Handy Work of Tamil Tigers
http://www.spur.asn.au/LTTE_Atrocities_20070528_Ratmalana_Bomb.htm
http://www.spur.asn.au/LTTE_Atrocities_20060615_Kebithigollewa_Massacre.htm
http://www.spur.asn.au/chronology_of_suicide_bomb_attacks_by_Tamil_Tigers_in_sri_Lanka.htm
http://www.spur.asn.au/After_signing_the_so-called_JM.htm
"eelam news" <sarruka@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
news:2eaecc85-2137-48fc-b02b-fe8410578333@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Tigers prepare to face Army's mechanised infantry
>
> By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
> An im****tant militaristic development is unfolding in the northern
> theatre of war.
>
> The 57, 58 and 59 Divisions of the Army continue to battle it out with
> the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) within the Mannar,
> Vavuniya and Mullaitivu Districts in the north west, south and south
> east of the Northern Province while the 53 and 55 Divisions are
> engaging in combat along the Kilaly-Muhamaalai-Nagar Kovil axis inside
> the Jaffna peninsula.
>
> While fighting goes on almost on a daily basis in the northern
> mainland, known generally as the Wanni, the peninsula witnesses an
> intense exchange of artillery fire each day. There are also occasional
> skirmishes and minor offensives of a limited nature.
>
> Line of control
> As of now, the initiative is with the security forces, which are
> frequently launching attacks along the Kilaly-Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil
> axis. The time, place and intensity of such attacks is decided and
> determined by the security forces.
>
> The LTTE for the time being is merely reacting and responding to
> military initiatives by fighting what is essentially a defensive war.
>
> The greater part of the Jaffna peninsula and outlying islands are
> under the control of the armed forces. The LTTE controls the
> underdeveloped, sparsely populated areas in the south, south west and
> south east of the peninsula.
>
> These areas consist of the Pachchilaippally AGA division and parts of
> the Thenmaratchy and Vadamaratchy East AGA divisions. Some of these
> areas fall under the Jaffna District while others come under
> Kilinochchi District.
>
> All areas of the peninsula south of Nagar Kovil on the east coast,
> Muhamaalai in the middle and Kilaly in the west are under LTTE
> control. Thus, the effective line of control is along an axis
> comprising Kilaly-Muhamaalai-Nagar Kovil.
>
> This is a 'rekha' that both sides have been trying to cross for many
> years.
>
> The LTTE conducted phase four of its staggered 'Unceasing
> Waves' (Oyatha Alaigal) operation in 2000 to extend this line further
> north but failed. The Tigers also made an abortive attack in Muhamalai
> in August 2006 to reach the defences at Muhamaalai.
>
> The armed forces conducted 'Operation Agnikheela' in April 2001. It
> was a colossal disaster. Security forces also made a determined push
> in October 2006 that failed.
>
> There were also two limited offensives in November and December last
> year.
>
> Retaking Elephant Pass
> The strategic objective as far as the security forces are concerned is
> to drive the LTTE away from the peninsula and re-take the isthmus of
> Elephant Pass that links the peninsula and mainland.
>
> For this the armed forces need to progress southwards about 10 to 12
> miles from where they are located now. The terrain consists of plains,
> grasslands, fields, marshes, scrub jungle, coconut and palmyrah
> groves, etc.
>
> Despite the overwhelming military superiority of the armed forces,
> they have found it difficult to dislodge the LTTE from entrenched
> positions. The Tigers, holding on to territory, are engaging in
> positional warfare like a conventional Army to defend and retain it.
>
> The Army is determined to push forward and re-take Elephant Pass in
> the near future. A key element of the military plans to push forward
> in the peninsula is the large-scale deployment of its newly created
> Mechanised Infantry Division (MID).
>
> The MID is a brainchild of Army Commander Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka. It
> was formally 'raised' on February 14, 2007.
>
> The MID is in actuality the 53-4 Brigade that was designated later as
> the mechanised infantry brigade. It consists of three battalions
> called the first, second and third Mechanized Infantry Regiments, or
> MIR.
>
> The military personnel deployed in these MIRs come from the 3rd Light
> Infantry Battalion, 10th Sinha Regiment, 4th Gajaba Battalion and 5th
> and 6th Reconnaissance Regiments of the Sri Lanka Armoured Corps.
>
> The MID has a variety of armoured vehicles including BTR-80A, BMP-2,
> Type 63 and WZ551, for operational purposes.
>
> Baptism of fire
> The MID had a baptism of fire, literally. It was on February 14, 2007,
> at the Regimental Headquarters of the 53 Division located in Kodikamam
> that the Mechanised Infantry Regiment was ceremonially inaugurated.
>
> While the ceremony was in progress, the LTTE fired its artillery
> accurately from across the lagoon in Poonagary on the mainland.
> Brigade Commander Lt. Colonel Ralph Nugera, Lt. Col. Sumith Atapattu,
> Major Harendra Peiris and two staff officers were injured.
>
> A major factor that led to the establishment of the MID was the
> military debacle on October 11, 2006 when the Army tried to push
> southwards to Elephant Pass. The LTTE allowed the soldiers to proceed
> to some extent and then counter-attacked.
>
> An im****tant highlight of the fighting on that day was the severe
> losses of armoured vehicles by the Army. At least 12 Armoured Fighter
> Vehicles (AFV) and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) were put out of
> action by the Tigers in three hours of fierce combat.
>
> Even as fighting progressed, government troops backed by artillery
> went forward. The advance was slowed down to some extent by Tiger
> artillery as well as mines.
>
> Two Main Battle Tanks (MBT) were hit by anti-tank 'monster' mines.
> These mines were placed and triggered by the Victor Unit of the LTTE,
> which specialises in anti-tank and anti-armoured vehicle warfare.
>
> After the first MBT tank was hit and rendered non-operational, the
> second MBT overtook it and proceeded ahead. This too was hit in turn
> by a 'monster' anti-tank mine. A third armoured vehicle moved in a
> different direction and fell into a deep, waterlogged ditch. It was a
> pit that was dug and covered up with vegetation.
>
> It was a well camouflaged Tiger trap. This too was laid by the Victor
> Unit and demonstrated that the LTTE excelled in both using modern
> weaponry as well as engaging in comparatively 'primitive' yet
> effective warfare tactics.
>
> LTTE's Victor Tank Unit
> The LTTE's Victor anti-tank and armoured Unit continued engaging in
> action during intensive fighting too. Despite having lost its founder
> Commander, Lt. Col Akbar to a random Army shell on October 7, members
> of the unit fought fiercely.
>
> In addition to the earlier losses of two armoured vehicles to
> 'monster' mines and another to a camouflaged pit trap, three more AFVs
> were hit by anti-tank RPGs and destroyed.
>
> Six AFVs comprising four Czech built T-55s and two Russian built ones
> were put out of action by the Victor Unit.
>
> The Victor Unit also fired at Chinese built APCs with success. Three
> APCs were totally destroyed while another three were extensively
> damaged.
>
> Altogether the Victor Unit had put six armoured fighting vehicles and
> six armoured personnel carriers out of action within a few hours of
> fighting. The armed forces had never sustained such massive losses in
> this manner before.
>
> Significantly, the LTTE had suffered a major loss four days before the
> fighting. On October 7, Lt. Col Akbar of the LTTE was killed along the
> Muhamaalai FDL as a result of an Army shell.
>
> Akbar, a Batticaloa Tamil, was the head of the Victor Unit. He joined
> the LTTE in 1990 got married in 2003. He was, from its inception, the
> chief of the Victor Unit, which was named after former Mannar Tiger
> Commander Victor.
>
> This unit, known generally among LTTE cadres as the 'RPG Commando,'
> had its roots in the 'Col.' Kittu Artillery Unit and had its baptism
> of fire during 'Operation Sathjaya' in Kilinochchi.
>
> It then became a sub-division of the Imran-Pandian Unit, named after
> two of Prabhakaran's trusted bodyguards.
>
> 'Blood sacrifice'
> By 1997-98, the unit began functioning independently under Akbar.
> Members of this unit have vertical and not horizontal stripes on their
> uniforms.
>
> Though many stalwarts of this unit like Maj. Navachandran, Lt. Col.
> Manivannan and Lt. Col. Chutta are no more, Akbar had survived despite
> being a veteran of many 'Jayasikuru' and 'Oyatha Alaigal' battles.
>
> Lt. Col Akbar's death at a critical time may very well have affected
> LTTE fortunes as the Victor Unit was of crucial im****tance in
> countering Army advances.
>
> His death, however, seemed to have inspired his unit members to
> perform well during war. Instead of being a bad omen, it seemed to
> have become the 'blood sacrifice' made to the gods before war to
> ensure victory. This was a practice in the lost martial tradition of
> the Tamils that has been revived by the Liberation Tigers.
>
> Incidentally, R. Pageerathan, alias Ilango, who led the attack on the
> Anuradhapura Air Force base in Saliyapura last October was also a
> stalwart of the Victor Unit. Ilango's greatest military achievement
> prior to the Anuradhapura attack had been at Ithavil during the
> Elephant Pass operation.
>
> LTTE cadres brought by sea had landed at Vadamaratchy east and moved
> inland. They had penetrated Ithavil along the A9 Highway and
> interdicted military movement along the road to Elephant Pass/
> Iyakkachchi.
>
> The security forces were fighting hard to drive the Tigers away and
> clear the road so that supplies could reach beleaguered troops at
> Elephant Pass. The use of tanks and armoured cars placed the LTTE at a
> disadvantage.
>
> It was then that the Victor Unit, named after the former Mannar LTTE
> Commander, got into action. Two armoured cars were hit by light anti
> tank weapons.
>
> At one stage Ilango is said to have jumped on top of a Buffel tank and
> shot dead the gunner. Ilango had then turned the tank's weapons on the
> security forces. This act helped turn the tide of war, it is said.
>
> Deployment of the MID
> The deployment of the MID is expected to turn the direction of the war
> in favour of the armed forces. Massive destructive power is to be
> unleashed on a terrific and widespread scale as the MID gets going.
>
> The earlier role of the infantry, advancing with the aid of armoured
> vehicles, will be reversed with the armoured vehicles advancing with
> the infantry behind.
>
> On January 31 this year the MID had its first taste of success. Thanks
> to the rapid deployment of the MID, the armed forces overran the first
> line of LTTE defence along the Muhamaalai front. Around 25 bunkers
> were destroyed.
>
> In mid-March the armed forces undertook another major push. The Tigers
> quietly retreated and waited. Smelling a rat, the armed forces also
> opted to stay put for several hours and then withdraw. Consequently
> military intelligence uncovered the LTTE strategy.
>
> Apparently the Tigers, in anticipation of the mechanised infantry, had
> embarked upon classical trench warfare. In a bid to entrap the
> advancing tanks and armoured vehicles, the LTTE had constructed a
> wide, deep and long trench behind their second line of defence. Two
> other defence lines consisting of a network of trenches had been
> constructed behind the major trench.
>
> The giant trench was wide and deep so the tanks could not bridge over
> the top but would instead fall into the trench and not be able to get
> out. Welded 'stars' of steel, or specially-designed blocks of
> concrete, had also been placed in the way of the tanks so they could
> not get over or go around the trench.
>
> The LTTE forced a large number of civilians to engage in digging
> trenches and bunkers as part of defence preparations. Every able-
> bodied man was required to do a minimum of seven days enforced
> 'shramadana' in digging in one stretch.
>
> If anyone wanted to opt out of it, they had to pay a 'fine' of Rs.
> 5,000 per week. The LTTE used that money to pay the people doing the
> digging. The LTTE kept Rs. 1,000 of the fine and paid the hired help
> Rs. 4,000 for a week's work.
>
> Trench warfare
> It is noteworthy that the LTTE is engaging in trench warfare to
> confront the mechanised infantry formations when they advance.
>
> Earlier, the familiar tactic of the LTTE was 'in-depth defence,' where
> the security forces were encouraged to advance deep into Tiger
> territory and were then counter-attacked.
>
> Interestingly, 'tanks' were developed during World War I to overrun
> trench-based defences. During World War II, trench warfare was
> modified to prevent defences being overrun by the mechanised and
> armoured divisions.
>
> The French, for instance, constructed the famous Maginot line trench
> complex to stop German invasion but Hitler's Panzer divisions just
> rolled around the end of it and kept going ahead.
>
> A recent event of significance in the annals of trench warfare has
> been the construction of deep trenches in Western Golans by the
> Israeli defence forces. Massive trenches are being dug by troops and
> civilians behind the slopes of the Golan heights, in anticipation of a
> possible advance by Syria.
>
> Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan armed forces have also 'delayed' their plans
> in the aftermath of knowing the trench warfare plans of the LTTE. The
> MID is being put through different types of tactical training to
> surmount anticipated trench based warfare of the Tigers.
>
> The unusually long rainy season is also a deterrent to the MRD as
> soggy, muddy terrain is not very conducive to forward movement by
> heavy vehicles.
>
> In any event, both sides are getting ready for the inevitable 'big
> bang.' There is no doubt that the MID will play the decisive role in
> breaking down LTTE defences. On the other hand, the Victor Unit will
> play a crucial role in countering the MID advance.
>
> Ultimately, the renewed battle for Elephant Pass could be a novel form
> of trench versus tank warfare or mechanised infantry versus anti-tank
> unit confrontation.
>
> (D.B.S. Jeyaraj can be reached at djeyaraj@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
)
>
> Right of reply
>
> Sri Lanka Army Headquarters
> P.O. Box 553, Colombo.
>
>
> Editor, The Bottom Line
> Rivira Media Publications (Pvt) Ltd.,
> 742, Maradana Road ,
> Colombo 10.
> March 12, 2008.
>
> Clarification on feature 'LRRP Infiltration Demolishes Impregnable
> Tiger Terrain Myth' in your March 12, 2008 issue
>
> 1. Your kind attention is drawn to the above article written by Mr.
> D.B.S Jeyaraj, in which he has compiled a catalogue of killings and
> retaliatory attacks that have been attributed to a so-called 'Long
> Range Reconnaissance Patrol of the Army.'
>
> 2. More im****tantly, the writer, since the beginning of the re****t,
> has strongly implied that the TNA Parliamentarian K. Sivanesan's death
> was caused by this alleged wing of the Army, which was repeatedly
> denied earlier by the Army and rejected outright.
>
> 3. Most of the contents in the article were largely based on
> assumptions and hypotheses, in some instances even going to the extent
> of blaming the Army for attacks on school buses and ambulances.
>
> 4. The Army categorically denies having to do anything with the TNA
> Parliamentarian's untimely death in the un-cleared Kanagarayakulam
> area and also the presumed LRRP operations, as stated in the re****t.
>
> 5. The Army also wishes to request the journalist or any other party
> to keep the Army informed of existence of any such wing in anywhere of
> the island under the Army, as stated in the re****t, sup****ted by
> substantial evidence or eye-witnesses.
>
> 6. You are kindly requested to give this clarification also its due
> prominence in your next Wednesday's issue.
>
> Signed,
> V.U.B. Nanayakkara USP
> Brigadier
> Director, Media.
>
> D.B.S. Jeyaraj responds
>
> The heading and general thrust of the article outlined Long Range
> Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) activities of the Army in general and
> pointed out in particular that the impregnable LTTE terrain myth had
> been exploded as a result.
>
> In such a situation, Army directors of media would usually be happy
> but Brig. Nanayakkara seems to be an exception. He refers to my having
> compiled a catalogue of attacks "attributed to a so-called Long Range
> Reconnaissance Patrol."
>
> I would like Brig. Nanayakkara to clarify what he means by "so-called"
> LRRP? Is he denying the existence of the LRRP or is he unaware of the
> existence of the LRRP?
>
> I wish to point out that one of his predecessors, Brig. Sanath
> Karunaratne, used to deny the existence of the LRRP and blamed
> killings of LTTE leaders inside Tiger-controlled territory to internal
> rivalry until events blew up in his face. The result was that the Army
> Spokesman of the day cut a sorry figure as far as credibility was
> concerned.
>
> The LRRP, described as deep penetration unit by the LTTE, was
> officially acknowledged by the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22,
> 2002.
>
> Article 1.2 of the CFA debarred offensive military action by either
> side and included certain acts specifically. Among those mentioned
> were the deep penetration units.
>
> Consequent to the arrest of some members of the LRRP at Athurugiriya,
> the entire LRRP story became known to the country. Sections of the
> media went to town about the fact that an injustice had been done to
> members of the then LRRP. Some even went to courts admitting that they
> were members of the LRRP and that their rights were violated.
>
> Subsequently, the then Defence Minister Mr. Tilak Marapone ordered an
> inquiry through then Army Commander Gen. Lionel Balagalle. Another
> inquiry was ordered by then Prime Minister Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe
> through the Defence Secretary of the time, Mr. Austin Fernando. Former
> President Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga also appointed retired Appeals
> Court Judge D. Jayawickrema to inquire into the matter.
>
> All three inquiries confirmed beyond doubt the existence and
> functioning of an Army unit known as LRRP. I am therefore puzzled as
> to why Brig. Nanayakkara is denying the obvious by referring to a "so-
> called LRRP."
>
> If the name of the LRRP has been changed, then it is Brig.
> Nanayakkara's duty as media director to reveal it.
>
> The media director also refers to my "catalogue" of attacks. May I ask
> him whether he feels these incidents also fall under the "so-called"
> label?
>
> Brig. Nanayakkara also refers to "assumptions and hypotheses" by me.
> My analysis is based on the incidents that occurred.
>
> Many people including both LTTE members and innocent civilians have
> lost their lives. These are undisputable facts.
>
> I also wish to point out that there were glowing media re****ts about
> the LRRP and even its modus operandi when LTTE Military Intelligence
> Chief 'Col.' Charles was killed on January 5 this year. I do not
> recall Brig. Nanayakkara protesting against such media references to
> the LRRP or issuing clarifications then. Why did he not do so and deny
> the existence of the "so-called" LRRP then?
>
> In my article I have clearly explained the dilemma faced by
> authorities with regard to unorthodox outfits like the LRRP and the
> fact that many of their successes are un-claimable. I also called LRRP
> operatives unrecognised heroes.
>
> It is a pity that these nuances have escaped Brig. Nanayakkara, who
> tries to invoke sarcasm by referring to "so-called" LRRP.
>
> I would also like to ask Brig. Nanayakkara whether he admits to LTTE
> leaders like Shankar, Kangai Amaran, Charles, Nizam, Mano, etc., being
> killed. If so, will he let us know who killed them?
>
> Brig. Nanayakkara categorically denies that the Army did not kill the
> TNA Parliamentarian Mr. Kiddinan Sivanesan. I state categorically that
> the LRRP was responsible for Mr. Sivanesan's death.
>
> I also understand that there are certain acts that cannot be
> officially acknowledged.
>
> Brig. Nanayakkara also calls upon the media to keep the Army informed
> of the existence of any such wing (LRRP) sup****ted by substantial
> evidence or eyewitnesses.
>
> The Army Media Director must understand that it is not the role of the
> media to keep the Army informed privately. Whatever is known will be
> re****ted publicly by the media.
>
> But the question that arises is, how will the Army respond to such
> re****ts? If Brig. Nanayakkara's clarification is any indication, only
> 'hurrah' stories will be responded to positively, it seems.
>
> If Brig. Nanayakkara is truly in the dark about the LRRP, it is
> inappropriate for him to seek media assistance in this matter. He
> should go through proper channels and seek enlightenment from the
> Directorate of Military Intelligence about the LRRP.
>
> Brig. Nanayakkara can also read the proceedings and re****ts of the
> three inquiries to find out all about the LRRP.
>
> I thank Brig. Nanayakkara for issuing this clarification and request
> him as Director Media to keep the media informed regularly with
> authentic information to enhance the quality of re****ting on military
> matters without endangering national security.
|
