On May 11, 2:44=A0am, aozot...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
> http://upiasiaonline.com/Politics/2008/05/08/chinas_fake_talks_with_t...
>
> China's fake talks with the Dalai Lama
> By CHEN WEIJIAN
> Guest CommentaryPublished: May 08, 2008
>
> AUCKLAND, New Zealand =97 It is widely understood that the May 6 talks
> between the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama
> took place under pressure from the international community --
> especially as the talks were announced immediately after the visit of
> European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso to Beijing on April
> 25. At a meeting with President Hu Jintao, Barroso expressed the
> European Union's hard line on the Tibet issue.
> If one adopts the thinking of the Chinese Communist Party, one must
> conclude that these talks were the product of Western interference in
> China's domestic affairs.
>
> Amazingly, the CCP still maintains its two-faced position -- claiming
> to keep the door open for dialogue under the condition that the Dalai
> Lama abandons the idea of splitting China, while continuing to slander
> and demonize the Dalai Lama.
>
> In fact, this mindset can be tracked back to the time when Deng
> Xiaoping returned to power. It was he who established the principle
> that "whatever can be discussed except for independence" concerning
> Tibet. After that, the CCP opened certain channels to communicate with
> the Dalai Lama.
>
> The first official talk between Deng and the Dalai Lama's group was
> initiated in 1979. In 1986, the CCP decided to invite representatives
> of the Tibetan government-in-exile to return to China for a visit.
> However, after arriving in Tibet, this delegation was astonished and
> deeply pained by what they found. The 1966-76 Cultural Revolution had
> trampled their culture to the ground. Tibetans came to kneel down in
> front of the visiting delegation, crying out about the tyranny of the
> CCP. The Dalai Lama's representatives were heartbroken and grief-
> stricken. Such scenes strongly shocked the Chinese officials who
> accompanied the delegation, too.
>
> Upon returning to Dharamsala in India, the delegation re****ted what
> they had seen in Tibet. Their re****ts and videos of their visit
> aroused great anger among the Tibetan people living abroad. On the
> other hand, the Chinese officials also re****ted the delegation's
> experiences in Tibet to the central government. The government felt
> that the loss outweighed the gain in this case, and decided to
> discourage any future such visits.
>
> The talks were not resumed until 2002. From 1986 to 2002 there were
> some s****adic contacts, but due to the repression in Tibet in 1989, no
> further talks took place until 2002.
>
> That year the talks were also resumed owing to strong pressure from
> the Western world. At that time the Dalai Lama had considerable
> influence in the international community, and the Tibet issue became
> an internationalized issue. China was still under the shadow of the
> June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and desired to restore its
> relations with Western society.
>
> A sixth round of talks ended in July, 2007. During the six long years
> from 2002 to 2007, the Tibetan government-in-exile warned domestic and
> overseas Tibetans not to engage in any activities that might harm the
> negotiations. Especially, it urged Tibetans not to organize any
> protests while the Chinese leader****p was visiting abroad. Moreover,
> it asked Tibet sup****t groups worldwide to tem****arily suspend any
> events focused on Tibet.
>
> Nevertheless, during the same period, the CCP did not let up on its
> repression in Tibet and the human rights situation there did not
> improve.
>
> None of the contents of the six previous talks were released to the
> public, as nothing substantial was achieved in them. Even more pitiful
> is that they were downgraded by the CPP to mere "visits" by overseas
> Tibetans, rather than "talks." Thus the Tibetan delegation had no
> choice but to explain to the citizens in Tibet that nothing was
> accomplished beyond an improved "atmosphere" in six years of talks.
> That humble result highly disappointed the Tibetans, after their long
> years of hope, and deepened their doubts about the Dalai Lama's policy
> of peace.
>
> Seen from the history of negotiations between China and the Dalai
> Lama's group, Western pressure contributed to all their contacts,
> except for those between 1979 and 1986. In other words, the CCP was
> not sincere in handling this issue. After Party General Secretary Hu
> Yaobang's leader****p, from1980-1987, the CCP ****fted its thinking;
> considering that Tibet was under tight control, it saw no need for
> negotiations. The CCP came to believe that the issue of Tibet would
> naturally disappear under its policy of sending Han Chinese to live
> and work in Tibet and develop its economy, and as the Dalai Lama grew
> old.
>
> With this mindset, the talks conducted under pressure from
> international society turned out to be nothing but fair words. They
> were just killing time; how could such talks possibly generate
> positive results?
>
> For example, ahead of the talks this time the Chinese government set
> three preconditions: the Dalai Lama was to stop his separatist
> activities, stop planning and fomenting violent activities and stop
> disturbing and harming the Beijing Olympics. These conditions already
> showed a refusal to negotiate, logically speaking.
>
> There might be some other possibility justifying the three conditions.
> Their purpose may have been merely to appease the wild nationalism of
> China's angry youth. After all, one minute the government was calling
> the Dalai Lama "a wolf in a monk's robe," while offering to hold talks
> the next. Thus the government needed to find a way out for both the
> angry youth and itself.
>
> How much longer can the Dalai Lama's group, his sup****ters and
> concerned people worldwide wait for the CCP to show a sincere
> attitude? If there is no substantial progress made, none of these
> people will buy the CCP's line any longer.
>
> There must also be some voice within the CCP calling for Hu Jintao to
> better deal with the Tibet issue and the coming Beijing Games, without
> worsening China's relations with the international community. Besides,
> careful handling of the Tibet issue could decrease domestic
> instability as well.
>
> The key question is whether the CCP will realize that the current hard
> line within the party does no good, but only makes a bad situation
> worse. In fact, the CCP should adopt a soft, flexible approach and
> seek mutual consensus. For instance, if the CCP had used the policy of
> control through conciliation that Hu Yaobang adopted, many events
> would not have occurred, and many issues would have been handled more
> easily.
>
> The CCP will not have many more op****tunities to resolve the Tibet
> issue. In the case of Taiwan, the CPP lost its best chance to
> negotiate reunification with the island's former leader, Chiang Ching-
> kuo, before he finally passed away. The party would be well advised to
> take advantage of the op****tunity to hold peace talks with the Dalai
> Lama before it is too late.
>
> --
>
> (Chen Weijian is editor-in-chief of the Chinese-language newspaper
> "Xin Bao" in New Zealan
It is unfair to the Chinese people for both unelected sides to talk to
each other how to deal with the situation in Tibet. Both the Beijing
government and DL are not democratically elected. The sooner they
forget about the talk, the better it is. It is none of their
business. The Tibet issue should be decided by business people who
make no nonsense about it.
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