http://upiasiaonline.com/Politics/2008/05/08/chinas_fake_talks_with_the_dala=
i_lama/8335/
China's fake talks with the Dalai Lama
By CHEN WEIJIAN
Guest CommentaryPublished: May 08, 2008
AUCKLAND, New Zealand =97 It is widely understood that the May 6 talks
between the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama
took place under pressure from the international community --
especially as the talks were announced immediately after the visit of
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso to Beijing on April
25. At a meeting with President Hu Jintao, Barroso expressed the
European Union's hard line on the Tibet issue.
If one adopts the thinking of the Chinese Communist Party, one must
conclude that these talks were the product of Western interference in
China's domestic affairs.
Amazingly, the CCP still maintains its two-faced position -- claiming
to keep the door open for dialogue under the condition that the Dalai
Lama abandons the idea of splitting China, while continuing to slander
and demonize the Dalai Lama.
In fact, this mindset can be tracked back to the time when Deng
Xiaoping returned to power. It was he who established the principle
that "whatever can be discussed except for independence" concerning
Tibet. After that, the CCP opened certain channels to communicate with
the Dalai Lama.
The first official talk between Deng and the Dalai Lama's group was
initiated in 1979. In 1986, the CCP decided to invite representatives
of the Tibetan government-in-exile to return to China for a visit.
However, after arriving in Tibet, this delegation was astonished and
deeply pained by what they found. The 1966-76 Cultural Revolution had
trampled their culture to the ground. Tibetans came to kneel down in
front of the visiting delegation, crying out about the tyranny of the
CCP. The Dalai Lama's representatives were heartbroken and grief-
stricken. Such scenes strongly shocked the Chinese officials who
accompanied the delegation, too.
Upon returning to Dharamsala in India, the delegation reported what
they had seen in Tibet. Their reports and videos of their visit
aroused great anger among the Tibetan people living abroad. On the
other hand, the Chinese officials also reported the delegation's
experiences in Tibet to the central government. The government felt
that the loss outweighed the gain in this case, and decided to
discourage any future such visits.
The talks were not resumed until 2002. From 1986 to 2002 there were
some sporadic contacts, but due to the repression in Tibet in 1989, no
further talks took place until 2002.
That year the talks were also resumed owing to strong pressure from
the Western world. At that time the Dalai Lama had considerable
influence in the international community, and the Tibet issue became
an internationalized issue. China was still under the shadow of the
June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and desired to restore its
relations with Western society.
A sixth round of talks ended in July, 2007. During the six long years
from 2002 to 2007, the Tibetan government-in-exile warned domestic and
overseas Tibetans not to engage in any activities that might harm the
negotiations. Especially, it urged Tibetans not to organize any
protests while the Chinese leadership was visiting abroad. Moreover,
it asked Tibet support groups worldwide to temporarily suspend any
events focused on Tibet.
Nevertheless, during the same period, the CCP did not let up on its
repression in Tibet and the human rights situation there did not
improve.
None of the contents of the six previous talks were released to the
public, as nothing substantial was achieved in them. Even more pitiful
is that they were downgraded by the CPP to mere "visits" by overseas
Tibetans, rather than "talks." Thus the Tibetan delegation had no
choice but to explain to the citizens in Tibet that nothing was
accomplished beyond an improved "atmosphere" in six years of talks.
That humble result highly disappointed the Tibetans, after their long
years of hope, and deepened their doubts about the Dalai Lama's policy
of peace.
Seen from the history of negotiations between China and the Dalai
Lama's group, Western pressure contributed to all their contacts,
except for those between 1979 and 1986. In other words, the CCP was
not sincere in handling this issue. After Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobang's leadership, from1980-1987, the CCP shifted its thinking;
considering that Tibet was under tight control, it saw no need for
negotiations. The CCP came to believe that the issue of Tibet would
naturally disappear under its policy of sending Han Chinese to live
and work in Tibet and develop its economy, and as the Dalai Lama grew
old.
With this mindset, the talks conducted under pressure from
international society turned out to be nothing but fair words. They
were just killing time; how could such talks possibly generate
positive results?
For example, ahead of the talks this time the Chinese government set
three preconditions: the Dalai Lama was to stop his separatist
activities, stop planning and fomenting violent activities and stop
disturbing and harming the Beijing Olympics. These conditions already
showed a refusal to negotiate, logically speaking.
There might be some other possibility justifying the three conditions.
Their purpose may have been merely to appease the wild nationalism of
China's angry youth. After all, one minute the government was calling
the Dalai Lama "a wolf in a monk's robe," while offering to hold talks
the next. Thus the government needed to find a way out for both the
angry youth and itself.
How much longer can the Dalai Lama's group, his supporters and
concerned people worldwide wait for the CCP to show a sincere
attitude? If there is no substantial progress made, none of these
people will buy the CCP's line any longer.
There must also be some voice within the CCP calling for Hu Jintao to
better deal with the Tibet issue and the coming Beijing Games, without
worsening China's relations with the international community. Besides,
careful handling of the Tibet issue could decrease domestic
instability as well.
The key question is whether the CCP will realize that the current hard
line within the party does no good, but only makes a bad situation
worse. In fact, the CCP should adopt a soft, flexible approach and
seek mutual consensus. For instance, if the CCP had used the policy of
control through conciliation that Hu Yaobang adopted, many events
would not have occurred, and many issues would have been handled more
easily.
The CCP will not have many more opportunities to resolve the Tibet
issue. In the case of Taiwan, the CPP lost its best chance to
negotiate reunification with the island's former leader, Chiang Ching-
kuo, before he finally passed away. The party would be well advised to
take advantage of the opportunity to hold peace talks with the Dalai
Lama before it is too late.
--
(Chen Weijian is editor-in-chief of the Chinese-language newspaper
"Xin Bao" in New Zealan
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