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Beijing Embraces Classical Fascism
By Michael Ledeen
Far Eastern Economic Review (May 2008) | Friday, May 09, 2008
In 2002, I speculated that China may be something we have never seen
before: a mature fascist state. Recent events there, especially the
mass rage in response to Western criticism, seem to confirm that
theory. More significantly, over the intervening six years China's
leaders have consolidated their hold on the organs of control--
political, economic and cultural. Instead of gradually embracing
pluralism as many expected, China's corporatist elite has become even
more entrenched.
Even though they still call themselves communists, and the Communist
Party rules the country, classical fascism should be the starting
point for our efforts to understand the People's Republic. Imagine
Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead
and buried, the corporate state would be largely intact, the party
would be firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by
professional politicians, part of a corrupt elite, rather than the
true believers who had marched on Rome. It would no longer be a system
based on charisma, but would instead rest almost entirely on political
repression, the leaders would be businesslike and cynical, not
idealistic, and they would constantly invoke formulaic appeals to the
grandeur of the "great Italian people," "endlessly summoned to emulate
the greatness of its ancestors."
Substitute in the "great Chinese people" and it all sounds familiar.
We are certainly not dealing with a Communist regime, either
politically or economically, nor do Chinese leaders, even those who
followed the radical reformer Deng Xiaoping, seem to be at all
interested in treading the dangerous and uneven path from Stalinism to
democracy. They know that Mikhail Gorbachev fell when he tried to
control the economy while giving political freedom. They are
attempting the opposite, keeping a firm grip on political power while
permitting relatively free areas of economic enterprise. Their
political methods are quite like those used by the European fascists
80 years ago
Unlike traditional communist dictators--Mao, for example--who
extirpated traditional culture and replaced it with a sterile Marxism-
Leninism, the Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace
the glories of China's long history. Their passionate reassertion of
the greatness of past dynasties has both entranced and baffled Western
observers, because it does not fit the model of an "evolving communist
system."
Yet the fascist leaders of the 1920s and 1930s used exactly the same
device. Mussolini rebuilt Rome to provide a dramatic visual reminder
of ancient glories, and he used ancient history to justify the
conquest of Libya and Ethiopia. Hitler's favorite architect built
neoclassical buildings throughout the Third Reich, and his favorite
operatic composer organized festivals to celebrate the country's
mythic past.
Like their European predecessors, the Chinese claim a major role in
the world because of their history and culture, not just on the basis
of their current power, or scientific or cultural accomplishments.
China even toys with some of the more bizarre notions of the earlier
fascisms, such as the program to make the country self-sufficient in
wheat production--the same quest for autarky that obsessed both Hitler
and Mussolini.
To be sure, the world is much changed since the first half of the last
century. It's much harder (and sometimes impossible) to go it alone.
Passions for total independence from the outside world are tempered by
the realities of today's global economy, and China's appetite for oil
and other raw materials is properly legendary. But the Chinese, like
the European fascists, are intensely xenophobic, and obviously worry
that their people may turn against them if they learn too much about
the rest of the world. They consequently work very hard to dominate
the flow of information. Just ask Google, forced to cooperate with the
censors in order to work in China.
Some scholars of contemporary China see the Beijing regime as very
nervous, and perhaps even unstable, and they are encouraged in this
belief when they see recent events such as the eruption of popular
sentiment against the Tibetan monks' modest protests. That view is
further reinforced by similar outcries against most any criticism of
Chinese performance, from human rights to air pollution, and from
preparations for the Olympic Games to the failure of Chinese quality
control in food production and children's toys. The recent treatment
of French retailer Carrefour at the hands of Chinese nationalists is a
case in point. It has been publicly excoriated and shunned because
France's President Nicolas Sarkozy dared to consider the possibility
of boycotting the Olympics.
In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is
worried about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist
passions, feels compelled to portray the country as a global victim.
Perhaps they are right. The strongest evidence to support the theory
of insecurity at the highest levels of Chinese society is the practice
of the "princelings" (wealthy children of the ruling elites) to buy
homes in places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These
are not luxury homes of the sort favored by wealthy businessman and
officials from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Rather they
are typically "normal" homes of the sort a potential =E9migr=E9 might want
to have in reserve in case things went bad back home.
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that eruptions of nationalist
passion do indeed worry the regime, and Chinese leaders have certainly
tamped down such episodes in the past. In recent days, the regime has
even reached out to the Dalai Lama himself in an apparent effort to
calm the situation, after previously enouncing the "Dalai clique" as a
dangerous form of separatism and even treason.
On the other hand, the cult of victimhood was always part of fascist
culture. Just like Germany and Italy in the interwar period, China
feels betrayed and humiliated, and seeks to avenge her many historic
wounds. This is not necessarily a true sign of anxiety; it's an
integral part of the sort of hypernationalism that has always been at
the heart of all fascist movements and regimes. We cannot look into
the souls of the Chinese tyrants, but I doubt that China is an
intensely unstable system, riven by the democratic impulses of
capitalism on the one hand, and the repressive practices of the regime
on the other. This is a mature fascism, not a frenzied mass movement,
and the current regime is not composed of revolutionary fanatics.
Today's Chinese leaders are the heirs of two very different
revolutions, Mao's and Deng's. The first was a failed communist
experiment; the second is a fascist transformation whose future is up
for grabs.
If the fascist model is correct, we should not be at all surprised by
the recent rhetoric or mass demonstrations. Hitler's Germany and
Mussolini's Italy were every bit as sensitive to any sign of foreign
criticism as the Chinese today, both because victimhood is always part
of the definition of such states, and because it's an essential
technique of mass control. The violent denunciations of Westerners who
criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or
weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of
the regime's popularity. Remember that European fascism did not fall
as the result of internal crisis--it took a bloody world war to bring
it down. Fascism was so alarmingly popular neither Italians not
Germans produced more than token resistance until the war began to be
lost. It may well be that the mass condemnation of Western calls for
greater political tolerance is in fact a sign of political success.
Since classical fascism had such a brief life span, it is hard to know
whether or not a stable, durable fascist state is possible.
Economically, the corporate state, of which the current Chinese system
is a textbook example, may prove more flexible and adaptable than the
rigid central planning that doomed communism in the Soviet Empire and
elsewhere (although the travails of Japan, which also tried to combine
capitalist enterprise with government guidance, show the kinds of
problems China will likely face). Our brief experience with fascism
makes it difficult to evaluate the possibilities of political
evolution, and the People's Republic is full of secrets. But prudent
strategists would do well to assume that the regime will be around for
a while longer--perhaps a lot longer.
If it is a popular, fascist regime, should the world prepare for some
difficult and dangerous confrontations with the People's Republic?
Twentieth-century fascist states were very aggressive; Nazi Germany
and fascist Italy were both expansionist nations. Is it not likely
that China will similarly seek to enlarge its domain?
I believe the answer is "yes, but." Many Chinese leaders might like
to see their sway extend throughout the region, and beyond. China's
military is not so subtly preparing the capability to defeat U.S.
forces in Asia in order to prevent intervention in any conflict on its
periphery. No serious student of China doubts the enormous ambitions
of both the leadership and the masses. But, unlike Hitler and
Mussolini, the Chinese tyrants do not urgently need quick geographical
expansion to demonstrate the glory of their country and the truth of
their vision. For the moment, at least, success at home and global
recognition of Chinese accomplishments seem to be enough. Since
Chinese fascism is less ideological than its European predecessors,
Chinese leaders are far more flexible than Hitler and Mussolini.
Nonetheless, the short history of classical fascism suggests that it
is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with
the West. That is built into the dna of all such regimes. Sooner or
later, Chinese leaders will feel compelled to demonstrate the
superiority of their system, and even the most impressive per capita
GDP will not do. Superiority means others have to bend their knees,
and cater to the wishes of the dominant nation. Just as Mussolini saw
the colonization of Africa and the invasion of Greece and the Balkans
as necessary steps in the establishment of a new fascist empire, so
the Chinese are likely to demand tribute from their neighbors--above
all, the Chinese on the island nation of Taiwan, in order to add the
recovery of lost territory to the regime's list of accomplishments.
Even today, at a time when the regime is seeking praise, not tribute,
in the run-up to the Olympic Games, there are bellicose overtones to
official rhetoric.
How, then, should the democracies deal with China? The first step is
to disabuse ourselves of the notion that wealth is the surest
guarantor of peace. The West traded with the Soviet Union, and gave
them credits as well, but it did not prevent the Kremlin from
expanding into the Horn of Africa, or sponsoring terrorist groups in
Europe and the Middle East. A wealthy China will not automatically be
less inclined to go to war over Taiwan, or, for that matter, to wage
or threaten war with Japan.
Indeed, the opposite may be true--the richer and stronger China
becomes, the more they build up their military might, the more likely
such wars may be. It follows that the West must prepare for war with
China, hoping thereby to deter it. A great Roman once said that if you
want peace, prepare for war. This is sound advice with regard to a
fascist Chinese state that wants to play a global role.
Meanwhile, we should do what we can to convince the people of China
that their long-term interests are best served by greater political
freedom, no matter how annoying and chaotic that may sometimes be. I
think we can trust the Chinese leaders on this one. Any regime as
palpably concerned about the free flow of information, knows well that
ideas about freedom might be very popular. Let's test that hypothesis,
by talking directly to "the billion." In today's world, we can surely
find ways to reach them.
If we do not take such steps, our risk will surely increase, and
explosions of rage, manipulated or spontaneous, will recur. Eventually
they will take the form of real actions.
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