HOLODOMOR = ZYD/NKVD HOLOCAUST ON UKRAINIANS! Message:
Probably the best analysis of what happened that I have read to date.
Trident
IS THERE A "SMOKING GUN" FOR THE HOLODOMOR?
PRESENTATION: By Professor Roman Serbyn Universit=E9 du Qu=E9bec =E0
Montr=E9al, Canada
The Ukrainian Holodomor and the Denial of Genocides
International Conference, Federigo Argentieri, Ph.D., Organizer
Guarini Institute, John Cabot University
Rome, Italy, Friday, November 09, 2007
Published by the Action Ukraine Re****t #889, Article 5
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, November 19, 2007
In his seminal study on genocide, Leo Kuper observed that "governments
hardly declare and do***ent genocidal plans in the manner of the
Nazis"
[1]. Nevertheless, since modern states cannot function without large
bureaucracies and elaborate communication systems, tell-tale records
inevitably survive.
When the CPSU lost power and the Soviet empire fell apart, it was
Revealed that an elaborate paper trail of the 1932-33 famine and the
Soviet
authorities' involvement in it had been preserved in party and state
archives. These do***ents are being slowly declassified, examined and
published[2]. Historians can now give us a fairly accurate account of
the catastrophe and ascertain the responsibility of Stalin and his
collaborators.
As a result, scholars who previously hesitated to recognize the
Genocidal character of Stalin's forced starvation of Ukrainian farmers,
have
reexamined the question and readjusted their interpretations. In his
latest book, Nicolas Werth comes to the conclusion that thanks to recent
studies based on the new do***ents, it is now "legitimate to qualify as
genocide the cluster of actions undertaken by the Stalinist regime to
punish
the
Ukrainian peasantry by famine and terror"[3].
In this paper I analyze some of the main do***ents that provide
smoking-gun evidence of genocide, in line with the definition of the crime
given
in the UN Convention of 1948: "acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such".
The key criteria in the Convention are proof of "intent" and
Identification eligible "groups". Soviet do***ents corroborate the
accusation
against
Stalin and his closest collaborators for deliberately exterminating
Millions of Ukrainian farmers, and show that the perpetrators targeted
them as
Ukrainians.
Furthermore these and other do***ents reveal that the genocide was not
Just against Ukrainian farmers, the focus of the attack was the Ukrainian
Nation in all its component parts and on all its territories within the
Soviet Union.
The locus of this crime was thus the Ukrainian SSR, the predominantly
Ukrainian Kuban, and the other regions of the RSFSR with sizeable
Ukrainian populations. The simultaneous decimation of Ukrainian national
elites,
especially academic, cultural and political leaders, was an integral part
of
the destruction of the Ukrainian nation.
Stalin did not intend to kill all Ukrainians (nor is such an intent
Required by the Convention); his motive was to break the backbone of the
nation
By executing a sizeable percentage of the people and reducing the rest to
servile obedience, to transform them into manageable cogs of the state
mechanism. Stalin's means of destruction were varied: famine, shootings,
exhausting forced labor.
The UN Convention does not require the establishment of motives for
genocide, but determining the reasons for the act gives an insight
into the rationale which led to crime and thus help us comprehend the
perpetrator's intent. Stalin's measures against the Ukrainians were
predicated
on
his political ambitions, two of which provided the motives for the
eventual genocide[4].
The first was to extend socialism beyond the borders of the USSR. He
realized that the Bolsheviks' initial attempt to ex****t their revolution
into Europe failed primarily because of the weakness of the Red Army.
To resume Lenin's unfinished task, Stalin needed a powerful armed force,
Backed by modern heavy industry. Industrialization had to be financed by
Ex****ting natural resources, especially grain, which had to be extorted
from
the
farmers at the lowest cost to the state.
War communism had shown that door-to-door requisition was costly,
inefficient and politically dangerous. After the revolution, poor
farmers appropriated and divided up the land of rich landlords. As a
result,
farmers lived better, ate more but sold less to the state. Marketable
grain
(sold outside the village) in tsarist times was provided by the large
farms
Owned by landlords and kulaks. Now new large estates had to be set up in
the
Form of sovkhozy and kolkhozy. These would give the state easy access to
grain, produced by the newly enslaved peasants.
The immediate goal was not the increase of grain production (which
could be expected to fall as a result of peasant opposition), but of the
"marketable grain" to be delivered to the state. Since the main producers
of
grain
Were Ukrainians farmers, who had no tradition of the Russian semi-communal
obshchina organization, they could be expected to offer stiff resistance
to
forced collectivization and confiscation of the fruits of their labor.
Stalin's second ambition was to bring a permanent solution to the
National question, especially its crucial Ukrainian component. The 1926
census
Pegged the Ukrainian population at 31 million, of the Union's 147 million:
23
million in Ukraine, and 8 million in the rest of the USSR, mainly along
the
Ukrainian border.
Ukrainian national revival triggered by the Russian revolution forced
Lenin to give the reconquered republic nominal autonomy in the form of a
"sovereign" republic within a Potemkin-style Soviet federation.
Subsequent policy of Ukrainization, or the local application of a general
principle of korenizatsiia (nativization), allowed Ukrainians to add real
national
content to the pretentiously misleading form of "soviet republic"[5].
The Ukrainization of education, communications and administration, not
Only in Ukraine but also in the Ukrainian regions of the RSFSR, the
de-Russification of urban centers by the influx of Ukrainian farmers,
the demands on Moscow to transfer to the republic adjacent territories
with Ukrainian population, the ****fting of cultural orientation from
Moscow
and to the West - all these pressures on the imperial centre could not be
ignored by the Kremlin.
Stalin, Lenin's "magnificent Georgian" and foremost expert on the
nationalities question, understood the dangers of active nation-
building in Ukraine, in the best of times. Collectivization would only
aggravate
the situation. Over 85 % of ethnic Ukrainians were farmers and their
sudden disenfranchisement could throw the countryside into such turmoil
that
not only grain production would be catastrophically reduced, but also
farmers could gain the sup****t of the national elites in a united
rebellion of
the whole republic to the spoliation of their country by Moscow.
Similar, if smaller, unrest could be expected in the Kuban' and other
ethnically Ukrainian regions of the RSFSR. In the mid-1920s Stalin had
written that the peasant question was "the basis, the quintessence, of
the national question", that "the peasantry constitutes the main army of
the national movement" and that "there is no powerful national movement
without the peasant army"[6]. The stability and even the integrity of the
Soviet empire would be threatened.
Genocide does not happen spontaneously. The targeted group is first
identified, vilified and intimidated, then it is discredited in the
eyes of the rest of the population, and only when it has been sufficiently
isolated, is it submitted to total or partial extermination. In the summer
of
1929 the GPU (political police) "uncovered" a nationalist conspiracy,
headed
by
prominent Ukrainian intellectuals and conducting anti-Soviet work in
villages and regional centers.
Over 700 people were arrested for, among other things, "anti-Soviet
Activity in the villages and district centers" and a show trial was held
in
March 1930, appropriately staged in a Kharkiv theatre. 45 members of this
Mythical Association for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) were sentenced to
death or long prison terms.
Arrests and trials of other mostly fictitious groups followed:
Ukrainian National Center, Ukrainian Military Organization, etc.[7] The
condemned were former members of the former Ukrainian national
governments,
Ukrainian armed forces, Ukrainian political parties, and prominent people
in
fields of education, culture and the arts.
The purpose was to terrorize the Ukrainian elites into submission and
lethargy, and thus deprive the peasants of leader****p on the national
level.
It should be noted that, in connection with the less severe famine in
Russia, no parallel attack took place against Russian national elites
or the Russian culture.
Stalin's war against the peasants began in earnest towards the end of
1929.
In a two-pronged attack he ordered to "eliminate the dekulakization as a
class" and to collectivize the middle and poor peasants. Divided into
three categories, the kulaks were dispossessed and the most dangerous
were
shot.
The others were de****ted to the wilds of northern RSFSR, transferred
To distant regions in Ukraine, or given strips of poor land outside the
Kolkhoz near which they lived. The intention was not only to provide
kolkhozes
With the confiscated land, cattle and machinery, but also to deprive the
Peasants of the more qualified leader****p for their opposition to the
authorities.
During the winter of 1929-1930, 90 thousand Ukrainian households were
dekulakized, and a smaller wave more or less finished the job a year
later.
In 1934 Kossior, party boss of Ukraine, re****ted that 200 thousand
farms had been dekulakized in Ukraine. Out of this number of about one
million
(5 members per family), several thousand were de****ted to the northern
parts of the RSFSR and lost to the Ukrainian nation.
Collectivization went in unison with dekulakization: a major push was
Given in early 1930. By 10 March 1930 Ukrainian kolhosps integrated 64.4%
of
farmsteads with 70.9% of arable land. The operation was accomplished
with the help of some 50,000 activists, sent from Russian and Ukrainian
urban centers, with special powers to organize, punish, and terrorize.
Many poor peasants, paid for the service with confiscated goods,
participated in expropriating their richer neighbors, but many others
sympathized with the victims. Peasant rebellion swept Ukraine: in
January-March 1930, 3,190 uprisings with over 950 thousand
Participants confronted the authorities.[8]
Hundreds of fliers were picked up by the authorities with such slogans
As "Free Ukraine from Moscow rule", "Time to rise against Moscow yoke"
And others. National and peasant factors were coming together. Stalin
sounded a tem****ary retreat and in October of that year collectivization
was
down to 29 % of households and 34 % of arable land. But the reprieve was
brief
and a year later (October 1931) the figures rose to 68 % (for households)
and 72 % for arable land, with a much higher percentage in the
grain-producing
steppe regions.
The effect of Stalin's revolution on the countryside was disastrous,
especially in Ukraine and the Kuban. From 1929 to 1932 the evolution
can be summarized in these four curt phrases: production down; state
procurement up; grain ex****t up; peasant food consumption down.
Farmers' opposition to collectivization, mismanagement of collective
Farms by incompetent administrators, neglect and slaughter of farm animals
seriously hindered farming and brought down its production. Yet,
enforced obligatory state procurement increased, and in 1931, 42 % of
Ukraine's
grain harvest was turned over to the state.[9]
Kolhosps delayed or completely failed to pay out stipends for
"workday" (trudodni), and the their members had to rely on their meager
and
insufficient individual plots of land and a few domestic animals for
subsistence. Undernourishment became generalized. But Stalin had
reached his goal.
Grain ex****ts rose from below one million tons in 1929, to: 5,832,000
Tons in 1930/31 and 4,786,000 tons in 1931/32. It should be kept in mind
that one million tons could feed four to five million people for one year.
After two years of resistance and unequal struggle with the Communist
authorities, the Ukrainian elites were cowed and most of the collective
and
independent farms despoiled of all their reserves. The republic was on the
brink of a major catastrophe.
On 26 April 1932, Stanislav Kossior, the General secretary of the
Communist Party of Ukraine, informed Stalin about "individual
Cases and even individual villages that are starving" but blamed it on
"local bungling, errors, particularly in the case of kolkhozes." And,
Lest he displease his Kremlin masters, their lieutenant in Ukraine
dismissed the tragedy with the affirmation that "all talk of famine must
be
categorically discarded."[10]
Yet famine there was and on 10 June H. Petrovsky, the head of the
Ukrainian state and V. Chubar, the head of the Ukrainian government, sent
Separate letters to notify Molotov and Stalin of the appalling conditions
in
the Ukrainian countryside, and to ask for help.
Chubar admitted that cases of starvation among independent and
Collective farmers had already been signaled in December and January and
that by "March-April there were dozens and hundreds of malnourished,
starving,
and swollen people and people starving to death ac***ulate in every
village; children and orphans abandoned by their parents appeared".
Raions and oblasts organized aid from internal resources, but were
Obliged to do this "under conditions of acute food shortage, especially
bread".
[11]
Noteworthy additional remark: "Petliurite and other anti-Soviet moods
increased."
Petrovsky's letter was even more to the point. Having just returned
from an inspection of the countryside, he realized the catastrophic
situation
of the farming population. He visited many villages and everywhere saw
multitudes of people, mainly poor and middle peasants, starving,
subsisting on
surrogates.
Peasants scolded him, posed embarrassing question, reproached him,
Saying "why did you create an artificial famine, [...] why did you take
away
The seed material - this did not happen even under the old regime, why is
It necessary for Ukrainians to travel for bread [...] to non-grain
Producing territories?".
Echoing Chubar, Petrovsky re****ted that "because of the famine, mass
Thefts are taking place in the villages." Pointing out that grain harvest
is
Still six week off, and famine will only intensify, Petrovsky ask:
"shouldn't assistance be rendered to the Ukrainian countryside in the
amount
of
two or, at the very least, one and a half million poods of grain?" And he
predicted that if help is not given starvation would drive peasants to
pick
unripe grain and destroy much of it.
Petrovsky's letter paints a bleak picture of the forthcoming harvest.
Since the better grain had been seized by the state, seeds of poorer
quality
Were sown and scattered mores thinly. The young crops are good and the
Fields well weeded but the grain is sparse. Petrovsky was also struck by
the
Large amount of unsown land. Aware of all these problems, the farmers
Complained to Petrovsky that the new grain procurements would be even more
difficult to meet than last year's. "And this may very well be so", agrees
Petrovsky.
Finally Petrovsky draws attention to the exodus of Ukrainian farmers.
They are forced to seek food beyond the republic's borders, at "the Dno
station, in the Central-Black Earth Oblast', in Belarus, and in Northern
Caucasus", where grain is more readily available, and at much lower
prices.
When Petrovsky suggested that farmers band together for these
purchases, he learned that the Commissariat of Trans****t has drastically
reduced
the sale of train tickets to peasants. Bewildered Ukrainian peasants
needled
Petrovsky: "Why are they banning trips for grain?"
If the two Ukrainian leaders believed their pleas and warnings of
turmoil in the Ukrainian countryside would soften Moscow's position, they
were
mistaken. Their effect on Stalin, Kaganovich and Molotov was just the
opposite. Writing from Moscow to Sochi, where Stalin was vacationing,
Kaganovich criticized both Ukrainian leaders, even though he admitted
That some aid would have to be given to Ukraine, and asked Stalin to
decide
On the amount. Stalin's response was more brutal and more ominous of
things to come.
He condemned the hypocrisy of the two leaders, who only wanted to get
"new millions of poods[12] of grain from Moscow" and "a reduction in the
plan for grain procurement". Ukrainians must mobilize their own forces and
resources for already "Ukraine has been given more than she should
get".[13]
Nevertheless, on 16 June the Politburo considered Ukraine's plea and
Granted about 8,500 tons[14], a paltry amount in comparison with the
million
and a half poods requested by Petrovsky.
Politburo's niggardly "largesse" must have provoked Stalin's ire, for
in a letter to Kaganovich, Molotov and the Politburo he came back with
harsh criticism of past errors and new instructions for the coming
harvest.
The Gensec blamed "mechanical equalization", which did not take into
account the ability of the kolkhozes to deliver grain, and as a result of
which,
"fertile districts in Ukraine found themselves in a state of
Impoverishment and famine, despite a fairly good harvest."[15]
This is the only known acknowledgement of the Ukrainian famine by
Stalin. He blamed regional authorities for being out of touch with the
countryside and allowing kolkhozniks to travel around the entire European
part of the USSR demoralize "our farms with their complaints and
whining."[16]
Stalin proposed the calling of a top level conference on the
organization of grain procurement and its unconditional fulfillment, and
insisted
that personal responsibility for grain procurement be delegated to the
first secretaries of the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, and the other
grain
producing regions. "Personal responsibility" for "unconditional
fulfillment"
imposed from the top along the administrative vertikal became the
watchwords of the 1932/33 grain procurement campaign, which would result
in
the
genocidal famine.
On 21 June a telegram signed by Stalin and Molotov instructed Kharkiv to
carry out "at any cost" the July-September plan for grain delivery.
Two days later, Moscow answered Ukrainian Politburo's plea for 600,000
poods of grain with a terse resolution: "bar any additional grain
deliveries
to
Ukraine."[17]
The III Conference of KP(b)U (6-10 July 1932) was devoted to the
Upcoming harvest and grain procurement. Stalin sent Molotov and Kaganovich
to
The meeting "to ensure genuinely Bolshevik decisions". Molotov informed
The audience that Moscow had lowered Ukraine's quota but was adamant that
The plan be carried out in full.[18]
Declarations from regional leaders that the farmers were starving, that
much
land lay fallow, and that 100 to 200 m.poods of grain would be lost during
harvesting did not bend the resolve of Moscow's envoys.[19] The conference
adopted a resolution to carry out the plan of grain delivery "in full
and unconditionally".[20]
It was largely in response to the tense situation in Ukraine[21], and in
anticipation of new troubles in that republic that Stalin came up with
his infamous decree, dubbed by the farmers "the 5 ears of corn law".
Writing on 20 July to Kaganovich and Molotov, the Gensec complains of
Widespread theft by "dekulakized kulaks" and others, and proposes to write
a law, which would make theft of property belonging to collective farms
equal
to similar crimes against state property, and "punishable by a minimum of
ten
years'
imprisonment, and as a rule, by death".
"All active agitators against the new collective-farm system" and
"profiteers and resellers of goods" writes Stalin, should be removed
And sent to concentration camps.[22] He also wants stricter controls over
The limited kolkhoz trade allowed by a 6 May 1932 law (kolkhozes allowed
Sell their surplus after 15 January 1933, after fulfilling the state
Procurement plan), made more liberal on 20 May 1932.[23]
A follow-up letter provides ideological explanation: in the same way
That capitalism could not triumph without first making "private property
Sacred property", socialism will not finish off capitalism "unless it
Declares public property (belonging to cooperatives, collective farms or
the
state) to be sacred and inviolable".[24]
Returning to the topic on 26 July, Stalin insists on formal legality
of the proposed operations: "we must act on the basis of law ('the peasant
loves legality'), and not merely in accordance with the practice of the
OGPU, although it is clear that the OGPU's role here will not only not
Diminish but, on the contrary, will be strengthened and 'ennobled' (the
OGPU
Agencies will operate 'on a lawful basis' rather than
'high-handedly')".[25]
The joint Party-State decree "On the Protection of the Property of
State Enterprises, Collective Farms and Cooperatives, and on the
Consolidation of Public (Socialist) Property" was issued on 7 August 1932.
It became the main legal instrument used by the Soviet authorities to
condemn
millions of farmers to slow death by starvation. It repeated Stalin's
declarations
that all public property is "sacred and inviolable" and that individuals
attempting to take possession of public property should be considered
"enemies of the people".[26]
All collective farm property, whether in the field or in storage was
Decreed equal to that of state property and theft was made punishable by
execution, which could be reduced to 10-year imprisonment only under
mitigating cir***stances. Advocating withdrawal from the kolkhoz became
tantamount to treason and was punished with three to five years
imprisonment
in concentration camps. No amnesty could be applied in any of these
cases.
The decree on State property was applicable on the whole Soviet
Territory but, as Stalin's letter to Kaganovich shows, it was primarily
meant
For Ukraine. Stalin thought the law was "good" and would "soon have an
impact", and ordered a draft of directives from the C.C to the party,
judicial
and punitive organizations.[27] The Gensec then addressed the Ukrainian
problem.
The passage is highly revealing:
"The most im****tant thing right now is Ukraine. Ukrainian affairs have hit
rock bottom. Things are bad with regard to the party. There is talk
that in two regions of Ukraine (it seems in the Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk
regions) about 50 raion party committees have spoken out against the
grain-procurements plan, deeming it unrealistic. It is said that the
situation in other raion party committees is no better. [...] This is
not a party but a parliament, [...]
Instead of leading the raions, Kossior kept maneuvering between the
directives of the CC VKP and the demands of the raion party committees
[...]
Things are bad with the soviets. Chubar is no leader. Things are bad
With the GPU. Redens is not up to leading the fight against the
counterrevolution
[...]. [underlined and doubly underlined in original - R.S.]"
Then Stalin brandishes the specter of Ukrainian separatism: "If we don't
undertake at once to straighten out the situation in Ukraine, we may
lose Ukraine." He reminds Kaganovich that Pilsudski and his agents are
underestimated by Redens, and Kossior. He expressed utter contempt for
the whole KP(b)U, composed of 500,000 members ("ha-ha", snickers Stalin),
harboring Pilsudski's agents and "quite a lot (yes a lot!) of rotten
elements, conscious and unconscious Petliurists".
Thinking undoubtedly of Ukraine's negative reaction to the destructive
impact the just-passed property laws will have, Stalin warns: "The
moment things get worse, these [party] elements will waste no time
opening a
front inside (and outside) the party, against the party."
Frustrated by the fact that "the Ukrainian leader****p does not see
These dangers", Stalin proposes to replace Kossior with Kaganovich and
Redens with Balitsky, and eventually Chubar with Kaganovich. In this way
Stalin
Intends to transform "Ukraine as quickly as possible into a real fortress
of
The USSR, a genuinely exemplary republic."
The task is urgent and calls for immediate action, for without "these and
similar measures (the economic and political strengthening of Ukraine,
above all its border raions, etc.), I repeat, we may lose Ukraine."[28]
Kaganovich agrees, of course, and accuses Ukrainian party of creating a
certain
solidarity and "a rotten sense of mutual responsibility", not only in the
middle echelons of the party, but also among its leader****p.[29]
Stalin's exchange of letters with Kaganovich reveals the ambiance in
Which the policy of starvation will be implemented. The overall objective
was to maintain a high level of grain procurement. To assure this, all
challenge outside and inside the republic had to be eliminated, regardless
of
the cost. Stalin's raising of the specter of Pilsudski and Petliura agents
running loose in Ukraine and infiltrating the Soviet party and state
machinery was nothing more than a scare tactic and a rallying call.
He was well aware that by the summer of 1932, the weak Polish network
And the few local collaborators had been rounded up by the GPU, which also
arrested real and imaginary followers of Petliura whom Stalin had
eliminated by assassination in 1926. Poland may have had some illusions
about
a
Ukrainian insurrection in 1929-1930, but by 1932, the Poles realized
That the starving population was in no shape to revolt.
The Soviet-Polish nonaggression treaty signed on 25 July 1932 was
Ample proof of the changing relations between the two neighbors.[30] The
Pilsudski-Petliura scarecrow will continue to enjoy popularity in
Soviet propaganda. While there was no serious threat from the Poles or the
Ukrainian nationalists, a national insurrection could become a reality if
the expected famine (implied in Stalin's phrase "the moment things get
worse") could bind together the threatened middle cadres of the KP(b)U
with the surviving peasantry. To prevent this eventuality the KP(b)U had
to
be purged and kept under close Moscow surveillance.
Stalin maintained that the 1932 harvest was good; historians today are
More skeptical but consider it adequate to cover Soviet Union's internal
needs.
With the state reserves from previous year, there were enough supplies
To feed every citizen of the Soviet Union.
Famine was brought about by the exorbitant amount of grain and other
agricultural products taken from the Ukrainian peasants, and the way
they were extracted. Ukraine's plan was excessive, and in spite of the
protests from Kharkiv and three successive reductions, it remained so to
the
end.
Still, Ukraine delivered about a quarter of a billion poods of grain, or
over 90% of its procurement quota. [31] In addition it handed over
large quantities of meat, vegetables and other produce. Stalin insisted
that
state procurement have absolute priority. Following a CC VKP(b) directive,
a
KP(b)U resolution of 18 November reminded that "complete fulfillment
of the procurement plan by collective farms and the MTS constitutes their
primary obligation [...], to which all the other duties of the collective
farm
must be subordinated, including the duty to set up all sorts of funds:
seed
fund, forage and food supplies".[32]
Stalin was satisfied that he was achieving his goal. At a high-level
Party meeting, held on 27 November 1932, he gloated: "The party has
succeeded in replacing the 500-600 million poods of marketable grain,
procured
during the period of individual peasant holdings by our present ability to
collect 1,200-1,400 m.p. of grain. It is hardly necessary to prove that
without this leap forward the country would have a famine [sic-RS], we
would
not be
able to sup****t our industry, we would not be able to feed the workers and
the Red Army."[33]
The allusion to the famine, or rather to freedom from one, was an
Obvious lie, and the reference to the feeding of the workers and the Red
Army
- an overstatement; but then, Stalin's concern was not the feeding his
Subjectsb but the financing of Soviet industrialization with grain
ex****ts.
Obedience to Moscow's orders was assured in two ways: a) frequently
Repeated delegations to Ukraine and the North Caucasus Territory of
Molotov
Kaganovich and other high-ranking leaders to supervise the local
authorities, and b) party discipline enforced from Moscow down the
administrative structure. At the end of October 1932, two commissions
were sent, one to Ukraine headed by Molotov, and the other to North
Caucasus Territory headed by Kaganovich.
Stalin's emissaries supervised party meetings and forced them to pass
resolutions on grain procurements, party discipline, stricter
application of the 7 August property laws, the establishment of "black
lists"
of collective farms in arrears with grain deliveries, imposition of fines,
etc.
They also instigated purges in party organizations and administrative
structures.
Kuban' was particularly hit with the expulsion of 43 % of the 25,000
Party members, including 358 out of 716 party secretaries.[34]
In Ukraine, during November and first five days of December, the OGPU
arrested 1,230 people, including 340 heads of kolhospy while 327
Communists were brought before the courts for sabotaging state
procurements.[35]
In the 18 November resolution quoted above, the Ukrainian CC reminded the
directors
of sovkhoz of their "personal responsibility as party members and civil
servants for the fulfillment of the grain procurement".
"Personal responsibility" for the execution of instructions was a
Constant refrain in messages coming from above and became an im****tant
Means for forcing recalcitrant cadres to carry out the Ukrainian genocide.
Dekulakization and de****tation continued, on a smaller scale and were
Mostly of political and punitive nature. Arrests, beatings, and cruelty of
All sorts abounded as before, only now the victims were weaker and less
Capable of resistance. Kolkhozes, villages and individual farmers in
arrears
On state procurement were put on "black lists", lost access to state-run
stores, and could not buy such essentials as matches, kerosene, salt.
Fines amounted to a year and a quarter's worth of meat tax, without
Freeing the debtor from the unfulfilled grain procurement. "Activists" -
the
City workers and their komnezam helpers searched farmers' houses and
yards,
looking for the hidden grain.
There is no way of knowing what ****tion of the hidden grain was found
by the flying brigades of activists, but official re****ts state that in
Kuban
they found 345,000 poods of grain in November, while searches in Ukraine
from 1 December 1932 to 25 January 1933 yielded 1.7 million poods, in
17,000
hiding places.[36] What grain was found, was confiscated; if nothing was
discovered, they took whatever edibles were seen, leaving the family
to starve.
Peasants who could find some old religious medals or other mementos
Made of precious metals could trek to the city and exchange them at the
Torgsins (stores for foreigners) for vouchers, and then exchange them for
food.
Hardier peasants would flee their villages and seek salvation in urban
centers or in neighboring Belarus and RSFSR, where food was available.
Accounts of Ukrainian peasants overloading trains, filling stations
And wandering about Russian and Belarusian towns and countryside abound.
National and peasant questions became inextricably intertwined in
Stalin's decree of 14 December 1932, issued under the banal title "On
Grain
Procurement in Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and the Western Oblast"[37].
Ukrainization was blamed for problems in grain deliveries and
Exemplary punishment was prescribed for sabotage in grain procurement:
5-10
years of concentration camp for a number of "party traitors" arrested in
the
Orikhiv raion of Dnipropetrovs'k oblast of Ukraine, and de****tation to the
North of the Poltavska stanytsia of Kuban in the RSFSR.
The decree made the party and government chiefs in the three grain
Producing areas personally responsible for the completion of grain
procurement
By January 1933. Ukrainianization presently is carried out in Ukraine,
"without meticulous selection of the Bolshevik cadre", had allowed
bourgeois-nationalists and Petliurites to join party and state
institutions and set up their cells and organizations.
Absence of "revolutionary vigilance" by local party organizations let
"counterrevolutionary elements" become directors, accountants,
storekeepers, foremen in collective farms, members of village soviets.
Similar
accusation was brought against Northern Caucasus, with sup****ters of the
Kuban'
Rada figuring in place of Petliurites. This gave nationalists the
op****tunity to sabotage harvest and sowing campaigns and organize other
counterrevolutionary activities.
Party and Soviet authorities in Ukraine and Northern Caucasus were
Ordered to extirpate these counterrevolutionary elements, execute them or
De****t them to concentration camps, including "saboteurs with party
Member****p cards in their pockets".
The verdict against Ukrainization came in two parts. In Ukraine it was
Not formally prohibited, but Stalin insisted that it resume its primary
vocation, that of promoting "correct Bolshevik implementation of
Lenin's national policy", which in fact meant integration and
assimilation.
Ukrainian authorities were instructed to "expel Petliurite and other
bourgeois-nationalist elements from party and government
organizations", and "meticulously select and recruit Ukrainian Bolshevik
cadre". The
signal was thus given for rapid curtailment of Ukrainization and return to
a
more
sophisticated policy of Russification.[38]
Ukrainians of Northern Caucasus fared worse. "Non-Bolshevik
'Ukrainianization', which affected nearly half of the raions in the
Northern Caucasus," and which was declared to be "at variance with the
cultural
interests of the population", was totally discontinued and replaced
with Russification.
The use of the Ukrainian language was banned in public offices of
Local administration, cooperative societies, and schools. The printing of
newspapers and magazines in the Ukrainized raions of Northern Caucasus
was to switch immediately to Russian, and preparation were to begin
immediately for the transfer in the fall of all Ukrainian schools into
Russian.
The whole Poltava stanytsia was ordered to be de****ted and resettled
With demobilized Russian Red Army soldiers, who would receive the
abandoned
land, buildings, equipment, and cattle. In fact, 2,158 families with 9,187
members were sent out before 27 December[39] and resettled a month later
with
1,826 demobilized soldiers.[40]
Together with Medvedivs'ka and Umans'ka, the three Cossack stanytsias
Saw 45,000 persons de****ted to the North. On 15 December, Molotov and
Stalin signed a similar ban on Ukrainization, for the rest of the
previously
Ukrainized Soviet regions in the RSFSR.
Stalin's anti-Ukrainization decree reveals the extent to which the
dictator
was ready to go, in sacrificing the Ukrainian nation on the altar of
great-power ambitions. There is little doubt that the ban on Ukrainization
was a sop to Russian chauvinism, especially in ethnically mixed
regions outside the Ukrainian SSR. National and social repressions
reinforced
one another, even if neither was acknowledged openly.
For the next several months after the condemnation of the abuses of
Ukrainization and the Ukrainian sabotage of grain procurements, the
Ukrainian countryside passed through some of the worst moments in its
history. The litany of repressive measures is endless. 82 raions were
deprived of manufactured goods for not fulfilling their quotas of
grain deliveries.
On 19 December, Stalin orders Kaganovich and Postishev back to Ukraine
To help Kosior, Chubar and Khataevich carry out the procurement plan. On
24 December, collective farms are ordered to deliver all grain in
Fulfillment of the plan, including grain put aside for seed and food.
Direct
orders to increase repressive measures, arrests and de****tations increase.
A
real reign of terror seizes the republic and the Kuban.
On 22 January 1933 Stalin struck another crippling blow against the
Starving Ukrainian grain growers. The new secret decree, drafted by the
Gensec
himself, is perhaps the best available proof of the dictator's
genocidal intent against the Ukrainian nation. Sent to Ukraine, Belarus
and
the
neighboring regions of RSFSR[41], the do***ent calls attention to the
unrestrained exodus of peasants from the Kuban' and Ukraine to the
near-by regions of Russia and Belarus.
Central authorities are said to have no doubt that these migrants, who
pretend to search for food, are, in fact, Socialist-Revolutionaries and
agents of Poland, sent to agitate, "through the peasants", in the
northern parts of the USSR, against the kolkhoz system and the Soviet
power.
Addressees are reminded that a similar movement took place the
Previous year, but the party, soviet and police authorities of Ukraine did
nothing to stop it. It must not be allowed to happen this year.
Stalin then orders the party, soviet and the repressive organs of the
Northern Caucasus and Ukraine to prevent the exodus of their peasants
To other regions of the USSR and directs them to close border crossings
between Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.
The GPU of the Russian oblast's adjacent to the quarantined Ukrainian
And Northern Caucasus regions, and the trans****t section of the OGPU, are
instructed to arrest all peasants from Ukraine and North Caucasus, who
have managed to leave their territory, and, after segregating the
counter-revolutionary elements, return the others to their villages.
The next day, the Politburo of the CC KP(b)U adopted a resolution to
Carry out Moscow's orders and forwarded the directive, along with addition
instructions, for implementation by the appropriate Ukrainian
authorities.[42]
The Ukrainian branch of the OGPU was ordered to instruct all railway
stations not to sell tickets to peasants with destinations beyond the
Ukrainian borders, without formal travel permission from the raion
executive
Committee or a certificate of employment from construction or industrial
enterprises.
Oblasts were told to take "resolute measures" to prevent massive
Departure of their peasants, carefully check the work of agents recruiting
Peasants for work outside Ukraine, and to urge kolhospnyky and individual
farmers not to depart without permission for other raions because they
would
be
arrested there.
On 25 January, B. Sheboldaev, the party boss of the North Caucasus
Territory, issued a similar order, adding instructions on the
employment of internal forces and border troupes and the setting up of
filtration
points.[43]
Like the anti-Ukrainization decree of 14 December 1932, the 22 January
1933 directive, which closed the borders to the famished Ukrainian
peasants
Was not the beginning but the culmination of processes that had started
Many moths before. Petrovsky had complained to Stalin, back in June 1932,
About the ban on train ticket for Ukrainian peasants who wanted to obtain
provisions in Russia.
Evdokimov's telegram from Rostov-on-Don, which Iagoda prepared for
Stalin's attention on 23 January 1933, details the elaborate measures
taken
Since November to prevent the flight of farmers from the Northern Caucasus
Territory. Among these were roadblocks set up on the main arteries of
peasant migration.
Trans****t authorities had arrested 11,774 persons and another 7,534
Were incarcerated by other organs. In the same dossier, Balitsky's re****t
from 22 January informed of massive exodus of peasants from Ukraine since
December.[44]
Departures were registered in 74 raions, 721 villages and 228
kolhosps. In all, 31,693 persons left: 20,129 from Kharkiv oblast', 6,576
from
the
Kyiv oblast, 3,447 from Odessa oblast, and 1,541 from Chernihiv. Of these
migrants about one third were collective farmers and two thirds
individual farmers; 128 were activists. A check at the railway junction
stations
in the Kharkiv oblast revealed a great demand for long-distance tickets:
in
January 1933 16,500 such tickets were sold in Lozova station and 15,000 -
in
Sumy.
In the beginning of January 1933, the GPU began to apprehend agitators
And organizers of these migrations and arrested over 500 of them. [45] As
A direct result of Stalin's borders decree of 22 January 1933, 219,460
Persons were arrested in the first six weeks of its application; some were
sent to the Goulag, others punished in other ways, while 186,588 were sent
back to their villages to face the famine.[46]
In the middle of March 1933, Kosior wrote unperturbedly to the Kremlin
That "the famine still hasn't taught many kolhospnyky a lesson".[47] In
his
re****t from Kharkiv, dated 31 May 1933, the Italian consul general
prognosticated on the devastation of the country: "The current
disaster will bring about a preponderantly Russian colonization of
Ukraine. In
a
future time, perhaps very soon, one will no longer be able to speak of a
Ukraine, or of a Ukrainian people, and thus not even of a Ukrainian
problem,
Because Ukraine will have become a de facto Russian region."[48]
There can be little doubt today that the famine was not only used by the
Communist party for political purposes, but that it was actually created
and
directed by Stalin and his henchmen for that purpose. The regime's
ultimate objective was to transform the backward empire into an industrial
giant and a military superpower that could ex****t socialism abroad.
To achieve this, Stalin needed great quantities of marketable grain,
Which was to be extracted from the peasants "at any price" to the
producers
but at minimal price to the state. The most expedient way was to herd the
peasants into collective farms, subject them to a direct control from the
Kremlin, and in this way ensure maximum grain deliveries to the state.
The Kremlin knew that the peasants would resist and that the
imposition of its will would result in the loss of millions of human
lives,
but that
was of no concern for masters of a well-populated empire. Stalin's project
required a homogenous and docile population. Revived Ukrainian
particularism, taking advantage of the indigenization program,
reinforced national unity at the expense of cohesion of the new
"fatherland of
world proletariat".
The two sources of resistance to Stalin's plans (national and social)
Became embodied in the same group - the Ukrainian farmers. Stalin decided
to
sacrifice a considerable part of this group in order to eliminate the
opposition to his projects and to frighten the rest of the Ukrainian
nation into accepting the role of cogs (as he liked to call them) of the
great socialist mechanism.
The Stalin-Kaganovich discussion of the Petrovsy and Chubar letters
(June-July 1932), the "five ears of corn" law (7 August, 1932), the
condemnation of Ukrainization (14 December 1932), and the closing of
internal Soviet borders on starving Ukrainian peasants, each provide
smoking gun revelations about the genocide against the Ukrainian nation.
But a
multitude of other do***ents now emerging from the secret archives
help us get a rounded understanding of the gigantic crime and the
immeasurable
suffering of its victims.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------------
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Leo Kuper, Genocide. Its Politic Use in the Twentieth Century.
(Penguin,
1981), p. 35.
[2] Valerii Vasiliev & Yuri Shapoval (eds.), Komandyry velykoho
holodu.
Poizdky V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz
1932-1933 rr. Kyiv, 2001; I. Zelenin et al (eds.), Tragediia sovetskoi
derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i rasskulachivanie. Tom 3. Moskva, 2001;
Stalin I Kaganovich Perepiska 1931-1936 gg. Moskva, 2001;
Rozsekrechena pam'iat': Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini v dokumentakh
GPU-NKVD. Kyiv,
2007;
Ruslan Pyrih (ed.), Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: dokumenty i
materialy. Kyiv, 2007.
[3] Nicolas Werth, La terreur et le d=E9sarroi: Staline et son syst=E8me.
Paris, Perrin, 2007.
[4] Discussed more fully in my article, "The Ukrainian Famine of
1932-1933 and the United Nations Convention on Genocide", in Taras Hunczak
&
Roman Serbyn. Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933: Genocide by Other Means.
(Forthcoming.)
[5] For a thorough discussion of Ukrainization and its problems see
James Mace, Communism and the dilemmas of national liberation: national
Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933. Cambride, Mass., 1983.
See also Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and
Nationalism
in the Soviet Union, 1929-1939. Ithaca & London, 2001.
[6] J. V. Stalin, "Concerning the National Question in Yugoslavia"
Works.
Vol. 7. Moscow, 1954. Pp. 71-72.
[7] Rozsekrechena pam'iat'. Pp. 75-81.
[8] Valerii Vasil'ev & Linn Viola. Kolektyvizatsiia i selians'kyi opir
Na Ukraini (lystopad 1929-berezen' 1930). Vinnytsia, 1997. P. 91.
-
[9] Nicolas Werth, La terreur et le d=E9sarroi: Staline et son syst=E8me.
Paris, Perrin, 2007. P. 118.
[10] Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini:ochyma istorykiv, movoiu
dokumentiv. Kyiv, 1990. P. 148.
[11] All quotations and references to the two letters are taken from
Komandyry velykoho holodu. Pp.206-215.
[12] One pood =3D 16.36 kg; 1 ton - 61.36 poods.
[13] The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence 1931-1936. New Haven&
London, 2003. P. 136.
[14] For the allocation of the food aid, see Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na
Ukraini. Kyiv, 1990. P. 183, 187-188.
[15] The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence. P. 138 (Underlined by
Stalin).
[16] The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence. P. 138-139..
[17] Holod. 1990. P. 183 (doc. 63), P. 190 (doc. 68).
[18] The original plan of 410 million poods (6.7 m.t.) was lowered
twice to 356 and 274.8 million poods (5.8 m.t.; 4.5 m.t. ) but 16 November
was
raised to 5.8 m.t. Rozsekrechena pam'iat'. p. 84.
[19] For a detailed account of the deliberations see Komandyry
Velykoho holodu. Pp. 152-164
[20] See part of the resolution in Holod1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini.
Kyiv, 1990. P. 194-198
[21] A secret OGPU re****t from around 20 July 1932 stated that "as for
anti-Soviet manifestations, Ukraine occupies first place". "From 1
January to 1 July 1932, 118 counterrevolutionary kulak organizations were
discovered, counting 2.479 members. In addition, along the lines of
national counterrevolution we have unmasked 35 groups with 562 members."
Tragedia, p.
421. Another secret OGPU re****t, dated 5 August, contains a section
"National counterrevolution (U[krainian]SSR)" which relates the
Liquidation of 8 nationalist groups, two of which consisted of former
members
Of the outlawed UKP (Ukrainian Communist Party). These people are said to
have a leftist program and conduct systematic activity among members of
the
KP(b)U, arguing that the Soviet authorities are suppressing the Ukrainian
culture. In their platform, claims the re****t, they declare war on the
Soviet
regime and Polish fascism, while in fact keeping links abroad and carrying
out directives of the Second Department of of the Polish General Staff in
Ukraine. Ibid. p. 443.
[22] The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence. P. 164-165.
[23] S. Kulchytsky, Tsina "Velykoho perelomu". Kyiv, 1990. P. 296. On
23 July Stalin sent a telegram to Kaganovich demanding the restoration
And enforcement of last year's ban on trans****ting private bread supplies
By rail or water. Tragedia, p. 428.
[24] The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence. P. 166.
[25] The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence. P. 169.
[26] Tragedia, p. 453-454.
[27] Stalin i Kaganovich Perepiska. Pp. 273-275; The Stalin-Kaganovich
Correspondence. P. 179-181. A follow-up secret "Instruction on the
Application of the TsIK and SNK SSSR of 7 August 1932 About the
Safeguarding of State Property", signed by the Chairman and the Prosecutor
of
the
Supreme Court of the USSR and the Vice-Charman of the OGPU, was sent out
on 16
September to all republican and oblast authorities. Tragedia. P.
477-479.
[28] On 12 August Stalin sends a note to Kaganovich asking him to keep
secret for the moment the plan regarding Ukraine sent in the preceding
letter. Tragedia. P. 276. To stiffen Kosior's resolve, in January
1933, Stalin sent him the more resolute Postyshev as his second in
command;
Redens was replaced Balitsky in February 1933.
[29] Letter of 16 Augus 1932. Stalin i Kaganovich Perepiska. P.
283-284;
Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence. P. 183-184.
[30] Timoty Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War. New Haven, Yale
University Press. P. 104.
[31] Kosior spoke of 255 m.p. at the January plenum of the CC KP(b)U.
Holod1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini. P. 352.
Davies and Wheatcroft give
3,584,000 tons, or 219 millon poods, P. 478.
Other authors give similar figures.
[32] Holod 1932-1932 rokiv na Ukraini. P. 253.
[33] Tragedia. P. 559.
[34] Davies & Wheatcroft, The Years of Hunger. P. 178.
[35] Komandyry velykoho holodu. P. 50.
[36] Komandyry velykoho holodu. P. 49; Kulchytsky, Holod 1932-1933 v
Ukraini iak henotsyd. Kyiv, 2005. P. 98
[37] Tragedia, Pp. 575-577; also in Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini.
Pp 291-194.
[38] The Russification of Ukraine attracted the attention of the
Italian consulate in Kharkiv. "In government offices the Russian language
is
Once again being used, in correspondence as well as in verbal dealings
Between employees." See the "Italian Diplomatic and Consular Dispatches",
Re****t to Congress. Commission on the Ukraine Famine. Wa****ngton, 1988. P.
446.
[39] G.G. Iagoda re****t to Stalin, 29 December 1932. Lubianka. Stalin
I VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Moskva 2003. P. 386.
[40] Nicolaas Werth, Le pouvoir sovi=E9tique et la paysannerie dans les
rap****ts de la police politique (1930-1934). Rap****t du 27 f=E9vrier
1933.
/http:/www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/dossier_soviet_paysans/sommaire.html/
[41] Tragedia sovetskoi derevni. P. 634-635. The first English
Translation of the do***ent appeared in Terry Martin, The Affirmative
Action
Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca and
London, 2001. P.p. 306-307.
[42] Volodymyr Serhiichuk. Iak nas moryly holodom. Kyiv, 2003. PP
156-158.
[43] Tragedia, p. 636-637.Sheboldaev added more precisions on the
Filtration points three days later. Ibid. P. 638.
[44] Lubianka. Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Moskva 2003.P. 394.
[45] Lubianka. P. 392-393.
[46] N.A. Ivnitskii, Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie (nachala 30-
Kh godov). Moscow, 1994. P. 204.
[47] Tragedia. P. 657.
[48] "Italian Diplomatic and Consular Dispatches. Op. cit. P. 427.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------------
FOOTNOTE: Article published by the Action Ukraine Re****t (AUR) with
permission from Professor Federigo Argentieri, John Cabot University,
Rome, Italy.
For the real TRUTH about ZHIDS, visit the world top-rated website
for JEW-WATCH:
http://www.jewwatch.com
Now with more evidence coming out proving ZHID COLLABORATION
WITH NAZIS - another 51 cases besides the renowned Kastner case -
no wonder people around the world are really disliking the
Christkiller ZHIDS!!
Or, other useful websites include:
ZUNDELSITE - www.zundelsite.org
IHR - www.ihr.org
Stormfront - http://www.stormfront.org
OSTARA - www.ostara.org
PAMYAT - http://abbc.com/pamyat/index.html
Edgar J.Steele - www.ConspiracyPenPal.com
AL JAZEERA - http://english.aljazeera.net/HomePage
THE HOFFMAN WIRE - Dedicated to Freedom of the Press,
Investigative Re****ting and Revisionist History
Subscribe: HoffmanWire-subscribe@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
's White Nationalist Library - http://www.ddc.net/ygg
American Renaissance - http://www.amren.com
Campaign for Radical Truth in History - http://www.hoffman-info.com
Or, visit the website for NATIONAL ALLIANCE : http://www.natall.com
They have lots of information, as well as books and records.
Reply-To: Frank Arthur - Art@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
or to Steve Horn - kcom@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
KenMcVay@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
free to subscribe us to maillists for ***,
homo***uals and the like.
|
