"David McDuff" <dmcduff@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
news:fmfta4lng11j07ouflv5f06i1sqv22ql3u@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> FW:
> [details omitted]
> Sent: 8/19/2008 10:39:14 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time
> Subj: The NATO Member****p Dilemma
>
> A bleak picture emerges. What Stratfor could say but doesn't, is that
> there are member states of NATO that are so weak and so exposed that
> they could in essence be conquered in a day, and that their conquest
> would also graphically demonstrate that NATO has gone defunct.
> Guerrilla resistance in such countries might continue a little longer,
> but there would probably be no place that NATO response forces could
> land, by air or by sea. Civil war cavalry guy Nathan Forrest said that
> in order to win, you've got to show up the "firstest with the
> mostest". If you show up firstest with the mostest and take the venue
> in question (the prize, the bone of contention) over totally, the
> response forces of the second guy (NATO) won't bother showing up to
> the party at all. Eastern Europe needs to do the "lift itself up by
> the hair" trick as demonstrated by Baron von Munchhausen, in terms of
> substantially improving its defense capability as quickly as is
> feasible. Put a different way, NATO needs to be buttressed and
> empowered in vulnerable locations at the behest of Eastern Europe for
> Eastern Europe. Only by rendering itself capable of being protected
> can Eastern Europe, with the help of NATO, put NATO into a position
> for helping Eastern Europe! For all I care, parts of Western Europe,
> which apparently don't really care or are even at cross ends to our
> aspirations, should be given the op****tunity to depart the alliance,
> if proven to be a liability and a dead weight. CEE needs to be urged
> by all good men and women, particularly in the dias****a, to lift
> itself up by the hair, or God (NATO) won't be able to help those who
> didn't bother to help themselves. Sorry about the mixing of metaphors.
>
> Juri
>
>
> NATO Member****p Dilemma
>
>
>
>
<http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/geopolitical_diary_nato_member****p_dilemma>
> August 18, 2008
>
> NATO foreign ministers will meet Aug. 19 to discuss responses to the
> Russian invasion of Georgia. The United States is pressing for
> immediate action - although what that really means is movement toward
> admitting Georgia to NATO, rather than actual action. The Germans have
> expressed sup****t for Georgia's member****p in the alliance, but the
> French and Italians appear to be hesitating, not wanting to trigger
> the confrontation with the Russians that would likely result from such
> a move. The newer members of NATO, those who formally belonged to the
> Warsaw Pact, tend to want aggressive movement to include Georgia and
> Ukraine in NATO. They want to see NATO assert itself, in order to be
> assured that the alliance will do that.
>
> The problem is not that NATO is incapable of moving rapidly to include
> Ukraine and Georgia; it is a matter of what it means to be part of
> NATO. NATO was originally an anti-Soviet military alliance. It
> consisted of well-armed and well-trained armies - British, West
> German, Dutch and others - all backed by massive U.S. power and
> nuclear weapons. An attack on Europe would have meant an attack on
> NATO, and the Soviets never tried that. Had they done so, they would
> have faced a very dangerous military situation. The risks were much
> higher than the gains.
>
> Most of today's NATO members have minimal military forces that are
> poorly armed and trained. As im****tant, the geography has ****fted.
> From a compact western European alliance, NATO has become a sprawling
> entity, ranging from an exposed and barely defended flank in the
> Baltics to - if they were included - totally undefended Ukraine and
> Georgia. The forces necessary to defend those two countries would take
> years and hundreds of billions of dollars to recruit, arm and train.
> NATO was once able to defend Europe in the event of war. At this
> point, and for a very long time, the best NATO could do is to make a
> gesture of defense, particularly in the case of the vast Ukraine.
>
> It is very doubtful that Western Europe has the will to develop a
> force capable of defending Georgia and Ukraine. Eastern Europe might
> have the will but not the resources, from manpower to technology.
> Thus, member****p in NATO for Ukraine and Georgia would be a gesture
> without content. We are reminded of French and British guarantees to
> Poland in 1939. The French and British knew they could not protect
> Poland. The Germans knew it. Even the Poles knew it. The hope was that
> Germany, fearing a war with Britain and France, would not risk
> attacking Poland. But the Germans knew they could defeat Poland and,
> more to the point, were pretty confident that the British and French
> were all talk, and that a declaration of war wouldn't mean all that
> much.
>
> The NATO principle is that an attack on one would be an attack on all.
> The assumption is that the Russians wouldn't risk a general war in
> Europe to threaten Georgia or the Ukraine. Alternatively, however, the
> Russians might view the threat of a general war as minimal, since the
> rest of Europe would not attack Russia from the West to defend
> Georgia. In other words, the Russians' hesitation to attack Georgia
> would depend on their estimate of the likelihood of an attack on
> Russia by the Germans and Poles in response.
>
> It is a risk Moscow might take. First, the Russians know the German
> and Polish military capacity - and the limits of available American
> power. Second, the failure to defend a member would destroy NATO's
> credibility and shred the alliance. Most of the foreign ministers
> meeting on Tuesday are fully aware that extending NATO member****p to
> Ukraine and Georgia not only would be merely a gesture, but also could
> set up a greater calamity for the alliance. The United States knows
> this as well, but is making the most aggressive gestures it can,
> knowing that NATO works by consensus and that a single dissent can
> block the move. Wa****ngton is sure that dissent will come from
> somewhere. In the meantime, it is making the most bellicose gestures
> possible, short of actually doing something.
Interesting. This fairly accurately explains the Finnish defense doctrine,
why we hesitate to join NATO, why we still have conscription, why 80% of
our
young men _want_ to do military service, and why we're able to mobilize
one
of the biggest conventional armies in Europe. After Ossetia, nobody should
wonder why we have the third biggest artillery in Europe and why we don't
want to scrap our land mines. Our potential enemy is backward and
unsophisticated -- what threatens us is a conventional war. Besides, the
enemy knows that conquering Finland would put him in a hopeless position,
infinitely worse than what the US has experienced in Iraq.
Like Molotov said, the Finns are a bloody stubborn lot.
I strongly recommend the same doctrine for the Baltics. NATO member****p is
OK, but you must have the will and the means to make a potential invasion
so
awkward that Russia thinks twice before even contemplating one.
Regards,
John
|
