Burman ethnic areas. Moreover, there were many
high-ranking officers who supported the pro-democracy movement. These
officers refused the order to shoot into the crowd on September 1988. The
result of the 1990 election showed clearly that the majority of the
members
of the armed forces were pro-democracy. Had the non-Burman army seized the
opportunity and marched towards Rangoon, the Burma Army would have had no
means nor will to defend the city.
"Big Father's" Big Luck
The nightmare and catastrophe created by the Ne Win Dictatorship was the
source of income and livelihood for many corrupted officials of the BSPP.
Those who benefited from Ne Win's dictatorship affectionately called him
"Big Father." Indeed, Ne Win took advantage of the foolishness of the
non-Burman as well as the mainstream Burman line of thought. In 1988, the
non-Burman passed up the only chance to defeat the Burma Army. As usual
they
kept to themselves and their territory and never gained the aspiration to
advance to Rangoon. At the moment that the Ne Win army was incapable of
ruling the country, the Karen and the Mon were attacking each other for
control of trade routes in their areas which brought in trade taxes. Not
only did the non-Burman lose their only chance to table their demands for
equality with an upper hand, they awakened Ne Win to the realization that
had made a wrong calculation. He was rescued by the incompetence of the
non-Burman groups and the inability of leading Burman politicians to unite
themselves into a force that could assume power.
Seeing he had miscalculated and nearly lost control, Ne Win immediately
carried out what would prolong his grip on the population of Burma. His
first step was to take Manaplaw. Manaplaw, the headquarters of the Karen
National Union, had become the second capital of Burma. True to his
doctrine, Ne Win did not attack the KNU capital for over twenty years,
giving the Karen a sense of security. The existence of Manaplaw had been
one
of the excuses for Ne Win to build up his army. All forces opposing
Rangoon
had representatives in Manapalaw served as headquarters for
non-governmental
organizations and international media to collect news items and facts,
especially on the human rights abuses of the Ne Win regime. The
realization
that the non-Burman, together with the mass pro-democracy movement, could
have taken over Rangoon brought Ne Win to the understanding that he needed
to destroy Manaplaw.
In the past, Ne Win's terms of peace had always been only "unconditional
surrender," knowing full well that the non-Burman freedom fighters would
never give in. But after 1988, Ne Win had no choice. He undertook what he
had never allowed himself in the past; he decided to sign cease-fire
agreements with most of the non-Burman ethnic groups so that they would no
longer pose a threat to his domain. He allowed the rebels to keep their
arms
and territory so he could continue to use them as an excuse to keep his
large army to watch over these freedom fighters.
Ne Win also used the cease-fire agreements to gain access to the lucrative
drug trade of the opium growing Wa people. In the past the army was not
directly involved in the drug trade. Drug traders were international drug
smugglers, mostly Chinese. But the officers of the Burma Army wee involved
in transporting drugs. Whereas civilian drug carriers were subjected to
searches, army convoys, and transports were never bothered. Moreover, the
revenue and profits from the transportation were distributed among the
officers. A captain would give a portion of his drug money to his boss,
and
that officer would share with his boss, and so on up the ladder. The
cease-fire arrangement put opium transport and trade securely in the hands
of the Burma Army. The SLORC's announcements of confiscation of drugs and
arrests of drug handlers in the government-controlled news media did not
mean that the government was trying to stop the drug trade. The
announcements were supposed to inform the people that the military
government was serious about the elimination of the drug. In reality, the
military was trying to eliminate its competitors.
With this drug money, Ne Win improved the fighting ability of the Burma
Army
by buying over $1.4 billion worth of arms and ammunition from the Chinese.
A
convoy of trucks transported the arms and ammunition across the
Burma-Chinese border for four months. Within five years, the Burma Army
grew
in size from 180,000 in 1988 to 400,000, making it the sixth largest army
in
the world. In the meantime, Burma became the poorest country in Asia and
the
sixth poorest in the world. Meanwhile, the SLORC reached its lowest point
by
becoming the worst human rights abuser in the world.
Conclusion
The Panglong agreement brought together different nationalities to form
together the Union. When the Union of Burma drafted its constitution in
1947, the politic in Burma were dominated by the Anti-Fascist People's
Freedom League (AFPFL) of the Burman. This constitution betrayed the
Panglong agreement, leading to dissatisfaction among the non-Burman
nationalities, who chose to fight for their separation from the Burman.
History has shown that a betrayal of an agreement can loose bloodshed and
all the atrocities of war on the people. The peoples must decide whether
they want to live in peace and prosperity by respecting one another, or to
continue to dominate each other, which will be the continuation of the
present nightmare in Burma.
Today after 35 years of Ne Win's rule and the practice of the doctrine,
there is so much hatred between the nationalities. The non-Burman blame
the
Burman for the suffering they endured under the Ne Win dictatorship
because
they see the leadership under Ne Win dominated by the ethnic Burman. The
Burman on the other hand feels no responsibility because they likewise
suffered under the Ne Win dictatorship and blame Ne Win and the Burma Army
for the ills of Burma. It is therefore impossible to agree on any agenda
that might bring the non-Burman and Burman together. It will take many
long
years, even under democracy to bring the nationalities together, in mutual
respect and understanding. Until and unless the Ne Win doctrine is
destroyed, the future of the Union of Burma is doomed. The destruction of
the Ne Win doctrine can be accomplished only by working together,
non-Burman
and Burman alike towards an honest and trusting relationship.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/zomi/message/875
Also at:
http://web.archive.org/web/20031206055737/home.us.net/~suantak/docs/Doctrine3.htm
==========
This article is not copy-edited by me. (The copy-edited version will be
made available soon.)
Dr. Vum Son got his Ph.D. in geology from Germany. He was from Tamdeeng
Village, Tedim Township, Zomi State.
He was involved in non-violent opposition to the much-hated,
hyper-pernicious Maung Ne Win regime and the succeeding regimes of the
even
more evil Maung Saw Maung and Maung Than Shwe.
See also:
Dr. Vumson Suantak, Advisor of Zomi Innkuan D.C.
Memorial Webpage
http://www.zomidc.org/vumson.htm
http://www.zomidc.org/vumsoncondolence.htm
==
A Tribute to Dr. Vum Son Suantak
http://www.otiliorules.com/papi/
==
Pride of Zomi: Dr Vumson Suantak
http://zo-aw.com/2007/12/24/pride-of-zomi-dr-vumson-suantak/
==
Information Central
for topics related to
Zo Re-unification
and
Democracy and Federalism
in Burma
http://web.archive.org/web/20031206055737/home.us.net/~suantak/
==
Zomi
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zomi
==
A BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH OF CHINLAND
http://www.ccgev.de/home/pages/DCber-chinland.php
==
Zomi International Network
Who are the Zomi?
http://www.zomi.org/47.html
==
Bridging the Zomis
http://www.zogam.com/
==
The Justice of Tamadaw
Mass Execution of Minorities by the Burmese Army
By Dr. Vumson Suantak
http://web.archive.org/web/19960101-re_/http://www.chinland.org/sitemap/art4.html
==
Zomi Re-unification Organization (ZRO)
Truth and Freedom
(An organization different from ZORO)
http://www.zogam.org/
==
Zo Re-unification Organization (ZORO)
(an organization of non-violence and different from ZRO)
http://www.manipuronline.com/Interviews/August2006/zoro27_1.htm
http://www.manipuronline.com/features/February2003/zoreunification25_3.htm
http://www.e-pao.net/epSubPageExtractor.asp?src=news_section.Top_Stories.Kukiforum_intv_Zoro_Pres_200606
http://www.chinlandguardian.com/index.php/interviews/the_living_dream_of_
http://www.zogamonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1579&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0
http://www.kanglaonline.com/index.php?template=kshow&kid=237&
==
Zomi National Congress (ZNC)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zomi_National_Congress
http://hometown.aol.com/znc21/znc.html
http://hometown.aol.com/znc21/znc21.html
http://members.aol.com/znc21/PolBg.html
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/25/AR2006102501564.html
http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/200103/msg00070.html
==
THE SECOND CHIN SEMINAR
4-8, APRIL 2000, DELHI, INDIA
http://www.chinforum.org/ACTS/cs2.html
==
Chin Students at the funeral of Dr. Vum Son
http://www.robawm.com/vs/VSFuneral.htm
==
MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR DR. VUM SON
By Tg. Dong Khan Khup
(near the bottom of the webpage)
http://209.85.207.104/search?q=cache:Z_-TLU7-W34J:burmalibrary.org/docs3/KW96.html+Dr.+Vum+Son&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us
http://burmalibrary.org/docs3/KW96.html
==========
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