My presentation today focuses on the conflict in Sri Lanka. And as
such, you might be puzzled as to why I am introducing elements of
democracy as well as terrorism into the discussion. Well, there is
good reason to focus broadly on both subjects, when speaking of a
conflict that has dragged on, yes, for over 30 years.
Global View of Democracy
As far as the western world is concerned, the history of democracy
begins during the times of ancient Greeks and Romans. However, coming
as I do from the east, we are aware that a form of democracy existed
in ancient India, long before Athenians even began to practice
democracy.
The system of governance in ancient Sri Lanka also goes back several
centuries before the Christian era, and many of you may be aware, that
the history and culture of our island is intertwined with India=92s.
That being the case, it is safe to assume, that some form of
participatory democracy existed in ancient Sri Lanka as well.
Western democracy, which took root in ancient Athens and Rome,
blossomed in Europe and in North America during the 19th and 20th
centuries. Moreover, with the decolonization process taking place
during the middle of the 20th century, particularly in South Asia,
many colonized countries in the region had the op****tunity to enjoy
the fruits of democracy. Thus, in the late forties, former British
colonial subjects such as India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon, as our
country was known at the time, received independence, and an
introduction, to the democratic form of government. However, of those
countries, Pakistan and Burma could not enjoy democracy continuously
due to challenges they had to face. Today, Pakistan is making a bold
attempt to return to democracy, while Burma, now known as Myanmar, is
being ****ged by its neighbors and others, to return to the democratic
fold. In the meantime, despite its sheer size and diversity, India
remains a stalwart of democracy, and Sri Lanka, despite the challenges
it has had to face over the past several decades, with a bloody armed
conflict that consumed over 60,000 lives, continues its democratic
traditions and is currently engaged in a process of consolidation.
Democracy in Sri Lanka
A little known fact is that in Sri Lanka, the seeds of democracy were
sown long before its independence in 1948. In fact, universal adult
suffrage, an essential ingredient of democracy, was introduced to Sri
Lanka in 1931; a mere 14 years after the U.S. afforded that facility
to its people. Thus, Sri Lanka became the first country in Asia, where
its people enjoyed the op****tunity to vote without any distinction.
Addressing the Indian parliament on January 2, 1978, President Jimmy
Carter said, "Democracy is like the experience of life itself - always
changing, infinite in its variety, sometimes turbulent and all the
more valuable for having been tested for adversity." Taken in the
context of Sri Lanka, this compelling description of democracy by
President Carter, involuntarily moves to a more powerful echelon of
thought, for, democracy in Sri Lanka has indeed been tested more than
once, for adversity. And, it is an achievement of considerable
significance, that despite the challenges it had to face over the
years, the democratic fabric of our country yet remains intact. In
fact, it ought to be said that, the strength of democracy in any
country should be *****sed, not when those countries are enjoying
relative peace, security and prosperity, but when they are compelled
to face adversity, and challenges, which threaten the very sinews of
freedom and democracy. This is the case of Sri Lanka: a country that
has endured untrammeled terrorism for several decades, which has
violently pulled apart the country and its people, as never before in
history. Despite the magnitude of the challenge and the death and
destruction that spewed because of unmitigated acts terrorism, Sri
Lanka, has no choice but to respond to such threats appropriately, in
keeping with norms expected of democracies. This, I must say, is not
an easy task, and am confident that there will be no disagreement on
that score.
Recent history of Terrorism
History has witnessed many instances, where terror tactics were used
on people to achieve political or other leverages. The Greek historian
Xenophon, who lived from 431BC to 350 BC, has spoken of the
effectiveness of psychological warfare against enemy populations, who
were clearly non-combatants.
The 20th century saw terrorism being practiced widely when it became
the hallmark of subversive movements, representing the extreme right
to the extreme left of the political spectrum. Technological advances,
the spread of small arms and light weapons, deadly explosive devices
that can be electrically or electronically detonated, and the ability
to purchase air tickets on the internet, with freely available credit
cards, and circle the globe, thanks to rapid air trans****tation, have
given terrorists a new lethality and mobility. The Baader-Meinhof gang
of West Germany, the Japanese Red Army, Italy's Red Brigade, the
Puerto Rican FALN, the ****ning Path of Peru, PKK claiming to represent
the Kurds, the universally dreaded Al Qaeda and the LTTE of Sri Lanka,
to name a few, were among the most feared terrorist groups of the
latter part of the 20th century.
Increasing use of terrorism to achieve political objectives
The increasing use of terrorism to achieve political objectives, is a
relatively new phenomenon that developed in the second half of the
20th century. At first, the world witnessed a spate of hijackings of
civilian aircraft by Palestinian organizations. Gradually it began to
witness other acts of terrorism, such as the attack against the US
embassy in Beirut in 1983, followed by another truck bombing against
US Marine Corps headquarters in Beirut six month later, together
causing more than 300 deaths. In December that year, yet another
explosives-laden truck was driven into the US Embassy in Kuwait,
causing heavy casualties.
On the heels of these attacks, civilian airliners became targets, and
TWA Flight 840 was bombed in April 1986, followed by Pan Am Flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, killing 259. After these
and numerous other attacks against U.S. nationals, terrorists focused
their attention on two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in August
1998, killing 224.
Over the years, we have heard the LTTE, and similar organizations in
many parts of the world, express their view, that their acts of
terrorism can be justified, in exercising their right to self-
determination. However, it must be pointed out, that although the
universal right to self-determination is enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations, and embodied in the International Covenants on
Human Rights and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, none of those international
instruments encourage or condone terrorism in pursuit of that
objective.
Indeed, some groups tend to bolster their case by making reference, to
the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States, albeit partially. However, it is pertinent to point out that
in 1993, having deliberated on the matter extensively, UN member
States, while recognizing that all peoples have the right to self-
determination, declared, and I quote, "Taking into account the
particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien
domination or foreign occupation, the World Conference on Human Rights
recognizes the right of peoples to take any legitimate action, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." End of quote.
The crucial point made in the Vienna Declaration is that, those who
seek to exercise the right to self-determination should take
"legitimate action," and such action should be "in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations." I need not emphasize here that acts of
unbridled terrorism are wholly illegitimate and such actions are not
condoned, or encouraged in the UN Charter.
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural
Relations, state that, "All peoples have the right of self
determination and by virtue of that right, they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic social and cultural
development." However, both these conventions also make it clear that
those rights can only be promoted, "in conformity of the Charter of
the United Nations."
Sri Lanka Tamils speak of discrimination based on language and
standardization
Focusing on the Sri Lankan conflict, language and standardization in
university admissions, are among the major issues highlighted by the
Sri Lankan Tamil community, to establish that their community was
discriminated against, by successive administrations, thus, prompting
them to demand a separate state. To buttress their claim for a
separate state, they also claim that the north and the east had been
the traditional homeland of Tamils since time immemorial. However, the
fact remains that at no time in the history of the island was there a
=91Tamil Eelam,=92 encompassing the north and the east. Furthermore, when
a separate sub-kingdom did exist in the north, it never encompassed
the east of the island. Even the so called Jaffna kingdom came to a
partial end in 1561 A.D. and to a complete end in 1621 A.D., when
Cankili the Second, a usurper to the throne, was removed by the
****tuguese to Goa, and was promptly hanged. Therefore, the vain
attempt made by the TULF in 1976, to claim statehood on historical
basis, relying on an erroneous minute made by the first British
colonial secretary Hugh Cleghorn, can be put to rest.
However, when the allegation of discrimination relating to the
language issue is discussed, one can understand why the newly
independent Ceylon decided to introduce the Official Languages Act
(33) of 1956, with a view to making Sinhala the official language of
the country. Ceylon was emerging from colonial rule that had lasted
several centuries, where English had been the language of
administration, irrespective of the fact that over 70% of the
population spoke Sinhala. From a Tamil viewpoint, the Official
Language Act, while giving prominence to the Sinhala language, ignored
the fact that Tamils comprised approximately 23 % of the population.
Even though the administration of that time attempted to address this
lacuna, two years later, through the The Tamil Language (Special
Provisions) Act of 1958, it must be admitted that, the measure did not
fully remedy the situation.
Standardization was also a contentious issue, as the Tamils saw it as
a measure to admit Sinhalese to the universities at the expense of
Tamils. However, the Sinhalese saw it as a corrective measure, to give
the Sinhala youth their dues in university admissions, particularly to
the medical and engineering faculties, which had a much higher
percentage of Tamil students in comparison to their ethnic ratio.
While one can sympathize with the Sri Lankan Tamils, for losing the
privileged position they enjoyed during the colonial era, it must be
pointed out that even before independence, Tamil politicians made it a
practice to make submissions to the colonial administration that their
community was subjected to discrimination on several areas. However,
having examined the alleged discriminatory practices, the colonial
administration said, "A careful review of the evidence submitted to us
provides no substantial indication of a general policy on the part of
the government of Ceylon of discrimination against minority
communities." Similarly, responding to another complaint made by the
All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), that there was discrimination with
regard to public appointments affecting their community, the Soulbury
Commission said, "we received from the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress,
complaints of discrimination against the members of their community in
regard to appointments in the Public Services. This matter provides a
common source of dissension between majority and minority communities,
but in this case, the complaint did not, as might have been expected,
disclose that the pro****tion of the posts held by the Ceylon Tamils
was smaller than the size of their community would justify. On the
contrary, the Ceylon Tamils appear, at any rate, as late as 1938, to
have occupied a dispro****tionate number of posts in the public
services." Thus, it is apparent, that even during colonial times,
Tamil politicians attempted, now and then, to play the discriminatory
card, with a view to getting favourable advantages to their community.
1957 and 1965 agreements and exacerbation of the conflict Apart from
real or perceived grievances, such as those relating to
discrimination, Sri Lankan Tamils have other issues that make them
feel they have been short changed by respective governments, over the
decades. Take for example, the pacts, the leader of the Federal Party,
Chelvanayakam, signed in 1957, with then Prime Minister Bandaranaike
representing the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and in 1965, with
Dudley Senanayake, representing the United National Party (UNP). In
both instances, two agreements signed with two different
administrations in two different decades by Chelvanayakam, failed to
see the light of day, due to protests, primarily from the opposition
parties in parliament. First, it was the UNP, which opposed the
Chelvanayakam /Bandaranaike Pact, and hit the streets with massive
protests. Eight years later, the SLFP returned the favour to the UNP.
While Sri Lankan Tamils can fault the southern polity for reneging
agreements signed in good faith, and for their inability to make
concessions to the Tamils, there have been inherent weaknesses, not
only in the manner in which agreements were negotiated, but also in
the content.
One of the major drawbacks was, the administrations of the time, not
understanding the im****tance of taking the electorate into confidence,
and briefing them on the need for reaching accommodation with a
substantial group of citizens, and getting their consent, which is
part and parcel of participatory democracy. Thus, both Bandaranaike
and Senanayake, failed to make good of their understanding with the
Sri Lankan Tamil leader****p, and suc***bed to political pressure
exerted by opposition political parties of the day, whose interest was
not to accommodate the Tamil leader****p, but to use the op****tunity
provided to weaken the administration, in the hope of grabbing power.
LTTE=92s fight for supremacy over Tamil political parties and armed
groups
If the southern political parties were unable to make concessions to
the Tamils, because of their political ambitions and priorities, and,
thus prevented them from addressing an im****tant national issue at its
nascent stage, it can be pointed out, that the LTTE too, had no
intention of reaching a political arrangement, in place of a separate
state.
In the first instance, in its quest for power and unadulterated
supremacy over other Tamil political parties, and the numerous Tamil
armed groups that emerged in the late 70s, like wild mushrooms after a
monsoon rain, the LTTE systematically decimated leaders of other Tamil
political parties and armed groups, until it succeeded in emerging as
the single most powerful organization.
In this process of elimination, the LTTE assassinated the TULF
leader****p, including its party leader, A. Amirthalingam, along with
politbureau member, V. Yogeswaran, in 1989. J.N. Dixit, the Indian
High Commissioner, who played a key role in the 1987 Indo Lanka Peace
Accord, expresses his view of Amirthalingam=92s assassination, in his
book, Assignment Colombo (1998), and I quote, "The LTTE=92s apprehension
that Amirthalingam may wean away Sri Lankan Tamil public opinion to
the democratic mainstream of Sri Lankan politics led to the LTTE
killing him." End of quote. Irrespective of the accuracy of this
observation, it can be safely said that the LTTE believed the goal of
a separate state could be realized, not democratically, but only
through violence.
The role of the LTTE in the ensuing years in decimating the Tamil
intelligentsia, and in coercing the TULF to step aside and make way,
was described by the current leader of the party, V. Anandasangaree,
whose lone voice of reasoning is still heard from time to time. In his
views on Reflections on the Pongu Thamil (Tamil Resurgence) Festival,
held in Toronto, in 2004, he said, and I quote, "From the disbanding
of EROS 18 years earlier to the breakaway of Karuna=92s faction
recently, the number of our Tamil brethren killed in internecine
strife between armed Tamil groups exceeds those killed by the Sri
Lankan Armed Forces. Among the victims of internecine strife are
educationists, human rights activists, Tamil university students who
demanded justice, fellow militants, community and political leaders
and ordinary folk. Even amidst the winds of peace, Tamil women are
daily stricken to widowhood on their own Tamil soil, not by aliens,
but by their Tamil brothers. Even daily encounters with atrocities of
infants having their father or mother murdered for their political
stand are yet to stir anyone to Boil or Surge Over in protest." End of
quote.
The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed between the LTTE and the
Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) in February 2002, was a watershed for
the LTTE, as that event facilitated the LTTE to climb on to the world
stage. Moreover, thanks to the Norwegian insistence, the LTTE was
received and recognized as an equal to the government of Sri Lanka.
The leader of the LTTE delegation was addressed by the Norwegian
facilitator as, "Excellency Anton Balasingham." The two sides met on
six different occasions in locations such as Satthahip and Bangkok, in
Thailand, Oslo, Berlin and Hakone in Japan etc., from September 2002
to March 2003. Even though the CFA provided an ideal op****tunity for
both sides to reach an understanding, the LTTE was not prepared to
negotiate in any real sense, for one good reason. That was, that they
had not hit the peace alley with a view to giving up their demand for
a separate state, but took that path with the intention of taking a
short cut to a separate state. If they failed, they would yet use the
op****tunity provided by the CFA, to remove the debilitating blockade
of the north imposed by the government, and use the relatively
peaceful period to arm themselves, so that they could once again
challenge the government militarily, at an op****tune time. In
fairness, it must be said that the LTTE entertained the idea of
engaging in negotiations with the government, with a certain amount of
trepidation, not being certain as to which way the water would flow. I
remember accompanying a minister of the administration of that time to
Oslo in August 2002, meeting with late Anton Balasingham, and giving
him an assurance that the government would not try to gain undue
advantage, or pressure the LTTE, as they gingerly ventured into
negotiations with the government, for the first time since 1990. That
was how Balasingham obtained the concurrence of the LTTE leader****p to
begin negotiations.
When the going was good, the international media described the Sri
Lanka peace process as =91the fastest forward moving peace process,=92 at
that time. However, the enthusiasm of Sri Lankans and the world was to
be dampened soon, and it became evident that LTTE chief negotiator
Balasingham was pressed against a rock and a hard place, as the Sri
Lankan government wanted to engage in real negotiations, and the LTTE
leader****p did not see any reason to comply, as it would have
adversely impacted on its claim for a separate state. However much the
government delegation pushed, and the Norwegian facilitators prodded,
the LTTE stubbornly refused to budge, until negotiations virtually
came to a standstill one chilly evening of December 2002, in Oslo. To
be fair by the Norwegian facilitators, they persisted until
Balasingham yielded, and came up with a draft on the following
morning, later known as the Oslo Declaration. It said, "Responding to
a proposal by the leader****p of the LTTE, the parties agreed to
explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-
determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking
peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The
parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all
communities."
Which ever way one looks at the understanding reached in Oslo, it can
be taken as a landmark decision. First, it was a decision to look for
internal self-determination in place of external self-determination.
Second, it was a decision to look for a solution on a federal
structure within a united Sri Lanka and third, there was an agreement
that the solution had to be acceptable to all communities. In essence,
the LTTE had moved away from its demand for a separate state, and
returned to the original demand of the Tamils for a federal state,
first made in 1949, and the Sri Lanka government had moved away from
its long standing opposition to a federal arrangement.
While the understanding reached in Oslo, provided an op****tunity for
Sri Lanka to move away from a debilitating armed conflict, which had
caused tens of thousands of deaths, and inevitable retardation of the
Sri Lankan economy, which, ironically, the Far Eastern Economic Review
of July 1983, had predicted would replicate Hong Kong, it soon became
apparent, that either Balasingham had exceeded his authority, or the
LTTE leader****p realized they were speeding down the wrong track,
which would rob them of their quest for statehood. What followed was
an apparent disagreement between the LTTE leader****p and Balasingham,
and this time around, =91federalism=92 became a dirty word, not for the
southern politicians, but for the LTTE. Soon thereafter, Balasingham
retreated from the "Proposal by the LTTE leader****p," as the Oslo
understanding stated, for internal self determination, based on a
federal structure, thus, providing an op****tunity for some parties in
the south to insist on a =91unitary state=92.
I went to great lengths to explain what happened in the spring of
2003, in order to demonstrate that the LTTE was primarily responsible
for derailing the peace process. Having agreed to explore a federal
solution, the LTTE pulled out of negotiations, describing it as
suspension of "its participation in the negotiations for the time
being." Speaking of LTTE stratagem, M. Rama Rao says, in an article to
the Asian Tribune, "An unmistakable reality of Sri Lanka scene over
the past three decades is that the LTTE has been equally im****tant in
blocking the elusive "southern consensus". All peace initiatives have
failed because of its intransigence and because of its overriding
faith in violence as means to achieve its goal. The LTTE leader****p
will do well to realize that the world has moved a long distance after
9/11. And that the West, particularly the United States, is no longer
prepared to live with terrorism of one kind or the other=85" I fully
agree with Rama Rao=92s conclusion, but then, where do we go from here?
LTTE hijacks Tamil struggle and converts it into a violent conflict
That the LTTE hijacked the Tamil demand for a separate state in the
north and east of Sri Lanka, and systematically used violence and acts
of terrorism, to achieve that objective, are undeniable facts. Also,
nobody can disprove that several attempts were made by different
administrations to bring the conflict to an end through negotiations.
The Thimpu negotiations in 1985, and negotiations leading to the 1987
Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, were undertaken with the Indian government=92s
active participation. Negotiations with President Premadasa and
President Kumaratunga followed, in 1989 and 1995, respectively. Those
attempts were followed by negotiations with Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe and President Rajapaksa in 2002 and 2006 respectively.
The strategy employed by the LTTE was to walk away from the Thimpu
talks, the Indo Lanka agreement etc., following it up with the
assassinations of former Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and President
Premadasa, and attempting to take the life of President Kumaratunga,
employing suicide bombers. Among the long line of government leaders
assassinated by the LTTE, while the CFA was still operative, was
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.
Against this background, it is ironical that organizations such as
Amnesty International, and even some friendly countries, should have
expressed the view that the so-called unilateral abrogation of the CFA
by the Sri Lanka Government in January this year, resulted in
increasing the incidence of violence in the island! They fail to see
and refuse to acknowledge, that the CFA in fact did provide for one of
the parties to the agreement, to withdraw from it, if it became
necessary to do so. It was the repeated violations of the CFA by the
LTTE, on a massive scale, which compelled the government to see the
futility of hanging on to the CFA, which had practically become
defunct due to LTTE intransigence. Just for record purposes, by April
2007, the LTTE had violated the CFA 3830 times as against 351 times by
the government. Against such a number to its credit, it is ironical
that the LTTE had to wait until the government issued notice of
termination of the CFA in keeping with Article 4.4 of the agreement,
to assure 100% compliance of the CFA from thereon.
LTTE=92s failed strategy in 2006
Resumption of the conflict in 2006 was no accident. Events that
unfolded since early December 2005 indicate that the LTTE was moving
in the direction of provoking the government, and using the government
response to justify a thrust to capture Jaffna. The government was
cautious at the beginning, and practically ignored many grave
provocations. However, when the LTTE employed a suicide bomber in the
attempted assassination of the Army Commander, in April 2006, and
followed it by cutting off vital water supplies to some 60,000 farmers
in the east several months later, the government reacted firmly, and
with resolve. The LTTE=92s folly ended, with their losing of the Eastern
Province to the government, where steps have been taken toward
democratic elections on May 10, after a lapse of 14 long years.
The government=92s response to the challenges seems to have caused
concern, not only the LTTE, but also some friendly governments, who
believe that the current military operations in the Northern Province,
is aimed at seeking a military solution to the conflict. These sources
repeat themselves, every now and then, by proclaiming, "There is no
military solution to the conflict, and a solution must be found
through negotiations," as if they are privy to a formula, of which the
government is unaware. Simply put, what is being said by them is a
mere repetition of the government position, and there is no
fundamental difference between the government position and that of
some countries, which are engaged in the situation in Sri Lanka. The
irony is that, such views continue to be expressed despite repeated
assurances given by President Rajapaksa, that his desire is to grant
maximum possible devolution within one country. The Army Commander Lt.
Gen. Sarath Fonseka has made his position clear as well. He said, in
January 2008, "Ultimately, any solution will have to be political. But
there can be a political solution only after the LTTE had laid down
arms." He further said it was his duty is to prevent the LTTE from
using its military muscle to achieve its political objective through
resort to arms.
Thus, the government=92s position is clear. While it believes in a
political solution to resolve the issues faced by the minorities, it
has no choice but to act firmly and decisively against the LTTE=92s
armed incursions within and outside the north and the east, so that,
that organization will entertain no illusion that it could achieve its
political objectives by resorting to acts of violence and terrorism.
The message is loud and clear for all interested parties to hear.
Eventually, I repeat, eventually, there will have to be a negotiated
settlement to the conflict, and the LTTE should realize that resorting
to terrorism will not achieve for them a separate state.
A democratic solution
This brings us to the most im****tant issue concerning the conflict in
Sri Lanka. That is, the solution to the conflict, or issues affecting
the minorities, must first be discussed and negotiated, with the
involvement of all interested parties in the island. That is the only
way, a sustainable solution that is fair and reasonable to all, can be
arrived at. It is also crucially im****tant that the final agreement
should be democratically approved by the people. In certain western
democracies, people are consulted to decide whether shops should be
opened during weekends, or a bridge should be constructed at a certain
location. That being the situation, the people of Sri Lanka should
certainly be given an op****tunity to express their views, with regard
to a permanent arrangement to solve a crucial political issue, which
has dogged their lives for several decades. Sri Lanka cannot afford to
come up with another solution to address minority issues, such as
those negotiated in 1957 or 1965, only for it to be consigned to the
dustbin later.
The question we have to answer is, what should be a fair and lasting
solution? How do we reach that goal? What process should be employed
to reach that goal? Needless to say, whatever shape of the solution,
it will have to be arrived at through a democratic process.
The irony is that, the LTTE in its current form, cannot be a party to
a democratic process. If the past provides us with a guideline, then
we know, that throughout its existence, the LTTE has done its best to
stifle democracy. Assassinating moderate Tamil political leaders such
as A. Amirthalingam and Neelan Thiruchelvam, and preventing Tamil
people in the North and the East from voting at the 2005 presidential
election, are but two examples of how alien democratic practices are
to the LTTE.
If the demand for a separate state is a non-negotiable issue to the
LTTE, one cannot expect that organization to engage in negotiations in
good faith, for a political settlement. In such a backdrop, the
government will have the unenviable task of deciding how to proceed.
One way to address the issue is to consult the Tamil people in the
north and the east. And such an op****tunity has arisen at least in the
east, as a result of the bold decision taken by President Rajapaksa,
to go ahead with provincial council elections in the Eastern Province
in May, which was preceded by the peaceful and successful local
election held in Batticaloa District last March.
At least, there are signs of the long standing logjam being gradually
broken, as opined by Rama Rao. The first is, the decision to hold
provincial council elections in the Eastern Province, consisting of
three districts, and a mixed population of Tamils, Muslims and
Sinhalese. In fact, this exercise will be a test bed for turning the
Eastern Province around. The second im****tant aspect is, the decision
taken by none other than the LTTE, to field candidates under its
political party, the People=92s Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT), which
was registered by them, many years ago. The third and equally
im****tant issue, is the TMVP, the breakaway eastern group of the LTTE,
which participated in the local elections in the Batticaloa District
in March, which has also fielded candidates at the forthcoming
provincial election. All in all, the governing party, the opposition
party, the parties representing the LTTE and its breakaway group, the
TMVP, the SLMC and many others, will join the hustings, seeking the
vote of the long-suffering people of the Eastern Province, a feat that
would not have been predicted, even by the most confident soothsayers.
To say the least, it is a near miracle, how democracy triumphed in the
Eastern Province, while the people in some part of the Northern
Province are still under the jack boots of the LTTE.
President Rajapaksa has accomplished the impossible task, of providing
an op****tunity for the people in the east, to elect their
representatives through the ballot, in place of those who have, for so
long, imposed their will on a long-suffering people, through the
barrel of their guns. Rarely has the world seen such a feat of
democratization of a region held to ransom by terrorists, for such a
long time. The people of the east now have to move on, from democratic
elections to ensuring their personal security, development and
prosperity. It is here that the international community, including the
U.S., has a role to play. In this context, Sri Lanka welcomes the
stand taken in the U.S. Department of State Budget for the Financial
Year 2009, where it is stated: "The liberation of the east from the
LTTE control in July 2007, presents strategically im****tant
op****tunities for the United States to advance human rights by
promoting economic, political and social development." The
international community, with its concern for stability in Sri Lanka,
should move in and assist generously, in developing the Eastern
Province, and wean the youth away from the culture of violence, by
providing them with employment op****tunities. Now is the time to act
decisively, and to allow the process of healing to begin.
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