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COHA: Preval of Haiti - Provisional Re****t Card: Grade B+
Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit
This is the article that has apparently engendered much critical
discussion and about which COHA promised more. So far, there are only
a few comments posted on their website "Forum," here:
http://cohaforum.blogspot.com/2007/09/regarding-prval-of-haitia-provisional.html
NY Transfer News
*
Council on Hemispheric Affairs - Sep 14, 2007
http://www.coha.org/2007/09/14/preval-of-haiti%e2%80%94a-provisional-re****t-card-grade-b/
Pr(c)val of Haiti - A Provisional Re****t Card: Grade B+
by Michael Glenwick
COHA Research Associate
More than 18 months have passed since Ren(c) Pr(c)val was overwhelmingly
elected president of Haiti in what many regional analysts considered
one of the countrys most crucial elections in decades. Within a period
of only six years, Haitians had experienced a number of tumultuous
events. It started with President Jean-Bertrand Aristides chaotic
second term, in which international aid was suspended mainly due to
accusations of election fraud surrounding his 2000 victory. Shortly
thereafter, the 2004 coup d(c)tat designed to oust Aristide and his
government led to two wasted years under the unstable government of
Interim-Prime Minister G(c)rard Latortue and President Boniface
Alexandre, whose accomplishments were meager at best. In short, Haiti
was in desperate need of an effective and democratically elected leader
who would govern fairly and help inch the poverty-stricken state out of
its traditional despair. Expectations were large, and it was Pr(c)val, in
his second stint as president, who was expected to deliver on some, if
not all, of those expectations beginning in February 2006.
Eight days after the 2006 election, international observers almost
unanimously validated Pr(c)val as president and the elections as free and
fair. It was hoped that the unblemished manner in which Pr(c)val
won"through an entirely monitored democratic process that upheld the
Haitian constitution"would establish a mindset for his rule. Whether
that democratic process would be the hallmark of Pr(c)vals time in
office or just an early and later erasable blip on the screen would be
essential to know in evaluating the effectiveness of his presidency.
Now, more than a year and a half following what must have been Haitis
fairest election in decades, it is time to take a look at what has
transpired on the island in the intervening period. Was democracy as
practiced by Pr(c)val to be just a calling card for international
respectability, or was it intended as a constant thread of President
Pr(c)vals time in office? Following the period under Aristide defined by
its endemic corruption and the equally rocky interim period under
Alexandre when hundreds"if not thousands"of opposition party members
were murdered, only a true, stable democracy, it was believed, would be
able to start a long and difficult healing process.
Past and Present
Six years ago, President Aristide appeared to have given up hope of
ruling the country with intense energy, constitutional devotion, or a
tireless commitment to building democratic institutions. Perhaps due to
the attempted coup in late 2001"or, just as likely, his own
insensitivity to inclusive rule"Aristide seemed to manifest a show of
lassitude to the rule of law as well as indifference to democratic
institution building. He encouraged citizens to use violence when
needed to fight the nations armed opposition, and civil liberties and
political/human rights were in short supply. For all intents and
purposes, there was a constitution in name only, something which newly
elected President Pr(c)val, whom, it should be noted, was a close friend
and political comrade of Aristide, promised to change.
At the time of Pr(c)vals inauguration, the situation on the ground did
not look entirely different than it did in 2001. But within a few
months, some significant steps were taken in order to implement a
series of necessary changes geared toward getting closer to the ideal
of creating a democratic, law-abiding society and a fair-minded
administration. The most im****tant step taken was the first one"the
implementation of free and open balloting, whose results no one
contested. As much as that might be scoffed at due to Pr(c)vals
overwhelming popularity"he won with 51% of the vote, while runner-up
Leslie Manigat obtained only 12% of the vote"it was an im****tant
signature that put Haiti back on track to democracy. Most im****tantly
for average Haitians, this meant the reestablishment of much of the
international aid that had been cut off during Aristides time in
office; Pr(c)vals government was earmarked to receive an additional $750
million in assistance from donor nations to be dispensed to Haitis
population, indicating a major vote of confidence in his government by
the world community.
Baby Steps for Democracy
With Pr(c)vals decisive victory in the election, many analysts expected
his Lespwa (Front of Hope) Party to also carry the day in the two
legislative bodies, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (or lower
house). Lespwas opponents shocked Pr(c)val and his backers, as his party
was able to win only 13 out of 30 Senate seats and elect 23 out of 99
representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, Pr(c)val was thrown a
curveball at the outset of his administration. Whereas the margin of
his personal victory in the presidential race might have been enough to
give him a mandate to rule as a strong leader, the disappointing
results of the parliamentary elections were a stark reminder to him
that, even if he wanted to introduce dramatic reforms, he would face
major obstacles and likely would have to reach a variety of compromises
with the Haitian parliamentary opposition. In addition, while Pr(c)val
has gone some length to shape the legislature to cooperate with his
agenda, he was unable to generate a working majority on day-to-day
voting.
Pr(c)vals Powers Are Less Than Monarchic
As a result of this early check on Pr(c)vals power, few major pieces of
legislation have been passed as of yet. In addition, since no other
party held more seats than Lespwa, coalition building was, during much
of the period following the election, a slow and laborious process, as
in each instance Lespwas elected members tried, with little success,
to achieve a working majority coalition. To a large extent, this was
another im****tant sign that, although legislative accomplishments might
be slow in coming due to the lack of a working majority, the process
would, at least, be democratic.
In 2000, Aristides Fanmi Lavalas party had won 26 of 27 senate seats
and 73 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, leading to distrust of
both the president and his agenda inside and outside the country. On
the other hand, in 2006 and early 2007, individual Haitian political
thinkers and international observers alike expressed their confidence
that Pr(c)val, after he was elected, would have no choice but to govern
democratically. While political developments and the policies that he
wanted to push through the National Assembly have been slow in coming,
the respect that he attracted and his acknowledgement of constitutional
guarantees, which he freely offered to respect (unlike both
authoritarian and professed democratic chief executives), were
attributes that had been ignored for decades.
A closer look at how the National Assembly has functioned will help
shed a little light on the status of democracy in the country. Its
first"and, in many ways, most im****tant"function was to approve
Pr(c)vals cabinet choices. Due to the nature of the competing political
factions, this became a somewhat complex process. In the end, however,
a cabinet that included members of six political parties was approved
in a near unanimous vote; this was considered by both Pr(c)vals
sup****ters and opponents alike to be a vote of confidence for Pr(c)vals
rule. This process protected Haiti from the one-sided rule that had
dominated the country for so long, and, most im****tantly, it
demonstrated Pr(c)vals willingness to strive for consensus and govern in
a democratic fa****on.
Soon after the cabinet was formed, the Assembly began taking a few of
the necessary baby steps to effect political changes of its own. Many
of the elected officials in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies
have begun to craft pieces of legislation that would help curb
corruption in the courts. Although the National Assembly has been far
from entirely successful, it is still trying to push legislation
through in a democratic manner is an encouraging sign. This is
something for which, in a recent visit to ****t-au-Prince, United
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was moved to praise the National
Assembly, as he encouraged lawmakers to adopt legislation
reinforcing"if not establi****ng for the first time"the rule of law in
the country. In previous years, the combination of corrupt, strongman
presidents and the powerful influence of neighborhood gangs and
association of elites has made doing so all but impossible. However, as
the UN secretary generals confidence in the National Assembly
suggests, Haiti has a unique op****tunity to change course. This is an
op****tunity that cannot be squandered, a fact which is recognized by
both Pr(c)val and the opposition members of the legislative branch. When,
in 2008, one-third of the Senate seats will be contested, the continued
strengthening of the legislative process likely will be at the
forefront of many candidates platforms.
Many Problems Remain on the Road to Democracy
Although the current state of president-assembly relations might
suggest that all is well with democracy in Haiti, there are still
significant problems that remain, suggesting that the islands
political process has traveled only a few miles on the long road to
democracy. With the lack of a standing military force and the
systemically problematic Haitian National Police, Haitians who oppose
the government or voice thoroughly popular opinions defaming the police
force often find that the law has not always been there to protect them.
Even when the law does come into play, its inefficiencies and
unreliability usually dont allow it to do much public good. The court
system is weak, outdated, and, just like the tainted police and other
fouled Haitian organizations, corrupt. Prisons themselves are old and
unspeakably bleak. Prisoners live in overcrowded jails with only scraps
of food; according to an Amnesty International re****t, more than 2000
prisoners are being held in Haitian jails without ever having been
charged. At least 100 of those detained are said to be political
prisoners. Furthermore, because there is a lack of resources to
properly train personnel and provide decent conditions for the inmates,
a significant turn of events would be necessary to allow for a truly
democratic judicial and penal system to emerge.
The old-fa****oned, poorly managed, and chronically corrupt judicial
system is not the only aspect of Haitian society that suggests that
Pr(c)val and his legislative associates have a long way to go if they are
intent on ensuring the establishment of a long-lasting, genuinely
democratic state. Labor conditions in Haiti continue to reflect a
disdain for human rights and general democratic principles. For
example, Haitian authorities have done little to change the old Haitian
tradition of restavec, in which young Haitian children are sent away
from their parents to work, for all intents and purposes, as domestic
slaves for wealthier families in often far-off communities.
Although one can very well make the case that cultural traditions and
values should be upheld whenever they can, such archaic practices do
little to boost Haitis quest for a genuine democracy or a caring
society. Meanwhile, along Haitis border with the Dominican Republic,
little has been done to reinforce border security, with the illegal
trafficking of Haitian laborers continuing to be a chronic problem with
which the ****t-au-Prince government has ineffectively dealt. To date,
Haiti has done little to project its demands to implement border
reforms with its neighbor. This may prove to be a significant challenge
in the next few years, given the troubled history that the Haitians
have had with the Dominicans, as well as the array of problems that
Haitian refugees have brought upon their neighbors, including fighting
for access to the resources that can be found there.
In recent years, Haitis gangs have posed serious problems for the
countrys political leader****p, and Pr(c)val, too, has not escaped from
this problem. However, instead of choosing to let them dominate various
street corners of ****t-au-Prince and elsewhere in Haiti, Pr(c)val
recently decided that he would take the matter into his own hands,
something that Aristide (who chose to negotiate with the gang leaders)
never did. Due to the lack of an efficient police force, Pr(c)val has had
to rely on the current contingent of 7500 U.N. troops stationed in
Haiti to do his bidding. Although this has brought about some success,
the impaired state of the countrys judicial system means that many of
the gangsters who have been arrested might not ever face justice. This
series of recent actions concerning gangs raises a number of im****tant
questions that are likely to be resolved only after significant time
has elapsed. Certainly, negotiating with the heads of brutal and
power-hungry gangs has not advanced a society hoping to be orderly,
exemplified by the ineffective results in Aristides dealings with the
Cite Solei gangs. However, with corruption abounding in the courts,
with the gang leaders pockets running deep, and with the jails already
overflowing with citizens who havent even faced a trial, Pr(c)vals does
not have a wide range of choices.
A Long Road Ahead
Faced with the aforementioned gang problems, the acceleration of
drug-related issues, and the ongoing practice of media self-censor****p,
Pr(c)val and the National Assembly have much work to do in shaping how
the first elected government following Aristides ouster will
ultimately be perceived by the public. However, if the recent is any
indication, there is some ground for hope. Certainly, the government
has quite a bit on its plate"passing legislation that might lead to an
improvement next year of the countrys last-place finish in
Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index might not be
a bad place to start. But at least the Pr(c)val government is doing
things democratically. In both the executive and legislative branches,
the signs are there: there is a growing respect for the law and the
democratic process that were first spelled out in the countrys nearly
20-year-old constitution but never really honored until now. Democracy
is not a word that should ever be toyed with, and we should not expect
Haiti to turn into a ****ning model of democracy overnight. What we can
expect, however, is that the countrys modernization and humanization
will continue and that Pr(c)val and the Assembly will be respected as
they try to repair the nation.
*
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