By Vincent Bugliosi /
10/05/08 "CommonDreams" -- - There is direct evidence that President
George W. Bush did not honorably lead this nation, but deliberately
misled it into a war he wanted. Bush and his administration knowingly
lied to Congress and to the American public =97 lies that have cost the
lives of more than 4,000 young American soldiers and close to $1
trillion.
A Monumental Lie
In his first nationally televised address on the Iraqi crisis on
October 7, 2002, six days after receiving the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE), a classified CIA report, President Bush told millions
of Americans the exact opposite of what the CIA was telling him -a
monumental lie to the nation and the world.
On the evening of October 7, 2002, the very latest CIA intelligence
was that Hussein was not an imminent threat to the U.S. This same
information was delivered to the Bush administration as early as
October 1, 2002, in the NIE, including input from the CIA and 15 other
U.S. intelligence agencies. In addition, CIA director George Tenet
briefed Bush in the Oval Office on the morning of October 7th.
According to the October 1, 2002 NIE, =93Baghdad for now appears to be
drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional
or CBW [chemical and biological warfare] against the United States,
fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a
stronger case for making war.=94 The report concluded that Hussein was
not planning to use any weapons of mass destruction; further, Hussein
would only use weapons of mass destruction he was believed to have if
he were first attacked, that is, he would only use them in self-
defense.
Preparing its declassified version of the NIE for Congress, which
became known as the White Paper, the Bush administration edited the
classified NIE document in ways that significantly changed its
inference and meaning, making the threat seem imminent and ominous.
In the original NIE report, members of the U.S. intelligence community
vigorously disagreed with the CIA=92s bloated and inaccurate
conclusions. All such opposing commentary was eliminated from the
declassified White Paper prepared for Congress and the American
people.
The Manning Memo
On January 31, 2003, Bush met in the Oval Office with British Prime
Minister Tony Blair. In a memo summarizing the meeting discussion,
Blair=92s chief foreign policy advisor David Manning wrote that Bush and
Blair expressed their doubts that any chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons would ever be found in Iraq, and that there was tension
between Bush and Blair over finding some justification for the war
that would be acceptable to other nations. Bush was so worried about
the failure of the UN inspectors to find hard evidence against Hussein
that he talked about three possible ways, Manning wrote, to =93provoke a
confrontation=94 with Hussein. One way, Bush said, was to fly =93U2
reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, [falsely]
painted in UN colors. If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach=94
of UN resolutions and that would justify war. Bush was calculating to
create a war, not prevent one.
Denying Blix=92s Findings
Hans Blix, the United Nation=92s chief weapons inspector in Iraq, in his
March 7, 2003, address to the UN Security Council, said that as of
that date, less than 3 weeks before Bush invaded Iraq, that Iraq had
capitulated to all demands for professional, no-notice weapons
inspections all over Iraq and agreed to increased aerial surveillance
by the U.S. over the =93no-fly=94 zones. Iraq had directed the UN
inspectors to sites where illicit weapons had been destroyed and had
begun to demolish its Al Samoud 2 missiles, as requested by the UN.
Blix added that =93no evidence of proscribed activities have so far been
found=94 by his inspectors and =93no underground facilities for chemical
or biological production or storage were found so far.=94 He said that
for his inspectors to absolutely confirm that Iraq had no weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) =93will not take years, nor weeks, but months.=94
Mohamed ElBaradei, the chief UN nuclear inspector in Iraq and director
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the UN Security
Council that, =93we have to date found no evidence or plausible
indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq.=94
The UN inspectors were making substantial progress and Hussein was
giving them unlimited access. Why was Bush in such an incredible rush
to go to war?
Hussein Disarms, so Bush =85 Goes to War
When it became clear that the whole purpose of Bush=92s prewar campaign
=97 to get Hussein to disarm =97 was being (or already had been) met, Bush
and his people came up with a demand they had never once made before =97
that Hussein resign and leave Iraq. On March 17, 2003, Bush said in a
speech to the nation that, =93Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave
Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military
conflict.=94 Military conflict =97 the lives of thousands of young
Americans on the line =97 because Bush trumped up a new line in the
sand?
The Niger Allegation
One of the most notorious instances of the Bush administration using
thoroughly discredited information to frighten the American public was
the 16 words in Bush=92s January 28, 2003 State of the Union speech:
=93The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.=94 The Niger
allegation was false, and the Bush administration knew it was false.
Joseph C. Wilson IV, the former ambassador to Iraq, was sent to Niger
by the CIA in February 2002 to investigate a supposed memo that
documented the sale of uranium yellowcake (a form of lightly processed
ore) to Iraq by Niger in the late 1990s. Wilson reported back to the
CIA that it was =93highly doubtful=94 such a transaction had ever taken
place.
On March 7, 2003, Mohamed ElBaradei told the UN Security Council that
=93based on thorough analysis=94 his agency concluded that the
=93documents
which formed the basis for the report of recent uranium transactions
between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic.=94 Indeed, author
Craig Unger uncovered at least 14 instances prior to the 2003 State of
the Union address in which analysts at the CIA, the State Department,
or other government agencies that had examined the Niger documents
=93raised serious doubts about their legitimacy =97 only to be rebuffed by
Bush administration officials who wanted to use them.=94
On October 5 and 6, 2002, the CIA sent memos to the National Security
Council, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and to the White
House Situation Room stating that the Niger information was no good.
On January 24, 2003, four days before the president=92s State of the
Union address, the CIA=92s National Intelligence Council, which oversees
all federal agencies that deal with intelligence, sent a memo to the
White House stating that =93the Niger story is baseless and should be
laid to rest.=94
The 9/11 Lie
The Bush administration put undue pressure on U.S. intelligence
agencies to provide it with conclusions that would help them in their
quest for war. Bush=92s former counterterrorism chief, Richard Clarke,
said that on September 12, 2001, one day after 9/11, =93The President in
a very intimidating way left us =97 me and my staff =97 with the clear
indication that he wanted us to come back with the word that there was
an Iraqi hand behind 9/11.=94
Bush said on October 7, 2002, =93We know that Iraq and the Al Qaeda
terrorist network share a common enemy =97 the United States of America.
We know that Iraq and Al Qaeda have had high level contacts that go
back a decade,=94 and that =93Iraq has trained Al Qaeda members in bomb-
making and poisons and deadly gasses.=94 Of Hussein, he said on November
1, 2002, =93We know he=92s got ties with Al Qaeda.=94
Even after Bush admitted on September 17, 2003, that he had =93no
evidence=94 that Saddam Hussein was involved with 9/11, he audaciously
continued, in the months and years that followed, to clearly suggest,
without stating it outright, that Hussein was involved in 9/11.
On March 20, 2006, Bush said, =93I was very careful never to say that
Saddam Hussein ordered the attack on America.=94
Vincent Bugliosi received his law degree in 1964. In his career at the
L.A. County District Attorney=92s office, he successfully prosecuted 105
out of 106 felony jury trials, including 21 murder convictions without
a single loss. His most famous trial, the Charles Manson case, became
the basis of his classic, Helter Skelter, the biggest selling true-
crime book in publishing history. The Prosecution of George W. Bush
For Murder is available May 27.
For more information visit www.prosecutionofbush.com
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