China seeks an Afghan stepping-stone
By Tariq Mahmud Ashraf
May 16, 2008
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JE16Ad03.html
The resurgence of great powers' interests in Central Asia in recent
years is reminiscent of the Great Game that ensued in the region in
the 19th century between Czarist Russia and Imperial Great Britain.
Afghanistan's geographic location has made it a much coveted strategic
pivot in the current Great Game. Notwithstanding the similarities
between the two periods, some stark differences stand out prominently:
one, there are now significantly more stakeholders in Afghanistan's
security (United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, India and China); two,
while the first Great Game was precipitated primarily by Russia's
quest for access to the warm waters and the creation of a buffer
between British India and Czarist Russia, the stakes now include oil,
hydropower sources, strategic metals, pipelines, transit routes and
access to markets.
These significantly higher stakes have led to Central Asia assuming
military, geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic significance for
two major blocs - one led by the United States (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization - NATO) and the other by China (Shanghai Cooperation
Organization - SCO) - vying for influence in the region with seemingly
dissimilar interests. "China needs them, Russia wants to control their
distribution, and Western powers want to ensure they are not
monopolized by Moscow or Beijing," as a USA Today re****t of December
15, 2007, said.
Afghanistan's strategic location between Central and South Asia is of
immense geostrategic significance for the landlocked countries of
Central Asia and its prosperity is inextricably linked to the security
situation in Central and South Asia. Immense energy resources and
strategic location on China's western frontier have led to Central
Asia being referred to as China's dingwei (Lebensraum) [1].
China's interests in Afghanistan
The present regional order prevailing in Afghanistan and Central Asia
is similar in some ways to what transpired in Europe after the end of
World War II. The United States and Western European powers, under the
NATO umbrella, desire strengthening their presence in the region to
counter the growing power and regional influence of both China and
Russia while China, like the erstwhile Soviet Union, is aspiring to
extend its security perimeter westward by developing close links with
the countries in the region and ensuring unhindered access to the
energy resources therein.
Some Indian analysts are convinced that China is engaged in a
"creeping encirclement" of their country [2]. They see Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Iran forming the right or western pincer of this move,
Bangladesh and Myanmar making up the left or eastern pincer with Sri
Lanka acting as the southern anchor and completing the encirclement.
India's recent overtures toward Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia and
the development of close ties with these countries appear to be aimed
at weakening China's right pincer and denying Pakistan a secure
western frontier. Afghanistan figures prominently, therefore, in
Chinese and Indian foreign policies. In fact, the decision to
establish the first-ever Indian military outpost on foreign soil at
the Farkhor air base in Tajikistan, just two kilometers from the
Tajik-Afghan border, could well be perceived as an attempt to reduce
the impact of the Chinese encirclement.
According to a Chinese military journal, India's forays into
Afghanistan and the Central Asian arena are "designed to achieve four
objectives: contain Pakistan; enhance energy security; combat
terrorism; and pin down China's development" [3]. As in the past,
Afghanistan has once again emerged as the "strategic knot" for the
region's security.
Afghanistan's significance for China is also due to the latter's
imperative of ensuring Pakistan's security. Pakistan, which is China's
foremost ally in South Asia and has been instrumental in China's
emergence on the global scene, has been constrained by its lack of
geographic depth. Often referred to as Pakistan's lack of strategic
depth, this has been touted as a major weakness in Pakistan's military
confrontation with India. Pakistan's military considers that a
friendly Afghanistan bestows additional strategic depth to the country
- this was one of the factors that led to Pakistan sup****ting the
emergence of a "friendly" Taliban regime in Kabul.
An adversarial regime in Afghanistan is perceived to be de****ing
Pakistan of this strategic depth and could also impinge on Pakistan's
security by making it contend with two simultaneous threats. Since
ensuring Pakistan's security is an imperative for China, it would view
any Indian ingress into the country with wariness, concern and
caution.
China, like Czarist Russia, yearns for access to the Indian Ocean and
the plan to build a major ****t in Gwadar on Pakistan's Mekran coast is
a step in this direction. This ****t would enable China to project its
military presence in proximity of the strategic global petroleum
****pping routes as well as the oil-rich Middle East. The economic
feasibility of Gwadar as a ****pping hub would be significantly
enhanced were it to be linked to Central Asia and China by road and
rail links. Once again, since all such trans****tation links between
Gwadar and Central Asia have to traverse through Afghanistan, the
focal im****tance of the latter cannot be understated. According to the
US Energy Information Administration, "Afghanistan's strategic
location could make the country an im****tant pipeline transit route."
[4]
The vast expanse of the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which is
inhabited by the Uyghur Muslim minority, poses a security predicament
for China. Since the Uyghurs have strong religious and ethnic
traditional links with the natives of Afghanistan and the neighboring
Central Asian Republics (CARs), China is very keen that the militant
Islamic ideology of extremist elements such as the Taliban be
prevented from spilling over into Xinjiang.
Additionally, the presence of sizeable Western military forces in
Afghanistan is also a source of major concern for China [5]. China was
a major actor in the Afghan civil war and a key supplier of small arms
to the insurgents in the combined US-Pakistan effort to force a Soviet
withdrawal from the country. "Current Chinese interest in Afghanistan,
given its continuing civil war and virtual statelessness, is low and
relations are weak." [6]
This interest, however, would certainly grow once the situation
stabilizes since China's security imperatives directly translate into
its interest in a stable and moderate Afghanistan that is also free of
Western military presence. In line with its earlier practices, China
is exhibiting a policy of patience toward Afghanistan and
simultaneously making imperceptible inroads into the country through
growing economic relations and investment. These overtures would place
China in an influential position in Afghanistan once the Western
militaries eventually withdraw from the country.
In an indicator of China's growing involvement in Afghanistan,
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, during his visit last month to
China, indicated a desire for China, Russia and the SCO to play a more
positive role in bringing stability to Afghanistan, but without
getting into a conflict with the United States and NATO.
China's booming demand for energy and mineral resources, plus its
growing dependence on im****ted petroleum, has made Beijing
increasingly concerned with ensuring supplies of reserves and the
uninterrupted flow of oil at reasonable prices [7]. The resource-rich
CARs, having estimated oil and gas reserves of 23 billion tons of oil
and 3,000 billion cubic meters of gas respectively [8], have great
geo-economic significance for China as a source of fossil fuel.
While Afghanistan has no proven fuel deposits, it nevertheless offers
the easiest trans****tation route for the exploitation of the energy
resources of the CARs and is predicted to have substantial non-fuel
mineral resources essential for China's industrialization [9]. This
geo-economic significance of Afghanistan for China should not be
understated considering the latter's serious interest in the Caspian
Sea hydrocarbon resources and the growing Sino-Afghan trade which
reached $317 million in 2005-06.
China has also evinced an interest in a pipeline to the Arabian Sea,
with a view to im****ting gas and oil by supertankers from Gwadar, but
it should be noted that the Gwadar ****t project is still severely
debilitated by the absence of links to access the hinterland from the
****t [10]. As another option, China is considering trans****ting its
energy ****pments from Central Asia and the Middle East via tanker to
Gwadar and then by pipe or truck to western China through the
Karakoram Highway (KKH) [11].
Pakistan as a trade and energy corridor
The second option falls in line with what the Pakistani leader****p has
been harping on for the past few years - their vision of exploiting
Pakistan's geography as a Trade and Energy Corridor (TEC) for China
and other neighboring countries including India.
Just last month, Musharraf told a student audience at Beijing's
Tsinghua University, "Pakistan is very much in favor of a pipeline
between the Gulf and China through Pakistan and I have been speaking
with your leader****p about this. I am very sure in the future - it
will happen." Musharraf further elaborated that he envisioned improved
road linkages between the two countries as well as a rail link, a
fiber optic communications link and energy pipelines. He also
suggested the possibility of extending the proposed
Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline to China.
Interestingly, on the same date that Musharraf made this speech, the
Indian government announced the visit of its petroleum minister to
Islamabad to negotiate the possible extension of the proposed
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline to India and
renaming it as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas
pipeline.
Although senior Pakistani leaders have repeatedly alluded to the
proposal for the construction of an oil and gas pipeline connecting
Pakistan and China, there has been no official response or statement
yet on this suggestion from the Chinese leader****p. Despite the
evident potential of the TEC that Pakistan has to offer to China, the
latter has, at the declaratory level, shown only marginal interest in
the idea till very recently when China has started evincing a strong
interest.
Notwithstanding China's reticent and non-committal position on this
specific proposal, it is continuing sup****t and participation in the
major infrastructure projects in Pakistan that could be construed to
be components of the TEC. China's commitment to the construction of
Phase II of Gwadar ****t, the new international air****t at Gwadar, the
upgrading of the KKH and interest in investing in an oil refinery and
storage facilities are examples that substantiate the Chinese interest
[12].
This involvement of China in major infrastructure development in
Pakistan leads to the assumption that while there is no categorical
commitment on the TEC by China, it can be said with some confidence
that it will sup****t Pakistan's initiative, while maintaining a low
profile, because of political and strategic considerations. For ease
of analysis, the proposed TEC could be split into two distinct sectors
for development: a Trade Corridor and an Energy Corridor.
The Trade Corridor's starting point is the existing Karakoram Highway.
A decision to upgrade the 335 kilometer KKH was taken during
Musharraf's visit to China in February 2006. The envisaged upgrade
would widen the KKH from 10 to 30 meters, make it suitable for long
vehicles and allow it to remain functional the entire year. In
parallel with the KKH upgrade, China is also involved in the
construction of a new rail line linking Gwadar to the main
Iran-Pakistan rail line and is working with Pakistan to expedite
customs over the Sino-Pakistani highway with a view to creating a
stronger regional trade system.
On the Chinese side, a new extension of the Xinjiang railway up to
Kashgar (about 500 kilometers via the KKH from the Sino-Pakistani
border) has been completed while Pakistan has reciprocated by building
a dry ****t at Sust on the KKH, which was inaugurated by Musharraf on
July 4, 2006 [13]. In another related development, Iran has offered
Pakistan land access through its territory to Central Asia and
Afghanistan for trade in return for similar access to China through
the KKH [14].
A railway line along the KKH is also being considered as an integral
part of the TEC project. This would be used not only for trade
purposes but also to trans****t energy, in case a pipeline is not a
viable option. This rail track will be linked to Gwadar, where
oil-refining and storage facilities are planned to be constructed by
the Chinese. Pakistan has shortlisted a Chinese and a European firm to
conduct the feasibility study for this 1,000 kilometer rail-track.
In Pakistan, the 750 kilometer track starts from Havelian and p*****
through the Karakoram mountains up to the Pak-China border at
Khunjerab with the second part, consisting of a 250 kilometer track
being constructed inside the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Experts
estimate that this project could take 10 years to complete and cost
around $5 billion [15].
While the envisaged Trade Corridor comprising of road and rail links
could also be utilized for the trans****tation of oil and gas, a more
efficient means of trans****ting these commodities would be through
pipelines. These would make up the Energy Corridor component of the
TEC. In an address in Islamabad on May 23, 2006, former Pakistani
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said, "Pakistan and China are considering
a feasibility study for an oil pipeline from Gwadar ****t to western
China to trans****t China's oil im****ts from the Gulf. An oil pipeline
from Gwadar to western China would greatly reduce the time and
distance for oil trans****t from the Gulf to China. A major oil
refinery at Gwadar would further facilitate China's oil im****ts."
The Pakistani government presented a blueprint of the 3,300 kilometer
Karakoram oil pipeline during the first meeting of the Sino-Pak Energy
Forum held at Islamabad from April 25-27, 2006. This proposal entails
the construction of a 30-inch diameter pipeline from Gwadar till the
Khunjerab Pass capable of handling 12 million tons of oil per year
with an estimated construction cost of between $4.5 and 5 billion
[16].
China has also recently shown interest in reviving the dormant UNOCAL
pipeline project to pump natural gas from Turkmenistan to India
through Afghanistan and Pakistan. This could also then be extended to
China just like the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline.
Additionally, China's Exim Bank is financing an oil pipeline from ****t
Qasim in Pakistan's south to the country's north. This pipeline would
cater for 75% of Pakistan's future oil needs and it has been under
construction by China's Petroleum Engineering and Construction Company
since June 2006 [17].
Conclusion
China's strategic interests in Afghanistan are multi-dimensional, but
in its view any substantial advancement in Sino-Afghan ties is
contingent on stability returning to this war-ravaged country and
foreign forces withdrawing from its soil.
Energy-hungry China is also keen on capitalizing on the convenience
that Afghanistan and Pakistan offer for the exploitation of energy
resources of Central Asia and the Middle East, and is working in this
direction. As regards the utilization of Pakistan as a TEC, it appears
that while the Trade Corridor could be expected to be established in
the near future, the activation of an Energy Corridor would take an
appreciable amount of time and could only be considered a long-term
possibility because of the enormous costs involved.
For China, therefore, the stability of Afghanistan emerges as a
priority while the prospects of Pakistan becoming a trade corridor are
more promising than it becoming an energy corridor in the short and
medium terms. Since the chances of China using Pakistan as an energy
corridor are remote in the short term, it can be concluded that
Pakistan should place equal if not greater im****tance on providing TEC
facilities to its South Asian, Central Asian and West Asian neighbors,
who are eager to tap Pakistan's TEC potential.
Notes
1. Tarique Niazi, "The Ecology of Strategic Interests: China's Quest
for Energy Security from the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea to
the Caspian Sea Basin," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4,
No 4 (2006) p 97-116.
2. John W Garver, "China's South Asian Interests and Policies," Sam
Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology,
prepared for panel on "China's Approaches to South Asia and the Former
Soviet States". US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 22
July 2005.
3. Srikanth Kondapalli, "The Chinese Military Eyes South Asia,"
chapter in Andrew Scobell and Larry M Wortzel, Eds Shaping China's
security environment: The role of the People's Liberation Army, US
Army Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006. The author has cited
this information from the editorial titled "India Participates in
Central Asia" which appeared in Bingqi Zhi****, Issue 197, No 3, 2004,
p 6.
4. See the US Energy Information Administration
5. "America's War on Terrorism and Chinese Strategy," published in
China Brief, Volume 2, Issue 5, February 28, 2002 by the Jamestown
Foundation.
6. Sujit Dutta, "China's Emerging Power and Military Role:
Implications for South Asia," Chapter in In China's Shadow: Regional
Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development,
Edited by Jonathan D Pollack and Richard H Yang.
7. John W Garver, op cit.
8. Asma Shakir Khawaja, "Pakistan and the 'New Great Game'," Islamabad
Policy Research Institute Paper No 5, Published by Asia Printers,
Islamabad, April 2003.
9. Significant Potential for Undiscovered Resources in Afghanistan.
United States Geological Survey Re****t.
10. Tarique Niazi, op cit.
11. Fazal-ur-Rahman, "Prospects of Pakistan becoming a Trade and
Energy corridor for China."
12. John W Garver, op cit.
13. Fazal-ur-Rehman, op cit.
14. Naqi Akbar, "Railways shortlist two companies for China rail link
study," The Nation, November 16, 2006.
15. Fazal-ur-Rehman, op cit.
16. Ibid.
17. Stephen Blank, "China's recent energy gains in Central Asia: What
do they ****tend?" CACI Analyst, October 31, 2007.
Tariq Mahmud Ashraf is a retired air commodore from the Pakistan Air
Force. A freelance analyst on South Asian defense and nuclearization
issues, he has authored one book and published over 70 papers and
articles in journals of repute.
(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with
permission.)
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