DELIVERING ON RAUL'S PROMISES
2008-04-22. The Latell Re****t, April 2008
Raul Castro has delivered only a few major speeches during the
twenty-one months since he took the reigns of power, a period of time in
which his brother would typically have emitted a hundred or more. Public
performance has never been Raul's forte.
Despite decades of trying to improve his delivery, his oratory still
falls flat. He rarely says anything inspiring or unrehearsed. As in his
inaugural address on becoming Cuba's new president on February 24, he
almost always reads methodically from a script.
But surprisingly, what seemed for so long to be a deficiency that could
undermine his ability to govern in his own right turns out to be a
critical asset. Cubans are relieved they are no longer required to
listen to interminable speeches, especially if, as so often in the past,
they had to stand under a blazing sun for hours at a time.
They appreciate that they are not being imposed on or hectored, as they
were, by a leader obviously unsympathetic to their daily plight. And
they are grateful now not to be summoned to march in manifestations of
revolutionary fervor for causes that have no bearing on their real needs.
In part Raul's leader****p style is calculated to enhance his popularity
by contrasting himself favorably with his brother. Raul knows he was
feared and despised by many Cubans who remembered vividly his part in
brutal executions and repression, and has therefore been intent on
improving his standing. Since a long article (La Cercania de Raul), a
paean that dramatically contrasted him with Fidel, was published in May,
2006, Raul has increasingly presented himself to the Cuban populace as
the un-Fidel.
He is not contemplating any political opening. But he is elevating
popular expectations for economic and social decompression with promises
of major structural and conceptual change, and then delivering on them.
Cubans are aware too that nearly all of the promises Raul made in his
February speech represent significant breaks from fidelista orthodoxy.
His brother would not have permitted any of the initiatives Raul has
undertaken.
• Consultation with the Populace. During his early years in power Fidel
pretended to consult intimately with the m*****. He called it "direct
democracy," but of course it was neither. Raul's promises to engage the
people have been of an entirely different order. On February 24 he said,
remarkably, that Cuba has been "permanently opened to free debate." And
then to clarify his intent he added that we must "question everything."
Under Fidel such doubting would have been branded as
counterrevolutionary. So I thought that after about five million Cubans
engaged in tendentious debates about Cuba's myriad domestic problems
last fall, Raul might retreat from such potentially destabilizing
promises. But he made them even more explicit in his most recent speech.
"The best solutions," he said, "can come from a profound exchange of
differing opinions."
•
• Easing Hated Official Restrictions. Raul reiterated an earlier promise
to "reduce excessive prohibitions and regulations." Fidel's preference
for what Raul described as "the enormous amounts of meetings,
coordination, permissions, conciliations, provisions, rules, and
regulations" had caused debilitating inefficiencies, even gridlock. Raul
promised that the "most simple of them" would soon be lifted. And a
number of potentially significant reforms have been taken or outlined in
the two months since his speech, including ones to reduce restrictions
on home owner****p; sales of computers, DVDs, cell phones, video players,
and other appliances; as well as access to hotels previously off-limits
to Cubans.
• Wage and Monetary Reform. The system of dual currencies first
introduced by Fidel in 1993 is one of the most alienating and polarizing
policies the Revolution ever adopted. Raul promised a "progressive,
gradual, and prudent revaluation of the peso" and to delve into the
phenomenon of the dual currency." That cautious language indicates that
changes in this area will be among the most difficult to make. But more
modest steps have already been announced or presaged. Restrictions that
put ceilings on how much wage earners can make are being lifted. Raul
also promised "to protect and steadily increase the income and savings
of the populace, especially the least favored."
• Agricultural Reform. Last July Raul promised major restructuring in
the crippled agricultural sector, and a number of changes, whose impact
on productivity is not yet apparent, have been announced. Like the early
Chinese economic reform model, they seem intended to decentralize
planning, management, and marketing of food production while encouraging
greater private initiative. Raul has also hinted at the need for foreign
investment in agriculture, but has not yet revealed any plans.
• Changes in Government Institutions and Leader****p. On February 24 Raul
surprised most observers with the appointment of his alter ego, Jose
Ramon Machado Ventura, as first vice president of the Councils of State
and Ministers, and therefore first in the line of succession. A few
other new faces were added to the Council of State, and it seemed clear
that Raul was strengthening the hand of his closest and highest ranking
military and communist party associates. But in remarks during that
speech that have attracted little attention, he also promised that "the
composition of government" will be reevaluated later this year.
"Decisions about which changes may be required in institutions" as well
as "appointments" will be made. He made clear that his intent is a "more
compact" and streamlined system of government institutions. He seemed to
hint that capable civilian technocrats would gain influence, probably
including a number of representatives of younger generations.
• Decentralization. Raul signaled too that leader****p and institutional
changes, now undoubtedly under intense review, will result in much
greater decentralization. "Many believe," erroneously he implied, "that
solutions to every problem require a national measure."
He provided no specifics about the kind of restructuring he no doubt has
in mind, or about who in the current leader****p may rise or fall in the
reshuffling that will probably start to be unveiled in the next few
months. Once all that is accomplished, the true composition of Raul's
regime will be revealed. Certainly, some familiar faces in the highest
ranks of the civilian bureaucracy will be elevated or given substantial
new responsibilities, and some others, closer in the past to Fidel than
to Raul, will be eclipsed. And surely by then, anyone who may still
believe that Raul Castro is not actually calling the shots in Cuba ought
to understand that a new era has begun.
I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance provided by Vanessa Lopez,
my University of Miami student research assistant, in the preparation of
this re****t.
Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst and recent author of the
book, After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro's Regime and Cuba's Next
Leader, is a Senior Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed
American and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about
Cuba and Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He served in the early
1990s as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America at the Central
Intelligence Agency and taught at Georgetown University for a quarter
century. Dr. Latell has written, lectured, and consulted extensively.
The CTP, funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), can be contacted at P.O. Box 248174, Coral Gables,
Florida 33124-3010, Tel: 305-284-CUBA (2822), Fax: 305-284-4875, and by
email at ctp.iccas@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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