A hard look at China's soft power
By David Isenberg
May 16, 2008
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JE16Ad02.html
China's attempts to use its "soft power" assets are increasingly
successful, although not without problems, according to a recent
United States congressional study.
Soft power means the non-military tools of foreign and national
security policies, including international trade and investment,
development assistance, cultural influence, humanitarian aid, travel
and tourism.
On May 5, Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, released a study, prepared by the Congressional
Research Service (CRS). The study, "China's
Foreign Policy and Soft Power in South America, Asia, and South
Africa" found both strengths and weaknesses in China's approach to the
world.
On the plus side China provides the developing world access to cheap
credit and inexpensive consumer goods, and many countries are enjoying
rapidly rising revenues due to Chinese demand for their ex****ts.
On the negative side, China's manufacturing strength makes it
difficult for industries in the developing world to gain a competitive
advantage, putting some out of business. And China's investment in
developing economies, particularly in natural resource extraction,
sometimes undermines international efforts to link aid and investment
to measurable progress by recipient countries in combating corruption,
improving transparency, and respecting human rights.
The study noted, that given China's non-democratic regime it holds a
comparative advantage in attempting to increase its influence. The
study noted:
The recipient governments of PRC [People's Republic of China] trade
and investment are particularly attracted to the fact that Chinese
money generally comes with none of the pesky human rights conditions,
good governance requirements, approved-project restrictions, and
environmental quality regulations that characterize US and other
Western government investments. With an authoritarian government that
has few if any democratic imperatives, China has capitalized on its
willingness to make such "unrestricted" international investments as
part of its "win-win" international strategy.
One example was in response to the December 2006 military coup in Fiji
when Beijing promised to continue its aid programs on the grounds that
the coup was Fiji's "internal" affair.
On the other hand such a "hands-off" approach could have negative
longer-term implications for how China is viewed within the countries
in which it is investing. Over the long term China's approach has
potential negative consequences that could counterbalance any soft
power advantages.
But as China has become more engaged in world affairs, it has also
discovered that its foreign entanglements may not always be popular at
home or abroad. The re****t also indicates that China must grapple with
many limitations on its influence. CRS cited a study of UN voting
records that found that nations with increased trade dependence on
China do not appear more willing to vote with Chinese interests.
Moreover, CRS found that China's soft power achievements - such as
disaster relief assistance worldwide - pale in comparison to those of
the United States. The soft power gains that China hopes to achieve
are minimal compared to the capacity and willingness of the United
States to take on costly global tasks such as international disaster
aid. "Nothing in Beijing's current soft power approach suggests it is
willing to embrace such altruism," according to the study.
CRS also found that China's ***ulative stock of foreign direct
investment (FDI) worldwide amounted to just $73.3 billion at the end
of 2006 - 0.58% of global FDI.
In addition, America's private sector leaves a "substantial global
footprint" sometimes overlooked by those comparing only government
directed overseas initiatives. Aside from US business interests these
include such diverse products as schools, newspapers, journals, banks,
movies, TV programs, novels, rock stars, medical institutions,
politicians, religious groups, and non-governmental organizations.
The study also found that there is little agreement on whether China
marshals its "soft-power" assets as part of a pragmatic, overarching
strategy. Nobody is sure whether China makes decisions in general
terms, with regard to specific regions or countries, or whether it is
just a series of marginally related tactical moves to seek normal
economic and political advantages. Of course, as the study notes,
similar questions could be raised about the overall US approach to
China.
The fact that China uses soft power does not, however, mean they are
disconnected form hard power goals. The study notes that in all three
of the regions - Latin America, Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa -
discussed, where China is most active, access to energy resources and
raw commodities to fuel China's domestic growth plays a dominant role
in Beijing's activities.
China has oil and gas exploration contracts with Brazil, Ecuador,
Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba; oil contracts and pipeline
deals are a major part of China's activities in its relations with
Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and China's
oil exploration interests extend to Burma, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
Im****ts of crude oil constitute the bulk of China's im****ts from
African states.
China also deploys its soft power as part of the political dynamic of
trying to separate Taiwan from its remaining diplomatic relation****ps,
although this dynamic varies according to region. While it is
im****tant in China's African relation****ps, it is not im****tant in
China's relations with Central Asian countries, where Taiwan has no
official diplomatic relations. It is a negligible factor in China's
relation****ps with Southeast Asian countries, where Taiwan has
significant economic interests but no diplomatic ties.
But the Taiwan-China competition looms large in China's relation****ps
in Latin America and the Caribbean. The region's proximity to the US
mainland allows Taiwan's president and senior leaders to ask for
symbolically meaningful transit stops in the United States when making
official visits to western hemisphere countries. A significant
reduction, or even the disappearance, of Taiwan's Latin America and
Caribbean relation****ps could greatly impair this US connection.
David Isenberg is an analyst in national and international security
affairs, sento@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
He is also a member of the Coalition for
a Realistic Foreign Policy, an adjunct scholar with the Cato
Institute, contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project, a
research fellow at the Independent Institute,
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