ooooooh, stupid **** spake again !! we all better listen carefully
now.
On May 2, 1:14 pm, rst0wxyz <rst0w...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> I think Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad will be a powerful force
> in the Middle East for the next 10 - 20 years.
>
> On May 2, 1:07 pm, PaPaPeng <PaPaP...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>
> > Bush and Chenney, far from frightening Iran into submission, has
> > instead focussed Iran's attention to its place in the bigger scheme of
> > things. The article below outlines compelling reasons for an
> > energized Iran as the linchpin for pan regional co-operation and
> > therefore regional power and a major player in the global power
> > league. Such a development will of course greatly diminish US Israeli
> > power in Arab affairs. It will certainly reduce China's clout in
> > dealings with Arab countries (should they band together as described
> > below).
>
> > The empowerment of peoples who have little if any power now can only
> > be good. It is not a development China fears for China has always
> > maintained correct diplomatic and economic realtions with every
> > country. China treats them all as independent countries and respects
> > their sovereignity and independence by not interfering in their
> > internal affairs. China pays a fair price for everything she buys
> > from them. And China does not impose onerous and insulting conditions
> > on the trade, the aid and the loans she provides. Its a very simple
> > policy rich countries should make an effort to emulate.
>
> > Iran moving into the big league
> > By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
> > May 3, 2007http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JE03Ak03.html
>
> > Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's three-nation tour of Pakistan,
> > Sri Lanka and India and the welter of agreements and understandings
> > reached between Tehran and these governments serve notice beyond the
> > mere issue of energy security and Iran's expanding role in the
> > sub-continent's energy market; rather, these developments signify a
> > new stage in Iran's foreign policy that is best described as
> > "pan-regionalism".
>
> > From the Persian Gulf to the Caspian region, the Caucasus, Central
> > Asia, South Asia and beyond, thanks to its unique geographical
> > location, Iran is in many ways an ideal connecting bridge that has not
> > until now fully exploited its advantageous "equidistance" from India
> > and Europe.
>
> > Straddled between the two energy hubs of the Persian Gulf and Caspian
> > Sea, Iran is a suitable conduit for trade, energy and non-energy,
> > between the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which are members of the
> > Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the landlocked Central Asian
> > states. The GCC comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
> > and the United Arab Emirates.
>
> > Also, with ambitious trans****tation links projected under the veneer
> > of a "north-south corridor", Iran, Russia and India have conceived new
> > areas of cooperation that connect northern Europe to the Indian Ocean
> > via Iran and the Russian Federation [1] . Already, Iran is an energy
> > ex****ter to Europe through Turkey, funneling through Turkmenistan's
> > gas and swapping oil with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
>
> > Also, Iran has plans not to lag behind the so-called new "Silk Road"
> > project that involves China, India and the GCC states first and
> > foremost and yet for every conceivable reason must be considered
> > Iran-inclusive because of the country's proximity, its expanding trade
> > and economic cooperation with the GCC, and its own trade
> > liberalization policies, reflected in the expansion of free-trade
> > zones.
>
> > This is one reason why Iran is modernizing its Persian Gulf islands of
> > Kish and Qeshm, hoping to turn them into tourist hotspots as well as
> > hubs for trade and even finance in the near future [2].
>
> > The $7.6 billion Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI), meanwhile, has
> > the potential more than any other existing Iranian project to extend
> > the purview of Iran's "pan-regional" approach, by organically
> > connecting Iran to the sub-continent on a long-term basis and by
> > providing a new Iran-Pakistan-India nexus that could in turn be used
> > for addressing what is lacking so far, that is, more than paltry
> > inter-regional trade.
>
> > The 2,600-kilometer IPI pipeline, which was conceived in 1994,
> > envisages trans****ting Iranian gas to Pakistan and then on to India.
> > Following Ahmadinejad's visit to India this week, Iran re****ted the
> > three countries were close to signing a "final agreement".
>
> > The poor state of Iran's trade with South Asia is reflected in the
> > sub-optimal trade between Iran and Pakistan, as is the case between
> > Iran and other members of the region's 10-nation Economic Cooperation
> > Organization (ECO) [3].
>
> > Attempts to make the ECO a fulcrum of regional cooperation have by and
> > large failed and the ECO's struggle to achieve a major breakthrough in
> > terms of regional cooperation has not brought significant tangible
> > fruits.
>
> > Yet that may change, particularly if Iran (a) is inducted in the
> > Shanghai Cooperation Organization, at which it is presently an
> > observer [4], and (b) the IPI project finally gets underway, in which
> > case Iran's greater integration into larger entities will bolster its
> > attempt within the ECO to make this regional organization, which is
> > headquartered in Tehran, more effective.
>
> > With respect to the Persian Gulf, the GCC, which continues to shun
> > Iran's olive branch of cooperation, is under new pressures to rethink
> > that attitude as a result of the ****'ite-led government in Iraq, a
> > potential Iran allay in the politics of the Persian Gulf. It is not
> > far-fetched to think that Iran and Iraq will one day join the GCC
> > states in a new regional cooperative framework.
>
> > Certainly, that is how Iran wants it today, as seen in the recent
> > unveiling of Iranian plans for cooperative security and the like put
> > forward at their hitherto recalcitrant GCC neighbors [5], perhaps
> > better pitched as part of an Islamic common market.
>
> > Certainly, significant hurdles confront Iran's "pan-regional" approach
> > that seeks to make the country an integrative, nodal point of
> > cooperation between and among various regions, ranging from United
> > Nations and US sanctions out of fear of Iran and its pur****ted
> > "nuclear ambition", as well as a host of purely economic and technical
> > difficulties, such as poor trans****tation links and ***bersome custom
> > regulations.
>
> > Regarding the latter, one of the ECO's key contributions has been in
> > the area of prioritizing a customs agreement, as well as tariff
> > reduction schemes, between the member states that would facilitate
> > trade in the ECO region. Still, the low level of trade between the ECO
> > states is a harsh reminder of the long road ahead before Iran's lofty
> > objective of "pan-regionalism" can be fully realized.
>
> > Irrespective, the tangible gains mentioned above illustrate the
> > viability of Iran's "pan-regional" approach that could conceivably
> > elevate its status beyond a mere regional power and add to the cluster
> > of values in its arsenal as a global power.
>
> > In fact, as reflected in a recent statement by Iranian National
> > Security Advisor Saeed Jalili regarding Iran as a "global power",
> > Iran's self-image and self-understanding is global-looking and fuels
> > an activist foreign policy that is fully within the camp of the
> > Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and which constantly prioritizes "global
> > justice".
>
> > Economically, however, for Iran and other NAM states seeking a
> > redistribution of global wealth, concentrated in Western hands today,
> > there is no alternative but to push for greater cooperation between
> > themselves and achieve better coordination at international
> > institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), in light of
> > the WTO's ongoing trade wranglings known as the Doha rounds.
>
> > Although Iran is not yet a WTO member, it will be directly impacted by
> > the final agreements of the Doha rounds, due later this year, which is
> > why it is in***bent on Iranian policymakers to focus on the Doha
> > rounds and to scrutinize the agricultural and non-agricultural new
> > policies of the WTO that distinguish between developed and developing
> > nations. Yet these fall short of addressing the adverse impacts of
> > globalization and WTO-induced trade liberalization for a whole host of
> > Third World nations.
>
> > One thing is clear, the greater the impetus for Iran's "pan-regional"
> > goals and objectives, the more Tehran will find itself entangled in
> > complex regional, extra-regional and global issues and controversies
> > that impact the country's foreign policies, trade, and security both
> > directly and indirectly.
>
> > One of the understudied aspects of Iran's "pan-regionalism" is,
> > indeed, how it connects to the issue of globalization that, so far,
> > has been a mixed blessing for the developing world. After all,
> > regionalism and globalization have unhappy kindred relations, with the
> > former simultaneously strengthening and weakening it.
>
> > Notes
> > 1. For more information on the International North-South Trans****t
> > Corridor, click here.
> > 2. For more on the free-trade zones, click here.
> > 3. For more on the Economic Cooperation Organization, click here
> > 4. For more on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, click here 5.
> > See Iran unveils a Persian Gulf security plan by Kaveh L Afrasiabi,
> > Asia Times Online, April 14, 2007.
>
> > Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
> > Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and co-author of
> > "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs,
> > Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also
> > wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear potential latent", Harvard International
> > Review, and is author of Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus
> > Fiction.
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