On Fri, 2 May 2008 19:39:12 -0700 (PDT), pg <penang@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
wrote:
>ooooooh, stupid **** spake again !! we all better listen carefully
>now.
For your information, rst0wxyz, J. venning, Papapeng, and Charlesliu
belong to the same "close circle". The four of them always kissing
each other's smelly butts and eating each other's ****. Just take a
look at the way they post if you don't believe me.
>
>On May 2, 1:14 pm, rst0wxyz <rst0w...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>> I think Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad will be a powerful force
>> in the Middle East for the next 10 - 20 years.
>>
>> On May 2, 1:07 pm, PaPaPeng <PaPaP...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>>
>> > Bush and Chenney, far from frightening Iran into submission, has
>> > instead focussed Iran's attention to its place in the bigger scheme
of
>> > things. The article below outlines compelling reasons for an
>> > energized Iran as the linchpin for pan regional co-operation and
>> > therefore regional power and a major player in the global power
>> > league. Such a development will of course greatly diminish US
Israeli
>> > power in Arab affairs. It will certainly reduce China's clout in
>> > dealings with Arab countries (should they band together as described
>> > below).
>>
>> > The empowerment of peoples who have little if any power now can only
>> > be good. It is not a development China fears for China has always
>> > maintained correct diplomatic and economic realtions with every
>> > country. China treats them all as independent countries and respects
>> > their sovereignity and independence by not interfering in their
>> > internal affairs. China pays a fair price for everything she buys
>> > from them. And China does not impose onerous and insulting conditions
>> > on the trade, the aid and the loans she provides. Its a very simple
>> > policy rich countries should make an effort to emulate.
>>
>> > Iran moving into the big league
>> > By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
>> > May 3, 2007http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JE03Ak03.html
>>
>> > Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's three-nation tour of Pakistan,
>> > Sri Lanka and India and the welter of agreements and understandings
>> > reached between Tehran and these governments serve notice beyond the
>> > mere issue of energy security and Iran's expanding role in the
>> > sub-continent's energy market; rather, these developments signify a
>> > new stage in Iran's foreign policy that is best described as
>> > "pan-regionalism".
>>
>> > From the Persian Gulf to the Caspian region, the Caucasus, Central
>> > Asia, South Asia and beyond, thanks to its unique geographical
>> > location, Iran is in many ways an ideal connecting bridge that has
not
>> > until now fully exploited its advantageous "equidistance" from India
>> > and Europe.
>>
>> > Straddled between the two energy hubs of the Persian Gulf and Caspian
>> > Sea, Iran is a suitable conduit for trade, energy and non-energy,
>> > between the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which are members of the
>> > Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the landlocked Central Asian
>> > states. The GCC comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
>> > and the United Arab Emirates.
>>
>> > Also, with ambitious trans****tation links projected under the veneer
>> > of a "north-south corridor", Iran, Russia and India have conceived
new
>> > areas of cooperation that connect northern Europe to the Indian Ocean
>> > via Iran and the Russian Federation [1] . Already, Iran is an energy
>> > ex****ter to Europe through Turkey, funneling through Turkmenistan's
>> > gas and swapping oil with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
>>
>> > Also, Iran has plans not to lag behind the so-called new "Silk Road"
>> > project that involves China, India and the GCC states first and
>> > foremost and yet for every conceivable reason must be considered
>> > Iran-inclusive because of the country's proximity, its expanding
trade
>> > and economic cooperation with the GCC, and its own trade
>> > liberalization policies, reflected in the expansion of free-trade
>> > zones.
>>
>> > This is one reason why Iran is modernizing its Persian Gulf islands
of
>> > Kish and Qeshm, hoping to turn them into tourist hotspots as well as
>> > hubs for trade and even finance in the near future [2].
>>
>> > The $7.6 billion Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI), meanwhile, has
>> > the potential more than any other existing Iranian project to extend
>> > the purview of Iran's "pan-regional" approach, by organically
>> > connecting Iran to the sub-continent on a long-term basis and by
>> > providing a new Iran-Pakistan-India nexus that could in turn be used
>> > for addressing what is lacking so far, that is, more than paltry
>> > inter-regional trade.
>>
>> > The 2,600-kilometer IPI pipeline, which was conceived in 1994,
>> > envisages trans****ting Iranian gas to Pakistan and then on to India.
>> > Following Ahmadinejad's visit to India this week, Iran re****ted the
>> > three countries were close to signing a "final agreement".
>>
>> > The poor state of Iran's trade with South Asia is reflected in the
>> > sub-optimal trade between Iran and Pakistan, as is the case between
>> > Iran and other members of the region's 10-nation Economic Cooperation
>> > Organization (ECO) [3].
>>
>> > Attempts to make the ECO a fulcrum of regional cooperation have by
and
>> > large failed and the ECO's struggle to achieve a major breakthrough
in
>> > terms of regional cooperation has not brought significant tangible
>> > fruits.
>>
>> > Yet that may change, particularly if Iran (a) is inducted in the
>> > Shanghai Cooperation Organization, at which it is presently an
>> > observer [4], and (b) the IPI project finally gets underway, in which
>> > case Iran's greater integration into larger entities will bolster its
>> > attempt within the ECO to make this regional organization, which is
>> > headquartered in Tehran, more effective.
>>
>> > With respect to the Persian Gulf, the GCC, which continues to shun
>> > Iran's olive branch of cooperation, is under new pressures to rethink
>> > that attitude as a result of the ****'ite-led government in Iraq, a
>> > potential Iran allay in the politics of the Persian Gulf. It is not
>> > far-fetched to think that Iran and Iraq will one day join the GCC
>> > states in a new regional cooperative framework.
>>
>> > Certainly, that is how Iran wants it today, as seen in the recent
>> > unveiling of Iranian plans for cooperative security and the like put
>> > forward at their hitherto recalcitrant GCC neighbors [5], perhaps
>> > better pitched as part of an Islamic common market.
>>
>> > Certainly, significant hurdles confront Iran's "pan-regional"
approach
>> > that seeks to make the country an integrative, nodal point of
>> > cooperation between and among various regions, ranging from United
>> > Nations and US sanctions out of fear of Iran and its pur****ted
>> > "nuclear ambition", as well as a host of purely economic and
technical
>> > difficulties, such as poor trans****tation links and ***bersome custom
>> > regulations.
>>
>> > Regarding the latter, one of the ECO's key contributions has been in
>> > the area of prioritizing a customs agreement, as well as tariff
>> > reduction schemes, between the member states that would facilitate
>> > trade in the ECO region. Still, the low level of trade between the
ECO
>> > states is a harsh reminder of the long road ahead before Iran's lofty
>> > objective of "pan-regionalism" can be fully realized.
>>
>> > Irrespective, the tangible gains mentioned above illustrate the
>> > viability of Iran's "pan-regional" approach that could conceivably
>> > elevate its status beyond a mere regional power and add to the
cluster
>> > of values in its arsenal as a global power.
>>
>> > In fact, as reflected in a recent statement by Iranian National
>> > Security Advisor Saeed Jalili regarding Iran as a "global power",
>> > Iran's self-image and self-understanding is global-looking and fuels
>> > an activist foreign policy that is fully within the camp of the
>> > Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and which constantly prioritizes "global
>> > justice".
>>
>> > Economically, however, for Iran and other NAM states seeking a
>> > redistribution of global wealth, concentrated in Western hands today,
>> > there is no alternative but to push for greater cooperation between
>> > themselves and achieve better coordination at international
>> > institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), in light of
>> > the WTO's ongoing trade wranglings known as the Doha rounds.
>>
>> > Although Iran is not yet a WTO member, it will be directly impacted
by
>> > the final agreements of the Doha rounds, due later this year, which
is
>> > why it is in***bent on Iranian policymakers to focus on the Doha
>> > rounds and to scrutinize the agricultural and non-agricultural new
>> > policies of the WTO that distinguish between developed and developing
>> > nations. Yet these fall short of addressing the adverse impacts of
>> > globalization and WTO-induced trade liberalization for a whole host
of
>> > Third World nations.
>>
>> > One thing is clear, the greater the impetus for Iran's "pan-regional"
>> > goals and objectives, the more Tehran will find itself entangled in
>> > complex regional, extra-regional and global issues and controversies
>> > that impact the country's foreign policies, trade, and security both
>> > directly and indirectly.
>>
>> > One of the understudied aspects of Iran's "pan-regionalism" is,
>> > indeed, how it connects to the issue of globalization that, so far,
>> > has been a mixed blessing for the developing world. After all,
>> > regionalism and globalization have unhappy kindred relations, with
the
>> > former simultaneously strengthening and weakening it.
>>
>> > Notes
>> > 1. For more information on the International North-South Trans****t
>> > Corridor, click here.
>> > 2. For more on the free-trade zones, click here.
>> > 3. For more on the Economic Cooperation Organization, click here
>> > 4. For more on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, click here 5.
>> > See Iran unveils a Persian Gulf security plan by Kaveh L Afrasiabi,
>> > Asia Times Online, April 14, 2007.
>>
>> > Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
>> > Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and co-author of
>> > "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World
Affairs,
>> > Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also
>> > wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear potential latent", Harvard
International
>> > Review, and is author of Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating Facts
Versus
>> > Fiction.
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